CONSCIENCE AND THEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION

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PART I

CHAPTER 1

THEOLOGICAL PROBLEMATIC

This dissertation is meant to be at once a work in theological ethics and in constructive theology. I will first treat the problem of theological construction and through this discussion will show how it leads into the problem of theological ethics.

It is abundantly clear to every Protestant theologian that Schleiermacher marked a turn in the manner in which theological construction is to be carried out. What Schleiermacher noted was that Kant's Critique of Pure Reason not only marked a watershed in philosophy but meant that the rationalistic framework of philosophical work could no longer serve as the framework in terms of which one could make out the meaning of the Christian faith. To continue to do so would be to force the church into being a religious ghetto. On the other hand, Schleiermacher saw that it was ignoring but not solving the problem of an adequate framework for theological understanding simply to appeal to the Bible as supernatural. The emergence of the modern historiographical method had closed off this possibility at least for Schleiermacher. For the historical understanding of the biblical material meant the end to the supernaturalist view of scripture. One might continue such a tradition, but again in Schleiermacher's mind this would result in forcing the church to be a religious ghetto.

The importance of Schleiermacher, then, lies not so much in novel theological ideas but, as he says, in the arrangement of the materials. That is to say, the importance of Schleiermacher lies in his attempt to work out a new framework in terms of which the Christian faith could be meaningfully articulated in respect to the emerging natural sciences and historical scholarship. This is the importance of the great Introduction to his major constructive work, The Christian Faith. As Barth indicates, Schleiermacher introduced an era in Protestant theology the influence of which Barth is not sure Protestant theology has been able to overcome.[1]

There are several distinctive features that one might single out as distinguishing the framework Schleiermacher set out in his Introduction. I want to call attention to just one, to wit, fixing upon the nature of man. It is in terms of Schleiermacher's conception of man as self-conscious and the proclamation of the Christian faith as addressed to man's consciousness that we see man's experience introduced into theological construction as the replacement of speculative metaphysics and supernatural biblicistic frameworks.

Lest I overstate this shift a qualification must immediately be entered. It cannot be said that theology previous to Schleiermacher did not understand the Christian faith as proclamation to man--to the center of his being. Rather, as will come out with more clarity in the next chapter, the shift is not entailed by a discovery of man but by the emergence of the necessity for a new conceptuality for understanding not only man but the world as well. Thus one distinctive feature of the era

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[1] Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 30.

Schleiermacher introduced is the effort to work out the meaning of the Christian faith in terms of a credible understanding of man, where by credible is meant an understanding consistent with the emerging sets of conceptions derived from the special sciences.

One could make a case for this problem formulation as the central axis around which main line Protestant theology has revolved since Schleiermacher. While Karl Barth, for instance, tries to move from the opposite direction, a central point with him is that man is not adequately understood apart from Jesus Christ. Thus Barth, while rejecting with Schleiermacher rationalism and the uncritical approach to the biblical material, sees the need for an adequate understanding of the ones to whom the Gospel is addressed. But in Barth's case this comes from the Gospel itself.

I take it that the point of all these efforts is that theology understands the Christian faith as related to the central springs of life of the person. That is to say, the message of the Gospel is not something incidental but is a matter of "ultimate concern", to use Tillich's expression.

The experiences of the first world war signaled for some at least a bankruptcy of the Schleiermacherian approach through religious experience. One might say that theological liberalism was too closely identified in the minds of many with the optimistic bourgeois mentality which received such a shock with the war.[1] But this raises of course a number of problems. For my purposes I need single out only two. First, even if one does not move in terms of religious experience in theological construction, one still has the problem of an adequate understanding of man to be handled.

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[1] Karl Barth, The Humanity of God (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960), p. 14.

Thus Karl Barth, as already noted, does his anthropology in terms of Jesus Christ. Secondly, there is the problem of making out in some conceptually adequate manner the relation of God to the world. We could say that for the Schleiermacher tradition this was done in terms of the feeling of absolute dependence. But how is this point of connection made out by the so-called neo-orthodox successors of Schleiermacher? For the most part they seem to have employed some form of existentialism (understood loosely in most cases) and so drew their anthropology in part at least from existential thought. This is probably most clearly the case with Bultmann. But the existentialism and its anthropology were rarely used in such a way as to specify conceptually a relation between God and the world. This in part has constituted the Barth/Brunner dispute over the years. Barth was bothered not by the fact that Brunner granted man too much, but that he granted man anything at all in terms of which he might know God on his own. God for Barth, "is not a thing among other things, but the Wholly Other"[1] or, as he writes further on:

> Man is a riddle and nothing else, and his universe, be it ever so vividly seen and felt, is a question. God stands in contrast to man as the _impossible_ in contrast to the possible, as _death_ in contrast to life, as _eternity_ in contrast to time. The solution of the riddle, the answer to the question, the satisfaction of our need is the absolutely _new_ event whereby the impossible becomes _of itself_ possible, _death_ becomes life, _eternity_ time, and _God_ man. There is _no_ way which leads to this event; there is _no_ faculty in man for apprehending it; for the way and the faculty are themselves new, being the revelation and faith, the knowing and being known enjoyed by the new man.[2]

While this is clearly a statement that would need some modification in terms of where Barth's thought finally ended, nevertheless it is representative of the thrust of the neo-orthodox retrenchment in the face of the so-called collapse of theological liberalism. This thrust stressed the primacy of God's revelation over philosophical reflection, and revelation was closely tied in one way or another to the biblical material. In every case the necessity of Christ was central. Philosophy, on the other hand, has to do only with the formal structures of actuality and, as can be intuited from the quotation above, these structures never include God. At most philosophy can clarify the formal structures, ask the right questions (Tillich) or point to the problematic of man (Bultmann); but it does not possess an answer. Part of the concern of this dissertation will be to indicate what is going on with this rejection of man or philosophic reflection as a starting point for theology's methodological reflection, so that what is rejected can be understood. Too often the wrong thing has been rejected and the real error of the rejected position has been taken up in the newer theological formulations. At this point we may say that the neo-orthodox mind-set which has characterized much of Protestant theology until the last few years ends in a cul de sac. For so long as it is maintained that God is not related to the world in terms of specifiable structures and processes, there is no way of understanding the relation of God to the world other than sheer miracle. That means that we have no way of understanding how to live the will of God. In short, it means that faith is really a surd element in the world.

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[1] Karl Barth, _The Word of God and the Word of Man_, trans. Douglas Horton (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 74.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 197.

One of the results then of neo-orthodox thought has been the so-called "death-of-God" theologies. Despite their wide differences, these theologies all seem to hold in common the impossibility of the "meaning" or "relevance" of a God who is beyond the structures and processes of this world. It is not surprising that Langdon Gilkey is able to make a more substantive link of the "death-of-God" theologies to neo-orthodoxy than to 19th Century Liberalism.[1] What is all the more ironic about the death-of-God theologies is that at least one of their number sees the death of God as liberating, and they all seem agreed that theology can go on without God. The central focus is Christology, usually through an emphasis upon the historical Jesus. I say this is ironic because the problem of Christology has always been that of setting out the relation between God and Jesus so that the Christ-event could be understood in its decisiveness for man. Just how Christology is possible without God is not too clear, but maybe we will find out.

On the other hand there is a more general problem with Christological formulation. This can be seen in Ott's analysis of the problem in reference to the historical Jesus. Ott compares the problem to the one that occupied Lessing. Lessing simply was unable to bridge the gap between accidental truths of history and the necessary truths of reason. Ott notes that the situation has changed since Lessing's time--we no longer speak of the necessary truths of reason--but the problem remains substantially the same and can be stated in somewhat similar fashion, to the effect that "historical judgments of probability can never furnish the ground for the certainty of faith."[2]

The point to note here is that of the problem lifted up by the historical-critical understanding of the biblical material. Can an adequate Christology be worked out in terms of the relativity of history?

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[1] The Voice (Crozier Theological Seminary), quoted in T.J.J. Altizer and Wm. Hamilton, Radical Theology and the Death of God (New York:Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1966), p. 27.

[2] Heinrich Ott, "Sprache und Verstehen", Kerygma und Mythos VI, (Hamburg-Bergstedt: Herbert Reich-Evangelischer Verlag, 1964), II, 22.

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That is a fundamental question which must be faced by every theologian today. What are the bases upon which Jesus of Nazareth is said to be the Christ? If I read contemporary theology correctly, these grounds usually devolve to faith, or Jesus as the full manifestation of what God is, love. Paul Tillich is one exception I know of who has made a sustained effort to spell out a criterion for a Christ figure.[1] As for Jesus as the full manifestation of God's love, this usually amounts to little more than an assertion. Daniel Day Williams is the only theologian I know of who has tried to spell out the nature of love with reference to Christological formulation.[2] But what of faith as a criterion? Is not faith adequate? Should we not say with Bultmann that the appeal to any criterion, to move in terms of anything outside of the strict relation of word and faith, is theologically illegitimate?[3] But if we allow Bultmann's argument, are we not trapped in a logic that will allow anything? Recent history has shown that people will believe almost anything. Can we afford the theological requirement of faith alone? In my judgment we cannot, and this will be an informing assumption of the dissertation.

Our efforts to this point have been simply to indicate the necessity for an adequate understanding of what gives theological statements their justification. Are they simply statements without warrant--which would relegate Christianity to an intellectual ghetto--or do they have

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[1] Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), I, p. 135ff.

[2] Daniel Day Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

[3] Cf., for instance, Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 40f, where the argument is couched in terms of security.

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warrants? If the latter, how can this be spelled out? I have tried to show in two crucial doctrines of the Christian faith, the doctrines of God and of Christ, that without such a framework for understanding theology becomes highly problematic at best.

In one sense at least this dissertation will be a sustained effort to spell out a criterion for theological construction through the development of an adequate understanding of conscience. This at once moves us into the area of theological ethics. Thus the informing vision of the dissertation is that the ethical may be one of the keys to constructive theological work in our time. It is my judgment that this orientation has something in common with the thrust of theologians like Harvey Cox who speak of the "political" as replacing the metaphysical for theological construction. Perhaps I should not put it that way, as that evinces a less than adequate understanding of metaphysics and probably of the political as well. Nevertheless I believe there is a commonality. It will not, however, be made out in the dissertation. Rather I want to focus upon the problem of theological ethics as that emerges in the debate over situation ethics, and in particular as this is found in the work of Joseph Fletcher, Paul Ramsey and Paul Lehmann. My thesis in reference to this debate is that the problem in ethical formulation is just one more exemplification of the more general problem of theological construction which I have gone over above. It is for this reason that a solution in the area of theological ethics will provide us with constructive theological possibilities, while at the same time exemplifying the constitutive relation of theology and theological ethics.

Joseph Fletcher gives ample evidence that there is a definite relation between the theological revolution (the terminology is his) taking place and situation ethics, which in his mind requires a new morality.

> Ours is a revolutionary era, one in which the change that is a continuous feature of civilization is abnormally rapid--due, I believe, fundamentally to the "new world" of thought and practice opened up by science and technology. Theologizing, or God-thought and God-talk, is never carried forward in a vacuum. Theology works in a socio-cultural context just as all human inquiry and reasoning do. And in sensitive response to the world revolution a New Reformation is taking shape.[1]

Thus it would seem clear that Fletcher sees something of the theological import of scientific and social change which prompted Schleiermacher to take up the problem of how theological statements are possible.

We may ask of Fletcher how ethical statements are possible. What are his criteria? We get a straight-forward answer. It is always love. It is not love understood abstractly but rather love understood contextually in terms of the consequences for persons.

He summarizes his position in the following statement:

> It seems to me that we can characterize the new morality as a shift away from moral law and precriptive rules and ontologically grounded values to situational particularities and to a commitment to persons rather than principles. My own way of formulating the essence of this is in two propositions: (a) We are commanded to love people, not principles, so that the needs of human beings come before adherence to any rule--although adherence to rules is often less opposed to human welfare than sentimental or unreflective persons may be willing to appreciate; and (b) We are to love people and use things, "things" including abstractions such as moral principles as well as material objects, so that the clue to immorality lies in loving things and using people--that is, subordinating persons to principles, thus reducing them from subjects to objects.[2]

The unreflective person may agree all too readily with Fletcher's analysis without questioning the import of what he says. An immediate implication of what he writes is that persons evidently have no unity, continuity or order to their lives in virtue of which valid principles might be abstracted in order to understand how to commit ourselves to persons. How could human welfare be gauged without principles, warrants or some kind of justifications? Are we to say that love is without structure? This does seem to be the thrust of Fletcher's argument despite the fact that he does not wish to do away with principles. They have their place, but essentially only as "maxims or guidelines or statistical preponderances about what is good and right"[1] which are thereby always open for revision and addition. I take it that the basic reason for this, besides the fact that he evidently does not believe persons and love have structure, is that he embraces what he calls relativism. My own judgment is that he embraces the relativism ingredient in modernity, but he seeks to ground this scripturally if not theologically by appeal to Is. 55:8-9: "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, says the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts." It is curious that the relativist Fletcher can be certain about this reference when he is so loose with scriptural injunctions otherwise.[2]

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[1] Joseph Fletcher, "What's in a Rule?: A Situationist's View", in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, ed. Gene H. Outka & Paul Ramsey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 326.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 328.

The point that Fletcher is concerned to make in asserting that situation ethics embraces relativism is that the "situationist will not and cannot absolutize _any_ kinds of laws or rules--natural, scriptural,

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 333.

[2] See for instance his discussion of the Decalogue! (_Ibid_., 335f.)

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or positive (whether ecclesiastical or civil)."[1] But again we might ask why Fletcher has not asked about the structure of relativity. Or does he assume that there is no structure to it? Can he be so unimpressed with the continuities of life as to believe that relativity cannot be understood? Even if Fletcher is right that principles may be only "statistical preponderances", is there to be no structure in view of which this is the case? Fletcher may want to go this far, for he does indicate that he sees his position as one of embracing nominalism. One virtue of such a position is that as Walter Muelder points out in respect to Fletcher, as contrasted with other contextualists such as Barth and Lehmann, Fletcher clearly shows the greatest appreciation for the empirical dimension in arriving at ethical judgments.[2]

Our discussion of Fletcher has indicated the strength of his position in respect to the empirical data, but it has also indicated a problem in his understanding of principles, persons and relativity. Paul Ramsey takes Fletcher to task for his depreciation of principles. In an exceedingly well argued contribution to Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, Ramsey sets out to locate an exception to ethical principles and rules. In brief it may be said that to the extent that there is an exception, the exception must have warrants; and if it is so justified, it can be universalized; and so logically there cannot be an exception.[3] Ramsey makes the argument out in terms of a spectrum of highest generality descending down to what he calls definite-action rules. The further we get from the highest generality the more of the spectrum is included and the closer we get to the concrete. Each level of the spectrum constitutes a genus for the species below it. Each species is thereby also a genus to what lies below it. Thus when Ramsey arrives at the lowest level of the spectrum, definite-action rules, he is speaking not about specific action but about kinds of cases. He is not moving deductively; rather there is always the necessity of exercising choice, of determining from the situation the relevant factors and deciding. There is no overcoming the gap between the universal and the particular for Ramsey except through decision. At least there is no way of overcoming it through universals.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 335.

[2] Walter G. Muelder, Moral Law in Christian Social Ethics (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1966), p. 19.

[3] Paul Ramsey, "The Case of the Curious Exception", Norm and Context. . ., p. 76f.

Ramsey addresses himself somewhat perceptively to the problem of the grounding of ethical principles of the Christian community when he discusses the canons of loyalty. It is in this context that he addresses himself to the problem of criteria for ethical judgments. To be sure the basic criteria come from the understanding of faith and this is what Ramsey makes out. He goes beyond Fletcher and Lehmann, however, by suggesting that the Christian makes the assumption "that the grain of things cannot ultimately prove unsupportive of the doing of our fidelities under the moral constitution God makes known in His word-deeds towards us."[2] Still this amounts to no more than faith being its own criterion. The direction of this dissertation is to indicate how the "grain of things" is supportive of the doings of God.

While I have hardly done justice to the full scope of Ramsey's perceptive article, I have singled out one important problem that he

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 101f.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 133.

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notes in the loose treatment of principles by the situation ethicists. Furthermore he also notes against Fletcher that no universals (principles and rules) are particulars. He thus draws attention to the gap between principle and act. Secondly, while Ramsey draws attention to the gap between principle or rule and act, he evidently does not believe this to be a fundamental problem. He simply states that here is where one must exercise prudence or wisdom. Possibly this is as much as a formal analysis of actions within principles will allow. It may be that another approach is necessary before the gap is seen as a substantive problem.

It is, among other things, to the problem of the gap between principle and act that Lehmann addresses himself.[1] I have saved the treatment of Lehmann to the last because in many ways his position is the most comprehensive theologically as well as being in some ways the most perceptive, and because he brings conscience back into the discussion of theological ethics.[2] Lehmann seeks to overcome the gap between principle and act through the phenomenon of conscience. His central point is that conscience is in need of a proper context in terms of which it will not be arbitrary, as he believes his analysis of the history of conscience indicates it to be. One should not be surprised to see that it is the Christian faith or the Koinonia which emerges as the context for authentic conscience.

While I think that all kinds of things are wrong with this move of Lehmann's, I want first to point out how important it is. The importance consists in the fact that Lehmann is closing the gap through theological formulation of the meaning of the Christian faith. Thus the Christian faith is understood as constitutive of true maturity.

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[1] Paul Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Context (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 152.

[2] I do not mean by this any particular criticism of Ramsey and Fletcher, for they did not set out to be as comprehensive as Lehmann.

The great problem in Lehmann is that for him it is impossible to talk about the structures and processes of maturity. Lehmann indicates that there is a kind of relationship between what he means by maturity, which he speaks of as the New Testament understanding, and "psychoanalytic connotations of the word 'maturity'." But unfortunately he nowhere spells out in any detail the New Testament understanding.[1] What he does is to assert without analysis that the "psychoanalytic theory defines maturity as self-realization through self-acceptance",[2] while the New Testament understanding is that "maturity is self-acceptance through self-giving."[3] The difference Lehmann points out is brought about, he believes, by the fact that psychoanalytic theory cannot recognize Christianity--that it must confine itself to man and his world--while "for Christianity, what is fundamentally human in human nature is the gift to man of the power to be and to fulfill himself in and through a relationship of dependence and self-giving toward God and toward his fellow man."[4]

It is true that Lehmann does not say in so many words in the passage cited that psychoanalytic theory cannot in any substantive form recognize Christianity for theory construction.[5] But that is what lies behind his remarks. This should be clear from the way he discusses the relationship between philosophy and theology. For it turns out curiously enough that theology is more comprehensive than philosophy. This results, in Lehmann's version of Barth, from the fact that what is a problem for philosophical ethics, namely the Good, is not a problem for theology which already knows the Good through the action of God.[1] Presumably the same holds for all disciplines of lower generality and so of psychoanalysts.

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[1] See p. 54 & p. 316 where he briefly touches on the subject.

[2] This is not documented. [3] Ibid., p. 16. [4] Ibid.

[5] The complicated issue of the relation between theology and nontheological disciplines will be taken up with some care in Chapter 6.

It is not simply the case that non-theological disciplines cannot or do not know God. It is also apparently a problem within the Christian faith as Lehmann sees it. For him the will of God cannot be generalized.[2] Thus, for Lehmann, since the ethical is response to what God is doing, and since God's will cannot be generalized, it follows that no approach to the ethical problem through principles will suffice.

Lehmann's informing vision here seems to be structured by his Barthian background to the effect that God is beyond man in such a way that man knows nothing of God apart from God's own gracious revelation which is focused in Jesus Christ. Lehmann does not articulate his understanding of God in terms of Barth, however. Instead he makes a brief excursion into Aristotle's _Politics_ and then to Abraham Heschel's work, _God in Search of Man_. His point, following Heschel, is that the process of conceptualizing distorts the character of religious knowledge. He goes on citing Heschel's insistence that concepts are to be windows that help us become "aware of the ineffable". He quotes Heschel:

> However subtle and noble our concepts may be, as soon as they become descriptive, namely, definite, they confine Him /i.e., God/ and force Him into the triteness of our minds. . . .To form an image of Him or His acts is to deny His existence.[3]

Lehmann comments on this as follows: "As a warning against abstraction, and especially against idolatry, this severe restriction upon the attempt to think and to speak about what God is doing in the world is as necessary as it is inescapable."[1]

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 274f. [2] _Ibid_., pp. 77, 130. [3] _Ibid_., p. 87.

I take it that what Lehmann means by necessary and inescapable is that it is inescapable because God is beyond or ineffable, and it is necessary in order to avoid idolatry.[2] At the same time Lehmann asserts that God's activity is man's command such that this activity is supposedly the means by which the gap between principle and act is overcome.[3] Our action is not to be based upon principle but upon God's activity which is instrumental for our coming to maturity. For God's action is always that of making and keeping life human.[4] My question is why Lehmann thinks that "making and keeping life human" is not a generalization of God's will. Lehmann's point seems to be that if God's will is generalized, then he has to do precisely the same action on each occasion, so that he would be "devoid of imagination."[5] But even on Lehmann's thesis, God does do the same thing, viz., humanization, only it takes proper shape according to the situation. It is hard for me, for instance, to see how a number of principles are not to be derived from such a statement as "it /the will of God/ is fundamentally and initially concrete, relational,

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 88.

[2] One might quarrel with the above to the effect that I have neglected the key to God's activity in Lehmann, that it is parabolic--but parables and parabolas are not without order or structure. Lehmann's way of using the parabolic is to say that God only touches the world at points. But surely he cannot mean that, for he also asserts that God's activity is ingredient in all ethical situations (p. 141). Therefore God's activity cannot be an occasional thing.

[3] _Ibid._ pp. 131, 152, 366.

[4] _Ibid._, pp. 14, 66, 73, 85, 112, 117, 152, 324.

[5] _Ibid._, p.141.

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and human, indicative of what belongs to the wholeness and the fullness of man's humanity toward man."[1] Why Lehmann does not believe so needs explanation. One reason is suggested by the following:

> For a Koinonia ethic the clarification of ethical principles and their application to concrete situations is ethically unreal because such a clarification is a logical enterprise and there is no way in logic of closing the gap between the abstract and the concrete. Ethics is a matter not of logic but of life. . . .[2]

It is my judgment that few ethicists in the past and present have thought that logic was expected to close the gap. As Ramsey points out, it was always seen by the great ethicists that something like prudence was required. Lehmann is surely right in drawing our attention to the importance of the problem of the gap between principle and act; but he only confuses the issue, in my judgment, by dismissing the possibility of a principled approach on the grounds that principles cannot do a job they were never meant to do! They are meant to be helpful in sorting out reality in a meaningful way. The decision is always ours. The problem of the decision, of the gap, is that of the proper direction, of the proper motivation or intentionality of our lives.

Lehmann has another, and in a way a more subtle, argument against the principled approach. It turns on the reality of evil which Lehmann believes is only taken seriously in rare instances by ethicists. Concerning the problem of ethical generality and evil he writes:

> Philosophical ethics cannot overcome such a cleavage /the gap between the ethical claim the the ethical act/ because the rational validation of the Good, to which it is methodologically committed, functions as a principle of inclusiveness which excludes what is unlimited. Ethically speaking, evil is the unlimited, whether as resistance to limit or refusal of limit. What evil means ethically is that the rational Good cannot give

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[1] Ibid., p. 248.

[2] Ibid., p. 152.

> direction and validation to human good. It cannot do so because the rational Good presupposes the possibility and applicability of ethical generalization to the structure of human self-determination. Evil cannot be excluded from the concrete ethical situation by the devices of excluding it from rational generalization.[1]

If I understand this argument aright it amounts to something like the traditional understanding of the effect of original sin or the Fall. I would not want to underestimate the reality of evil, but on the other hand there is the danger of overestimating evil. Lehmann's point appears to be that of the gap between ethical generalization and act; that somehow evil comes into the gap, into the concrete decision. As expressed biblically, "I do not the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do."[2] This is taken by Lehmann as invalidating the principled approach. But is this the case? Lehmann seems to grant that we may know the good rationally through a principled approach, but that this finally is of no avail, because this approach doesn't get us over the gap where evil somehow comes into play. If this is his reasoning, it is not clear to me how this invalidates the rational approach. If the rational approach can direct us to the good, I should have thought this to be a great gain even if there remains a problem of actually doing the good. Thus if this is Lehmann's argument it again amounts to a case of dismissing an approach for the wrong reason.

It may however be the case that Lehmann's point is somewhat more subtle. It may be that he means that ethical generalizations are of no use because the power of evil is so present in the world that the circumstances infected with evil simply cannot be encompassed by reason. The generalization itself partakes of evil (think of Freud on rationalization). Put more crisply: the dynamic power of evil outruns reason; our generalizations continually break down before experience. If this is Lehmann's argument there is more substance to it, but I do not believe it to be decisive.

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[1] _Ibid._, pp. 280-1. [2] Romans 7:19.

At this point I want to draw attention to the fact that in his appreciative discussion of Kant on evil, Lehmann cites approvingly Kant's pointing to the issue as being that of "a good or an evil heart."[1] He goes on to say that Kant derived this from the Bible. It could not, on Kant's own admission, have come from the pure principles of reason. At the same time Lehmann is quick to point out that "the Bible points to the ethical resources of Christianity for dealing with the very problem which the pure principles of practical reason cannot resolve."[2] Without denying the possibility that Christianity may have resources for dealing with such a problem, it should be pointed out that Kant's understanding of pure principles as unable to penetrate the problem of evil does not mean other approaches by means of principles are thereby excluded. Nor does the fact that Kant derived his insight into evil from the Bible necessarily mean that one could not come to such an insight otherwise. But if Kant and the Bible are right that evil is a matter of the heart, of motivation, then I should suspect that psychologists should be able to give us a number of principles that might be helpful in ethical formulation.

I want to consider at this point why it is that Lehmann is so against a principled approach. I have cited his theological reason in respect to God, his belief that principles will not help us over the gap between principle and act, his insight that evil often steps into the gap and that evidently the "heart" cannot be understood in terms of principles. Furthermore, I have indicated that I do not believe these arguments against principles will wash. How can we account for the fact that Lehmann believes these arguments will stand up? It cannot be a matter of perversity on his part; it must somehow lie in the way he perceives the nature of rationality, principles, abstractions and generality. I believe the clue for us lies in the typical stress that Lehmann gives to dynamics. God is always spoken of in terms of activity, or dynamics. Typical of this in reference to God and Christian behavior are these lines:

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[1] Lehmann, p. 183.

[2] *Ibid*.

> The fact is that the dynamics of the divine behavior in the world exclude both an abstract and a preceptual apprehension of the will of God. There is no formal principle of Christian behavior because Christian behavior cannot be generalized. And Christian behavior cannot be generalized because the will of God cannot be generalized.[1]

The connection that Lehmann makes between God and maturity naturally enough would predicate dynamics to the character of maturity. It is a becoming.[2] Evil also appears to have such a quality. It belongs to the class of the "unlimited".[3] It is a power that is not domesticated by reason.

On the other hand, principles have reference not to the concrete dynamic quality of life but to the abstract.[4] Principles and precepts have nothing to do with relations and functions.[5] An ethic of principle must find the ambiguities of life inadmissible.[6] The discussion of conscience indicates this same tendency. Lehmann speaks of the "domestication of conscience". He means by this the intellectual transformation

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 77. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 17. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 170, 180f, 280.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 152. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 124. [6] *Ibid.*, pp. 144, 146f.

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of the phenomenon of "the fierce and awesome internal arbiter" to a reasonable, rational conscience of principles. Its power, its dynamic quality, has been taken away.

I submit that what all this amounts to is that Lehmann identifies the principled approach with mechanics and abstraction. Therefore it follows that a move away from mechanics and abstraction to the concrete and dynamic is seen as a move away from principles and generality, and that this accounts for the inadequacy of reason. To a certain extent I believe we can agree with Lehmann. We can agree that the principles formed in terms of mechanics may very well be inadequate for the dynamics. But this surely must not be taken to mean that there are no principles of dynamics.

I believe the informing vision of Lehmann's thought can be summarized as follows. The central axis upon which everything turns is his division between the abstract and the concrete. The abstract is formal, rational, logical, general, static, absolute, unrelated, whereas the concrete is material, translogical,[1] living, particular, dynamic, functional, related. God as revealed in Jesus Christ is not some abstract formula--rather he is the living God who is involved in the concreteness of life, forever making and keeping life human. Therefore no principled, generalized approach will suffice. Such an approach really amounts to avoiding the real dimension of the ethical which is always the concrete. Thus God is spoken of as dynamic, as beyond the reach of the abstract and hence to attempt to conceptualize God amounts to idolatry. Additionally it would follow that because evil is dynamic it too cannot be grasped by principles, and so no philosophical approach can do justice to the ethical dimension.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 248.

With a more adequate understanding of the nature of abstractions as continuities within the concrete, such a radical division is pointless. Such a radical division between the abstract and the concrete is not only wrong-headed but is positively misleading. I have already indicated my conviction that Lehmann's division is predicated upon understanding the abstract in terms of mechanics or the classical world view and the concrete in terms of dynamics. A more adequate understanding of the difference is that the abstract has reference to those continuities within the concrete. It is something that is lifted out, it is the structure, the order of the concrete. Just as there are principles of mechanics so there are principles of dynamics. Thus Lehmann should have attempted to make out the principles involved in his central principle regarding man and God--to wit, maturity. Lehmann speaks continuously of the "principle" approach as "vague and enigmatic"[1] and "devoid of behavioral precision,"[2] etc., whereas the Koinonia approach has precision. However, I detect nothing but vagueness in such phrases as "I am to do the will of God,"[3] "involved in what God is doing in the world," and "making and keeping life human." These injunctions are devoid of what it takes to make and keep life human. The way Lehmann writes, it is as if life has no structure, as if we can never draw conclusions based upon continuities within experience. But the gap which he makes so much of is not a gap between the abstract and the concrete. Rather it is a gap between knowledge and action. It is a matter of motivation.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 344. [2] *Ibid*., p. 77. [3] *Ibid*., p. 344.

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Lehmann at times fixes upon the problem of motivation, but obscures the problem when he makes more of the gap than is warranted. Since he believes the gap is not to be surmounted in any rational way, the problem of adequate motivation lies beyond the bounds of reason.[1] For Lehmann the problem is resolved only in the Koinonia.[2]

I propose in what follows in this dissertation to explore the way in which this gap, the problem of motivation, can be legitimately addressed. This will be done along the lines marked out by Lehmann in terms of conscience. But contrary to Lehmann I will not be so much primarily interested in a concrete context for conscience as in the decisive feature Lehmann sees in his concrete context (the Koinonia), to wit, God's action of making and keeping life human, or maturity. One might do this from the nature of maturity as this is discoverable in the biblical materials and of course set this out in terms of principles. Having once done this one might then show forth the systematic relations of these with non-theological conceptions of maturity. Lehmann does neither for reasons that should by now be sufficiently clear. Or one might attempt to make out the nature of maturity from non-theological understandings and relate this to theological understandings. I choose to do the latter and will utilize the principles governing growth and development into maturity for working out an adequate conception of conscience. In the effort it is hoped that the problem of motivation can be shown to be addressable in a rational way.

Having worked out a conceptually adequate conception of conscience I will utilize this as a framework for constructive theological purposes especially in respect to the doctrines of God and of Christ.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 186.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 360f.

It may be objected that the project as outlined is doomed to failure, because it is the Schleiermacher "mistake" all over again only in more up-to-date understanding of growth and maturity. I believe the latter to be true, but not necessarily that it is mistaken. For it is also the case as has been seen that the same problem of an adequate framework for theological construction is still with us. I propose self-consciously to work at such a framework somewhat after the manner of Schleiermacher, i.e., in terms of anthropology.[1] The theological tradition of Barth and Lehmann rejected Schleiermacher's approach because of its anthropology. It has been argued that their approach through Christology by way of faith has come upon its own problems. Thus another effort along the Schleiermacher lines may be in order.

There is a more substantive point in moving in terms of anthropology. My argument is that the theological position of Lehmann and for that matter of Fletcher and Ramsey precludes the substantive use of a non-theological disciplines. There is for them no positive appropriation from such disciplines for constructive theological purposes. I believe such a procedure makes theological construction impossible. But Lehmann would reply, as he does in Ethics in a Christian Context, that it would mean the scuttling of faith to draw criteria or substantive understanding from a non-theological discipline. Lehmann seems to believe that if maturity is possible without Christ then there is no point to Christian theology.[2] In my judgment this is wrong. The problem is quite complex, involving the question in what sense if any a discipline could be non-theological. This will come out in the dissertation in the discussion of the problem of theological construction. For the present the following should suffice to set out the position taken in the dissertation in respect to this problem. It is assumed that Jesus Christ is the central focus of the Christian faith and that it is theology's task to understand this event. The effect of the life of this man and the effect of the Christian story have unquestionably transformed the history of the world and human lives. It is not necessarily assumed that ill effects have not occurred or that these might not outweigh the good. The point is that there is sufficient evidence to say that somehow there is power in the Christian story that potentially may help men become whole. The purpose guiding the dissertation is to specify in conceptually adequate ways the nature of this transforming power so that it may be tapped for healing rather than for keeping people immature. Put in another way, the purpose is to make out the generality that is contained in the particularity of the Christian faith. It is not meant that the power may not be manifest apart from the Christian particularity; only that for the Christian this power is to be appropriated in terms of the particularity of the Christian experience of this power. It is assumed that the creative power of life is only manifest in particularity, in some form of concreteness. In this I am in agreement with Lehmann. There is no experience nor appropriation of this power in general. But this must not be taken to mean that it is without structure as Lehmann would indicate. For then we would have no way of appropriating it and furthermore we would be left with the problem of explaining the continuities of life.

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[1] I am not, however, planning anything like the schematic structure of Schleiermacher's Introduction.

[2] Ibid., p. 121. But see, e.g., p. 158f, where he seems less rigid on this point.

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PART I

CHAPTER 2

HISTORY OF CONSCIENCE

Introduction

In this chapter I will review what from my study of the history of conscience appear to be the main features of that history in the Western tradition. The purpose is to enable me to specify what it was about the idea of conscience that led to its demise in our tradition.[1] No pretense is made here to furnish the "full-length study of what has happened to conscience in the Western cultural tradition" which Lehmann has called for.[2] Indeed my treatment has something of the same purpose as Lehmann's own, even if my conclusions differ. At the same time my treatment is intended not simply to account for the demise of conscience but also to indicate something of a typology of the view of conscience in our tradition. Thus the treatment will of necessity have a generality which makes for inexactness for any particular thinker. This is compensated for in nearly each type by attention to one or more specific thinkers. Because of the important place that the nature of the self has in the history of conscience, I have given careful attention to the nature of the self where this has seemed

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[1] A glance at almost any recent introductory text in ethics will convince one of the fact that conscience has not enjoyed a favorable mark in ethical theory at least.

[2] Ethics in a Christian Context, p. 327.

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germane. The types of conscience I have singled out are: (1) the afflictive, (2) the legislative or rational, (3) the intuitive, (4) the empirical, (5) the psychoanalytic, (6) the empirical-rational, and (7) the social-psychology conscience. The social-psychology conscience will be treated in the summary.

The whole direction of the account is designed to fit the substantive aim of the dissertation, and so the account of the history of conscience seeks to make out on its way the possibilities for reconstruction of the idea of conscience. This aim takes sharper focus in terms of the theological purpose of the dissertation when I come to treat of the sixth type of conscience, which I see exemplified in the creative thought of Ernst Troeltsch, the dogmatician of the Religionsgeschichtliche Schule. Troeltsch combines the rationalistic and the empirical types of conscience and has constructive programs in both theology and ethics which have a systematic point of connection. Because of the comprehensive character of his work I have given extensive space to the consideration of his program and why it collapsed.

The Afflictive Conscience

The first general type I want to single out can be labelled the afflictive conscience. I single this out first because it appears to be the primary datum for any theory of conscience. One writer asserts that without the experience of conscience by ordinary men and women "it is scarcely possible that ethical theorists would have any subject matter with which to concern themselves."[1] I am going to take this very seriously in this study. This primary datum must not be set aside by sophisticated theory. Rather the theory must make sense of the data. It will be one of the implicit arguments of this study that the "demise of conscience" has not had so much to do with conscience as with the theoretical understanding of it.

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[1] Bernard Wand, "The Content and Function of Conscience," Journal of Philosophy, LVIII, No. 24 (Nov. 23, 1961), p. 765.

The general characteristics of the afflictive conscience can be summarized as follows. As its label implies, it is afflictive. The experience of moral affliction which has come to be known as the experience of conscience seems to be fairly wide-spread. Some authors believe it to be a universal phenomenon among civilized peoples.[1] The affliction results from the sense of having transgressed one's own sense of right and wrong. The stress is upon its affective and powerful aspect, with whatever rational aspect there might be in the background.

In the Western tradition this experience has come to be known as conscience apparently through the popular tradition among the Greeks and is reflected in the New Testament materials. The fundamental point seems to turn on the guilt of having transgressed the code, and implies that if one does such then one will be afflicted by conscience until the situation is rectified. The reference of the afflictive conscience is therefore largely to the past.[2]

Concerning this type of conscience, Pierce asserts that it is not a source of knowledge or religious insight.[3] The reason for this is not clear. He evidently believes that the experience is wholly affective with no cognitive aspect in any form. Pierce additionally asserts that the afflictive conscience does not have reference to the acts of others, but convicts one of his own acts.[1]

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[1] Crane Brinton, for instance seems to indicate such to be the case, in A History of Western Morals (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1959), p. 30f.

[2] C. A. Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament (London: SCM Press, 1955), p. 43.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

Pierce's work, Conscience in the New Testament, is probably the most careful study of the linguistic origin of συνείδησις and its Greek brothers. Pierce finds that συνειδησις

> is used by every possible sort of writer: by philosophers and poets, by tragic and comic playwrights--and who more in touch with popular usage than the comedian; by historians and novelists; by engineers and physicians; by orators and rhetoricians; by learned critics and simple commissioners of domestic inscriptions; by writers of private correspondence. It is in fact an 'everyday' group of words expressing a commonplace idea--truly popular, and belonging rather to 'folk-wisdom' than to 'popular philosophy'--or, rather, second hand philosophical jargon.[2]

From the extant linguistic data of συνείδησις from the 5th Century B.C. through the 3rd Century A.D., Pierce concludes that the function of conscience in this tradition is that of a kind of internal governor of man's moral activity such that when he steps out of line he has conscience--i.e., the experience of affliction. Pierce notes that this function is understood in terms of the nature of things. Conscience is understood in "its connection with. . .the fixed and determinate order of things-as-they-are."[3] As an element in the fixed order it is only natural to trace it to the orderer of the universe, God. Pierce concludes his remarks on the meaning of conscience as follows: "The office of the συνείδησις for which God implants it in man, is to protect him from harm, physical and moral, not to teach, either morals or anything else."[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 42. [2] Ibid., p. 17. [3] Ibid., p. 40. [4] Ibid., p. 52.

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The connection with the nature of things places conscience in the context of the rational, of the structure of things. In making out my typology I do not mean to say that these are necessarily exclusive. Rather, I believe there is continual overlapping. Pierce swings too far in the non-cognitive direction. Nevertheless, I believe he does focus our attention on the dominant tendency of the afflictive conscience.

The Legislative or Rational Conscience

Whereas the locus of the afflictive conscience is the experience of moral affliction on the part of a transgressor, the locus of the legislative conscience is the philosophical tradition of the Greeks. As opposed to the afflictive conscience, the emphasis of the legislative is upon the rational rather than the afflictive; its reference is at least as much toward the future as toward the past; it is a source of knowledge for guidance as much as of warnings for violations.

I said that the locus of the legislative conscience is the philosophical tradition of the Greeks. Yet no work on conscience makes this connection to my knowledge except in reference to the Stoics. Specifically I want to trace this to Plato. Yet Pierce has indicated that the moral use of συνείδησις appears in Plato's works only twice,[1] and that other uses indicate that Plato used the word more in technical senses.[2] I am not so much interested in the instances of συνείδησις and its brothers in Plato as in Plato's understanding of man. For it is this general understanding of man which appears to have been basic in the Western tradition and in terms of which therefore the phenomenon of conscience was understood. Just how this latter is the case will come out

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 132ff.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 21f.

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as I proceed.

What I propose to do is to set out something of Plato's understanding of man as a model for understanding the structure of the legislative conscience. I do not pretend that my statement is in any sense the only understanding of man that can be derived from Plato. Indeed it is agreed by most commentators that there is no consisent understanding of the key element, the soul, in Plato. What I will do is to set out that understanding of man in Plato that appears to have been picked up by the Neo-Platonists and carried in the Christian tradition, thereby giving shape to the Western tradition.[1]

For Plato, man is a temporary union of body and soul. The more important partner in this union is the soul. To understand the nature of the soul for Plato we have to consider the reasons why Plato introduced the notion of the soul. In part, of course, it was to combat materialism which Plato felt was destructive of the moral life. But I am concerned with the structure of Plato's thought, not the occasion for it--though these are not to be set off as necessarily mutually exclusive. A fundamental intuition for Plato is that the sensuous cannot be a basis for rational knowledge--because the sensuous is always changing, and knowledge clearly could not be something forever changing.[2] Knowledge must be based upon that which is unchanging.[3] On the one hand Plato held that we do have knowledge and on the other that the world is appearance or change. How does Plato account for this knowledge and equally how does he account for any relationship between the worlds of the changing and the unchanging? For knowledge supposedly is in order to give us guidance in the midst of the ever-changing. The soul is Plato's answer.[1] The soul was in the realm of the forms--the unchanging--before its union with the body. Because of this it can be said to know the forms. On the other hand the knowledge that the soul possesses has been obscured through the body and the ubiquity of the sensuous. Thus it is not the case that no effort is required; rather it is the case that the soul and the body (so as not to stand in the way of the soul) must be properly nurtured. But the soul is also the point of connection between the changing world of appearances and the unchanging world of the forms. As occupying an intermediate position it is a mixture of the changing and the unchanging.

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[1] Julius R. Weinberg, A Short History of Medieval Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 9-24. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Image Books, 1962), Vol. I, Part 2, Chs. 45 & 46; Vol. II, Part 1, Ch. 3. Paul Shorey, Platonism: Ancient and Modern (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1938).

[2] Plato Republic 474B-480.

[3] Plato Phaedo 78.

How is the soul to be understood? There is some dispute on this matter, but for our purpose we can say that Plato held the soul to be tripartite. There is the rational part of the soul, the spirited part and the appetitive part.[2] To quote one author, these stand for the following: "The reflective aspect seeks understanding and wisdom; the spirited seeks success; the appetitive, the lowest form of desire, seeks bodily pleasures or means to them, especially money, food, drink, and sex."[3]

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[1] See Francis M. Cornford's summary of this in his translation and commentary, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (New York: The Liberal Arts Press: 1957), p. 2ff.

[2] Plato Republic 434D-441C.

[3] Robert I. Watson, The Great Psychologists (New York: Lippincott Co., 1963), p. 32.

The highest part of the soul is the rational part. It is meant to be the governor of the other parts because it is the divine element.[1] Plato's point is a very crucial one for understanding the self. The rational part of the soul is the basis for the unity of the self.

> The just man does not allow the several elements in his soul to usurp one another's functions; he is indeed one who sets his house in order, by self-mastery and discipline coming to be at peace with himself, and *bringing into tune those three parts*, like the terms in the proportion of a musical scale, the highest and lowest notes and the mean between them, with all the intermediate intervals. *Only when he has linked these parts together in well-tempered harmony and has made himself one instead of many, will he be ready to go about whatever he may have to do*, whether it be making money, satisfying bodily wants, or business transactions, or the affairs of state. In all these fields when he speaks of just and honorable conduct, he will mean the behaviour that helps to produce and to preserve this habit of mind; and *by wisdom he will mean the knowledge which presides over such conduct.*[2]

The unity of the self, then, is a function of the governance of the rational over the spirited and appetitive parts. It appears that where Plato speaks of the soul as having lost its peculiar virtue or having a defect,[3] what he means is that the spirited or appetitive parts have gained control. This is what happens in the man who is guided by the changing world of the appearances.[4] The unity of the self rests upon the proper functioning of the rational part of the soul. The question is, why should this be the case? It derives from Plato's fundamental commitment to order. It is always order that is rational, good, etc. The spirited and appetitive parts of the soul are not bad necessarily. They are so only when not properly ordered. Plato's model for order, for rationality, is the realm of the forms. Thus the unity of the self depends upon that which is really real or unchangeable.[5]

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[1] Plato *Republic* 590. [2] *Ibid.*, 442f. (Italics mine.)

[3] Cf. *Ibid.*, 353. [4] *Ibid.*, 441, 587. [5] Plato *Laws* 899, *Timaeus* 34.

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From the Timaeus[1] we see that the rational or divine part of the soul is "made" from the same elements as the World-Soul. Man is thus a microcosm of the macrocosm and the rational part of the soul appears to be the basis for this.

While the forms are understood as external to the mind of the Divine Architect in Plato (though not for later thinkers), it is clear that the forms are (1) unchangeable and (2) that the structure of the rational part of the soul must be such that it can know the forms--and this means that it must be unchangeable. The rationale for this unchangeableness is the principle that like only knows like.[2] Whereas the physical world could be said merely to reflect the forms imperfectly, the rational part of the soul was so constituted as to know the forms and thereby must be unchangeable.

In its kinship to the forms the soul is said to be incomposite, nonmaterial and unchangeable. However the soul is the point of connection between the world of Being and the world of Becoming. Thus far I have made out only the kinship to the world of Being where such qualities as unchangeableness make a kind of sense in terms of the understanding of the elements related. But what of the relation to the realm of Becoming? How does Plato hold the changing and the unchanging together in the soul? Briefly his answer is that the soul is fundamentally life or agency. The soul has the power of moving itself which Plato indicates to be "the very essence and definition of the soul."[3] But it is not clear that this indicates that the soul changes. For it may merely mean that the soul is the unchanging source of change. This appears to be the interpretation given by Demos.[1] It should be noted that the motion or activity of the soul which engenders change in things evidently is not to be understood as physical motion but as spiritual motion, which is understood as thought.[2] However the problem is to be resolved, it is clear that the weight of things in respect to the nature of the soul is in the direction of causa sui. The soul is a substance that is the cause of its own movement.

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[1] 34-44.

[2] Francis M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1937), pp. 58 & 142.

[3] Plato Phaedrus 245, Laws 894.

All this movement which Plato imputes to the soul has as its goal the Good.[3] The soul is programmed, so to speak, to desire the highest Good,[4] which is possible because the soul knows the unchanging forms of the Good from its existence prior to union with the body. Despite the fact that man desires the Good and has the knowledge of the Good in his soul, he often acts contrary to this because what he knows is not conscious. Thus Plato gives much attention to cultivating the soul so that man will actualize his desire for the Good in accordance with knowledge rather than the transitory pleasures that result from the world of appearances. To be sure, the Good is "greater than justice and the other virtues"[5], but it is through these that one arrives at a vision of the suprarational Good.[6]

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[1] Raphael Demos, The Philosophy of Plato (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), p. 80 and "Plato's Doctrine of the Psyche," Journal of the History of Philosophy, VI:2 (April 1968), p. 137, n. 10.

[2] Demos, "Plato's Doctrine of the Psyche", Ibid., p. 138ff.

[3] Plato Philebus 20, Republic 502-504. [4] Symposium 205-206.

[5] Republic 504. [6] Symposium 210-212.

On my understanding of Plato the phenomenon of conscience at least as afflictive does not loom large. There are a couple of passages such as in the Symposium where Plato speaks of the impact Socrates has made upon him and how bad he feels when he then "succumbs to the temptation of popularity."[1] But these are isolated instances, and the reference quoted speaks of the impact of a particular individual. On the other hand, a case could be made for the drive for the Good as a guiding conscience coupled with a knowledge of virtue. In part it may be that Plato does recognize an afflictive conscience in a general way because virtue is knowledge. Hence if one knows the right then one will do it. Transgressions only result from ignorance. Still one might want to make a case for the disunity of the person that results when reason is not governing the soul as an affliction of conscience.

However such may turn out, my concern is not so much with conscience in Plato, as was indicated initially, as with his understanding of the nature of man. In summary the following has emerged. Man is a temporary union of body and soul. The soul is his true being and the highest part of the soul is reason, which makes him akin to the forms. The true perfection of things is seen only in the forms. Thus man's true perfection is in terms of the forms, and so his unity depends upon the governance of his soul by the rational part of the soul. The soul is the source of agency. It moves itself. Its movement is not like that of things--rather the source of its movement is its own thought which in turn has its basis in the longing for the Good.

It may be well to pause here and briefly compare the understanding of the nature of things in Pierce's version of the afflictive conscience and Plato's understanding of man in the nature of things. Pierce spoke of conscience in "its connection with. . .the fixed and determinate order of things-as-they-are."[1] When this order is violated by the individual he has conscience in the sense of affliction. But evidently for him the nature of things is not a guide. For Plato it would appear that the rational as the real is a guide toward the Good. What receives little emphasis is the nature of things as a punisher, in terms of affliction at least. But both make an appeal to the nature of things.

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[1] Ibid. 216.

I have said that Plato's understanding of man provides the locus for the legislative view of conscience. It is in the Greek tradition, with its emphasis upon order both macrocosmic and microcosmic, that we have the background for the development of natural law.[2] In the tradition of the legislative conscience it is natural law, the rationality of things, that is the home of conscience. We have seen in Plato that man's soul is rational and that it is akin to the reason of things. As tradition worked itself out, natural law resulted. Thus when we get to Cicero we find:

> True law is right reason in agreement with Nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrong doing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by Senate or People, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchanging law will be valid for all nations and for all times, and

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[1] _Supra_, p. 29.

[2] James L. Adams, "The Law of Nature in Greco-Roman Thought," _Journal of Religion_, XXV:2 (April 1945), p. 98f.

> there will be one master and one ruler, that is, God, over us all, for He is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge.[1]

The following points should be noted from this quotation. First there is the connection of the natural law with God. It is his law and as such is fundamental to the nature of things. Secondly, as God's law it is unchanging. Thirdly, it apparently has force in itself. That is, it commands and makes prohibitions. "But what can wickedness contribute towards lessening the annoyances of life, commensurate with its effect in increasing them, owing to the burden of a guilty conscience. . . ."[2] This command of the natural law appears to be part of what Cicero means by conscience. For additionally he seems to mean that the clear conscience is a testimony to the unity of self. "I do not set much store by what others think of me; my own conscience counts for more with me than the verdict of all other people."[3]

What we see growing up then are a number of terms which may be equated with conscience: "the voice of reason," "the voice of nature," "the command of the law and conscience," and "the voice of God." It is worth noting that this tradition picks up the afflictive conscience and carries it with it. One is to obey conscience upon the pain of affliction. Thus conscience is operative here not simply as a negative force but has a positive function which is primary. We see the two views of conscience held at once in many instances with the Church Fathers. For Ambrose conscience is an interior judge "according to the state of his conscience within him. That is an accurate and incorruptible judge of innocence and guilt."[1]

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[1] Cicero De Republica (trans. Clinton Walker Keyes), III, xxii, 33.

[2] Cicero De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (trans. H. Rackham), I, xv-xvi, 51.

[3] Cicero Ad Atticum, XII, 28.

We see both lines in Augustine. It is evident that Augustine follows a general Platonic version of the self though he clearly holds the immortal soul to have been created by God and so not ungenerated.[2] For Augustine, the soul is living (active),[3] immutable,[4] incorporeal,[5] incomposite,[6] and a rational substance,[7] created in order to rule the body and as such immortal.[8] By substance it is clear that Augustine means to designate a being which can exist in and by itself, though the precise sense is not always clear.[9] Augustine also maintains that the soul can suffer defects, that the mind sometimes is stupid and other times is wise.[10] Augustine's solution to the problem is roughly to distinguish between essence and accident. Thus while the accidents change, the essence of the soul does not change.[11] Augustine also employs a hierarchy of being such that the superior or higher is never passive to the lower. Man then is essentially active with respect to every form of being, with the single exception of God. Thus it finally is not proper to speak of God as substance, for he is absolutely unchanging and therefore should properly be referred to only as essence.[1] It should be noted that while the soul is active with respect to all inferiors, it is passive with respect to itself; thus it can remember and experience time.[2] For Augustine the soul is constituted by the forms, as is the mind of God, which reflects the transition effected by the Neo-Platonists.

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[1] Ambrose De Officiis, 1, 12--(PL,16, 40) quoted in Father Eric D'Arcy, Conscience and Its Right to Freedom (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961), p. 13.

[2] Augustine The Soul and its Origin 1, 4, 4.

[3] The Immortality of the Soul 3, 3. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. 2, 2.

[6] Ibid. 3, 3. [7] Ibid. 10 and On the Magnitude of the Soul 12 & 13.

[8] Ibid. (Immortality. . .) 3, 4.

[9] The Trinity 3. 5. 10 cited in Immortality of the Soul 2. 2, n. 1.

[10] Immortality of the Soul 5. 7. [11] Ibid.

With this Platonic model in mind, then, it is not difficult to see how Augustine holds that the soul in its essence at least is unaffected by the sensations. The soul has impressed upon it the eternal ideas of the mind of God. The impression is what the mind of man sees; there is no direct vision of the mind of God.[3] These eternal ideas constitute the immutable standards for reasoning and judgment. It is in terms of these, then, that the soul is to guide the body. For Augustine the rational order of things, the law of nature, is in man's rational source which is for Augustine man's conscience.[4]

While the dominant note in Augustine's understanding of conscience is guidance in terms of the unchanging mind of God, there is also the clear note of the afflictive conscience in Augustine. "There is nothing in all the dungeons of this world, nay, not even in hell itself, to surpass the dreadful doom of darkness to which a villain is consigned by remorse of conscience."[5]

From this brief examination of the soul and conscience in Augustine

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[1] Augustine _The Trinity_ 5. 4, 5, and 7. 5. [2] _On Music_ Chs. 8-11.

[3] _The Trinity_ 7. 3. 4.

[4] For documentation see Herbert A. Deane, _The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine_ (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1963), p. 86.

[5] Quoted from Deane, _Ibid_., p. 84.

I want to stress the following: first there is the unchanging nature of the mind of God; second is this unchanging nature as reflected in the soul which entails the unchanging essence of the soul; third there is this rational essence as guide and judge.

Brief as this account may be, it shows the general matrix of ideas that gives form and content to the classical tradition including St. Thomas. It is true of course that there are all kinds of specific differences within the tradition, especially with regard to the shift that occurs in Thomas's Aristotelian approach. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Thomas challenges what he takes to be the Platonic version of the soul, the differences are not decisive for the material with which we are concerned. For Thomas, the soul is the form of the body. It is not simply the case that soul and body come together in a temporary union. Yet the soul appears to be characterized by all the predicates we covered in the discussion of Plato's soul.[1] Nevertheless there are some points that can be easily covered by reference to Thomas which have not been touched upon as yet.

Gilson draws attention to the apparent fact that the idea of intention arises in the Western tradition from the Christian emphasis upon the relation of God and the soul.[2] The emphasis upon this relation pertains to the state of the soul, its intention, and away from (though of course not necessarily neglecting) the actual acts which followed from the intention. Gilson notes that this emphasis upon intention is in marked contrast to the objectivism of the Greek moralists. Thus whereas for the Greeks one might say that virtue consisted in objective determination according to specific acts, for the Christian tradition there is a shift from the outward act to the will. Intention is understood as an act of will. For this tradition a great deal of attention came to be paid to the idea of intention. A man is shaped by his intentions.

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[1] Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica Part I, Question LXXV.

[2] Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 344f.

> Man tends to his ends by simple acts, but to attain them he has further to choose, that is to say to will, the means. This choice, in its turn, presupposes a rational deliberation, and this deliberation brings our intellectual and moral virtues into play, and lasts until the will, now judging itself sufficiently enlightened, decides upon this means rather than upon that. The operation is thus analysed into a number of distinct elements, but, in reality, a single movement runs through it from end to end: that of the intention. It is by one and the same movement that we tend to the end and will the requisite means to the end.[1]

One might be tempted to think of the self as identical with its intentions. But for the classical mind this was not the case. For Thomas, at least, the soul is something subsistent where "subsistent" is meant to exclude "inherence of an accident or a material form,"[2] whereas intentions are clearly accidental in the sense that they could have been otherwise. Thus the soul is the mover behind all intentions, a mover which cannot be grasped in itself. As DeWulf puts it:

> Consciousness directly grasps my substantial ego in and through my activities. In thinking, in making decisions, in walking, I attain to my own existing substance. However it is important to note, that consciousness reveals only the existence of the ego, and teaches us nothing concerning its inmost nature. It tells us that the ego exists, not in what it consists.[3]

The material on intention in relation to the soul is important in itself, but it is also important for a particular shift that took place in the discussion of conscience at Thomas's time. It is to be noted that the shift to intention places the weight of things upon the subjective understanding of the person. Now it may be the case that objectively speaking the well-intentioned person is doing the wrong thing--that in fact the thing he should do according to his conscience is the very thing he should not do. According to D'Arcy, before Albert the Great the question of whether or not conscience obliges was always discussed on the objective level.[1] Albert and Thomas mark a shift maintaining that conscience is binding "in terms of the subjective firmness with which the judgment of conscience is held."[2] This conclusion receives a number of qualifications by Thomas, most of which are not especially germane to my purpose. What should be pointed out is that the history of the discussion indicates that conscience was not regarded as infallible nor did Thomas so regard it. For him conscience obliges not because of its infallibility but because of its firmness, even though it may be objectively wrong. Thomas is clear that at least in some cases the erroneous conscience is not binding.[3]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 347f.

[2] *Summa Theologica* Part I, Question LXXV, Art. 2.

[3] Maurice DeWulf, *The System of Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959), p. 81.

For Thomas, infallibility has to do with the first principles of moral reasoning. D'Arcy writes of Thomas:

> All ratiocination must begin from some principles which are "given", or it would never begin at all. The first self-evident principles for speculative reasoning do not belong to a special faculty, but to an innate habit, the νους or intuitive reason of Aristotle. So the first self-evident principles for practical, moral reasoning do not belong to a special faculty, but to a special habit, which is called synderesis. These habits cannot

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[1] D'Arcy, p. 85. [2] Ibid.

[3] E.g. where ignorance does not excuse as in the case of willful ignorance, Summa Theologica Part II, Question 19, Art. 6.

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be lost as long as a man enjoys the use of his reason.[1]

Finally we should note that for Thomas conscience is the act of application of such principles to concrete cases.[2]

The Intuitive Conscience

This type of conscience has its main roots, I believe, in British soil with its seeming aversion to speculative rationalism. Thus this type of conscience is not made out in terms of a known or knowable rational structure of the world. It comes close to, if it does not posit, the autonomy of morality and so the autonomy of a moral faculty. It amounts to a rational intuition into what is right in the situation. But what is right is simply intuited--its rightness is not in terms of natural law or any set of general truths. The focus is primarily upon the situation wherein one must act rather than upon the past. Therefore the dominant note is more that of guidance than affliction. Finally it is this type of conscience where there is the pronounced tendency to regard its dictates as infallible.

The works of Bishop Butler provide a good example of the intuitive conscience. Whereas in classical culture, as we have seen, the structure of things could be known through reason and reason in some sense served as the regulative or governing faculty of the mind, what we have in Butler are two regulative centers, reason or conscience and self-love. These two centers are supposedly of equal weight and should never really disagree; but since the calculations of reasonable self-love are always in terms of probabilities, it is really better to act in terms of the certainity of conscience especially if there is any doubt. So conscience has at least operational superiority. What we see reflected here is the view that certainty is the only real basis for action. With the rational tradition we saw this in terms of the preference for unchangeable standards as the basis for virtuous action. In the rational tradition such standards were worked out in terms of natural law. But with Butler as we have already noted there is a bias against speculative rationaliam and a preference towards empiricism. This is explicitly stated in the Preface added to the second edition of the Sermons in 1729.

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[1] D'Arcy, p. 45. [2] De Veritate Ques. 16, Art. 1 & Ques. 17, Art. 1.

> There are two ways in which the subject of morals may be treated. One begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things: the other from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or constitution; from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is, which is correspondent to this whole nature. In the former method the conclusion is expressed thus, that vice is contrary to the nature and reason of things; in the latter, that it is a violation or breaking in upon our own nature. . . .
>
> The following Discourses proceed chiefly in this latter method.[1]

It is to be noted that Butler says "chiefly", not "wholly." (We will come to his empirical approach to the nature of man for his moral theory below.) Because Butler does not take the way of inquiring "into the abstract relations of things" he has no standard or rule for conscience. Yet because he takes the empirical approach where judgments are only probable, he has not the certainty or authority that he believes moral action requires. Therefore Butler needs more than the empirical probabilities, however good. He needs a prepotent reason. This he finds in conscience; but because he does not take the rational approach, he does not have an appeal to an objective standard in natural law. Thus while he speaks of conscience as a moral faculty because it is involved in making judgments, giving direction and superintending,[1] it takes on a _sui generis_ character. It is simply an intuition into the rightness and wrongness of an action. For Butler any plain honest man who engages in a little reflection can see into the rightness or wrongness in any course of action.[2] It is my judgment that this set of understandings is the intellectual home of the idea of the infallibility of conscience. I do not maintain that in Butler we have the first occurrence of the notion of the infallibility of conscience; only that the requirement for certainty coupled with _no rationally explicable basis for judgments_ (such as natural law) requires something like the positing of an intuitive infallibility.

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[1] Joseph Butler, Sermons (New York: Robert Carter, 1844), p. vi.

I want to turn now briefly to the other center of regulation for Butler, namely self-love as made out in terms of his understanding of human nature. He understands human nature as a hierarchical organization of the various "principles" which make up human nature. The stress is upon hierarchy and organization. The lower level is constituted by the unreflective principles, appetites, passions and affections. The next higher level is constituted by self-love and benevolence (though self-love seems to come out higher than benevolence). Both of these principles are reflective. The highest of all the principles is conscience which is the supreme principle of reflection. Theoretically the principles of self-love and conscience will never disagree. Butler's argument with regard to the principle of self-love can be summarized to the effect that self-love is truly self-love only when adequately governed and that true self-love meshes perfectly with benevolence. For Butler, then, man is fundamentally a social being such that true self-love contributes to benevolence and benevolence contributes to his self-interests. All of the lower level passions, appetites and affections promote both the public and the private good.[1] Butler holds to what he designates as the social nature of man. "We were made for society, and to promote the happiness of it;. . ." This sentence goes on to stress the individual's interests: ". . .as we were intended to take care of our life, and health, and private good."[2]

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 45.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 49.

The over-riding theme then of Butler's principle of self-love is the stress upon the hierarchical unity of the various principles that make up human nature. Man is so constituted that truly enlightened self-interest leads to his own and social pleasure. The theme that the harmony of the individual and the social group leads to happiness is the key to the principle of self-love. But Butler has doubts about the unlimited use of the principle of self-love and happiness because of the difficulty of adequately foreseeing all consequences of a course of action.[3] To quote J. H. Randall on this point in reference to Butler on the passages cited:

> There are certain dispositions of mind and certain actions that men immediately approve or condemn, quite apart from their consequences, like treachery, indecencies, meanness of mind. As C. D. Broad remarks, God, who foresees all consequences, can be a utilitarian consistently; man, confronting the incalculable complexity of the moral life, with a candle of reason that casts a dim light, can scarcely afford to be without stronger means of condemning certain things as wrong and recognizing others as right, even though he cannot see what they will in fact lead to.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 30. [2] Ibid., p. 32. [3] Ibid., p. 150-52.

[4] John Herman Randall, Jr., The Career of Philosophy: From the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 771.

This is something of the insight of Butler. Whether or not he would ascribe to the vision of God as the ground of the rational intuition of conscience is not clear. At one point he does seem to come close to identifying conscience with the voice of God. However that may be, in his discussion of conscience Butler continually refers to the law of our nature. This law is the unity, the constitution of the self.[1] Yet he will not explicate this. Now if he explicated it according to self-love and the organization of the principles which self-love organizes, then it would be hard to understand the reason for conscience or rather the difference between self-love and conscience. Just what the law of our nature is, then, is hard to spell out unless he has in mind something like the rationalistic natural law. My own view is that this is indeed what is lurking in the background, but given his empirical commitment he will not take that path. He may also refuse to move in that direction because of a belief that such an approach is only for the few and not open for any plain honest man. Whatever the reason, conscience seems to hang in the air for Butler without any substantive connection to his naturalistic understanding of human nature as made out in terms of self-love.

I want now to look briefly at the nature of the self in Butler. Butler clearly employs what he calls the social nature of man by positing the operation of the principles of self-love and benevolence as coordinate in man. At the same time his approach is empirical, and so one might wonder if for him there is the same essential unchangeability of the soul or self that we saw in the rationalistic tradition. For all the stress on the dynamic factors (self-love, benevolence, appetites, passion, affection) and organization, one might expect a problem in Butler over the soul or the self. But such is not the case. Rather the shadow of the rationalistic tradition of the unchangeable essence of the self is ever in the background. Butler challenges what he believes to be Locke's teaching to the effect that because consciousness exists at different times, each successive momentary consciousness must differ.[1] Butler agrees, but asserts that in order for these to be a unity to the successive states of consciousness there must be an identity throughout them such that they are consciousnesses of the same self or living agent.[2] Thus for Butler the essential self lurks in the background as the underlying subject of all action. The difference again between Butler and the rationalistic tradition is that he refuses to enter much beyond the doorway of the speculative nature of the self. We have already seen this in respect to conscience where its authority becomes sui generis rather than being grounded on the natural law. Thus I believe we have here the beginning of the gradual erosion of the self in Western philosophy and psychology, and so the erosion of conscience and natural law. This results from a lack of any rationally explicable way of speaking of the self and natural law.

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[1] Cf. especially Sermon III.

The Empirical Conscience

For this type of conscience no appeal to any supernatural power or rationalistic standard is made. Indeed one of the characteristic features is a conscious effort to set aside the rationalistic approach in general. But once such an approach is denied there arise the problems of standards and locus of authority. Whereas the locus of authority for the rationalistic conscience could be said to be the immutable natural law, the empirical conscience sees the locus of authority in terms of the moral sense or sensitivity for the regard of others in terms of their expectations. The standard then is the standard of the expectations of the social group. In terms of these expectations, conscience has reference both to the future as a guide and to the past in terms of failure to fulfill the group expectations. Clearly the standard of social expectation does not provide any unchangeable standard. For some empiricists this opens the possibility for a workable and ethical understanding of conscience. For others this analysis makes conscience virtually useless as a moral guide in any sense. For given the apparent fact that there is no innate, infallible, uniform conscience, it is concluded that the idea is highly suspect,[1] or that it is only one of several things to be taken into account when deciding a moral issue.[2]

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[1] Joseph Butler, The Analogy of Religion (New York: Ivison, Blakeman, Taylor & Co., 1872), p. 260f.

[2] Ibid., p. 263.

It may be worth noting that much of the work of empiricists on conscience does in fact turn on principles.[3] Conscience is thought of as a matter of principles adhered to or transgressed. One might be inclined to think this an effort in terms of the structure of reality, but such is not the case. There is rarely any attempt to view such principles in any other way than simply the principles one chooses to live by. Thus we have a positivistic view of principles, not a rationalistic view. In terms of the work of the dissertation, it will be seen that a major weakness of this understanding of principles is that it envisions no dimension of depth to man. One consciously forms one's principles and reformulates them to meet new encounters.

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[1] R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 77.

[2] P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1956), p. 261f.

[3] Cf. for instance Gilbert Ryle, "Conscience and Moral Convictions," Analysis, VII (June, 1940) or John Thomas Granrose, "The Implications of Psychological Studies of Conscience for Ethics," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, 1966.

In my judgment it is not necessary to do much with the empirical versions of conscience since these are for the most part, to my knowledge, perjorative in character based on the relativity of conscience. What I want to draw attention to is the basis for this type of understanding of conscience, for empiricism is the dominant informing thought-pattern today, at least in academic philosophic circles. I will make out this basis with respect to Hume who is generally acknowledged as the forerunner of modern empiricism.

Hume can be understood in terms of his revolt against the rationalist tradition. For him the rationalist tradition is vacuous because it is compatible with any state of affairs. Its key ideas are not tied to impressions except through imagination.[1] His concern is to set knowledge and morality on a firm footing through the experimental method. All knowledge must be based upon human experience (except for mathematics) where this experience is understood as impressions and ideas. Hume believed that through an investigation of the nature of man and his experience a firm foundation for all disciplines would be reached, for "all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to

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[1] David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1955). Cf. p. 16, for instance, in the discussion of substance.

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human nature."[1] But before Hume has gone very far the possiblity of knowledge is severely called into question through his analysis of causation. What Hume finds is that we come to say that A is the cause of B when they are in the relation of contiguity and succession.[2] But clearly this is not enough to say A is the cause of B, since contiguity and succession may be evident without A being the cause of B. Thus he looks around for what we might term the actual or real connection which he terms "necessary connexion."[3] This, of course, raises problems immediately; for in terms of his methodology it is impossible to specify any necessary connection. Hume finally concludes as is well known that the relation of cause and effect arises in imagination through the multiplicity of impressions. There is no explanation beyond our customary habits.

My point with respect to causality is that Hume finally gets involved in the insoluble problem he does because he looks for a kind of causality that logically does not belong to the approach he is using and in fact is more at home in the rationalistic tradition. The same phenomenon can be seen when he comes to the problem of the self. Hume finds useless the ideas of immateriality of the soul, substance and just about all the language the rationalistic tradition used with regard to the soul.[4] The same holds for personal identity. In order for there to be a real idea of the identity of the self there has to be an impression which "must continue invariably the same, thro' the whole course of our lives; since self is suppose'd to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable."[5] All Hume can come across when he enters most intimately into the self is some particular perception but never a perception of the self apart from other perceptions.[1] Thus the self can be nothing more than a succession of diverse perceptions.[2] Holding to the diversity of perception precludes the self-identical sort of identity of the rational tradition. Hume proposes however to explore other forms of identity. To this end he writes:

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[1] Ibid., p. xix. [2] Ibid., p. 77. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid., Sec. V.
[5] Ibid., p. 251.

> We may observe, that the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other. Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas in their turn produce other impressions. One thought chases another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expell'd in its turn. In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts. And as the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation.[3]

This does appear to be the beginning of a viable form of identity which can take account of diversity. Unfortunately, as Hume came to see later, it violates the structure of his thought. "If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding."[4] Thus it can be seen that the search for the illusive "necessary connexion" proves to be the Achilles heel in another promising possibility to work out a viable idea of the self. So Hume concludes, "I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding."[5]

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[1] Ibid., p. 252. [2] Ibid., p. 255. [3] Ibid., p. 261.

[4] Ibid., p. 635. [5] Ibid., p. 636.

All of this should have had the effect of precluding Hume's entry into moral philosophy. The crucial point is that for Hume any real connection between things depends upon the specification of a "necessary connexion" which he has been unable to specify. Thus logically morality can be nothing more than imaginary connections. To be sure Hume did not stop with this. Rather he continued the general line of moral thought of Shaftsbury, Hutcheson and Butler.

To Hume's credit it must be noted that he apparently believed the problem of a real connection to be avoided through the fact that morality supposedly is "more properly felt than judg'd of."[1] With the appeal to "feeling" Hume is able, he believes, to overcome the illegitimate jump from "is" to "ought" that characterizes so much moral thought that moves in terms either of reason or of nature.[2] For Hume, conscience is identified with a sense of morals.[3]

It should be noted that Hume shares a concern of Lehmann's. For Hume is not so much interested in rational principles of conduct as in the springs of action; thus Hume's long treatment of the passions. For Hume reason will not suffice because it is inactive and "an active principle can never be founded on an inactive."[4] Hume appears to be saying that if morality is based upon reason then we still have the problem of the gap between the inactive and the active, which is precisely Lehmann's point.

While rejecting the rationalistic approach Hume does examine it and sets out two conditions which such an approach must fulfill.

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[1] Ibid., p. 470. The point apparently is that morality is not an intellectualistic affair but has what might be spoken of today as a more existential character.

[2] Ibid., p. 469f. [3] Ibid., p. 458. [4] Ibid., p. 457.

> In order. . .to prove that the measures of right and wrong are eternal law, obligatory on every rational mind, 'tis not sufficient to shew the relations upon which they are founded: We must also point out the connexion betwixt the relation and the will; and must prove that this connexion is so necessary, that in every well-disposed mind, it must take place and have its influence; tho' the difference betwixt these minds be in other respects immense and infinite.[1]

Hume, of course, regards these conditions as "impossible to fulfill."[2]

The Psychoanalytic Conscience

Probably the most popular understanding of conscience in present American thought, this perspective views conscience as an internalization of arbitrary restrictions of the social matrix of the early experiences of the person. It is not unfair to say that the Freudian conception of conscience as identified with the super-ego is conceived as a destructive rather than as a positive factor as it was in most of the other views. As Freud put it:

> It is a remarkable fact that the more moral he [the normal person] is the more sensitive is his 'conscience'. It is just as though we could say that the healthier a man is, the more liable he is to contagions and to the effects of injuries. This is no doubt because conscience is itself a reaction-formation against the evil that is perceived in the id. The more the latter is suppressed the more active is the conscience.[3]

With this understanding of conscience it is fairly easy to see why Freud held that therapy should seek to reduce the power of conscience over the ego.[4]

The importance of the psychoanalytic view of conscience must not

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 465.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 466.

[3] *Collected Papers*, V, p. 157, quoted in David H. Jones, "Freud's Theory of Moral Conscience," *Philosophy*, XLI (January, 1966), p. 37.

[4] *The New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1965), p. 80.

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be minimized. Freud was clearly an astute clinician who probed the depths of man in ways hitherto unsuspected. In my judgment, therefore, we must not attempt to side-step him through cheap dismissals but must in some sense go through him, penetrating his thought more deeply than he did. Nor should the import of Freud's conception of conscience be side-stepped through the penetrating analysis of David Jones, who notes that Freud errs by failing to distinguish between moral feeling (shame, remorse, guilt, etc.) and security feeling (dread, anxiety, fear, etc.)[1] I think that Jones is clearly right that Freud does fail to make a distinction between moral feelings and security feelings, and that this unnecessarily mars Freud's account. But it is not clear that the problem with respect to conscience is solved or helped appreciably by separating the two and consigning conscience to moral feeling. I will argue in a later chapter that while the distinction is an important and necessary one, there is a significant relationship that exists between them and that this relationship is crucial for an adequate understanding of conscience.

What I want to examine is the theorizing that led Freud to his conclusions about conscience. Freud stands clearly within the general rationalistic tradition we have examined. Just as the rationalistic tradition held the instincts to be irrational and in need of rational governance, so also does Freud. The decisive difference is that while the rationalist tradition posited the necessary rational governance as the function of a substantial self, Freud holds the instincts to be fundamental and the soul or ego (the rational aspect of man) not to be substantial but rather emergent, being "that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world through the medium of the perceptual consciousness."[1]

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[1] Jones, p. 38 & p. 53.

Freud does not examine the nature of the rationality that he supposes is ingredient in the world. He simply assumes the world is rationally ordered while the id is not, and therefore the ego represents the id's response for survival in the face of the requirements of the external world. In order to overcome the problem of relating the irrational and the rational, the goal of therapy is to make the id into ego.[2]

The essential logic of Freud's theoretical reasoning with regard to conscience is as follows. Freud works from an understanding of the person as fundamentally instinctual energy--the person is an id. The basic character of the id is that of erotic libido--aimed supposedly at sexual fulfillment. The emergence of the ego comes about, as already indicated, from the interaction of the id's perceptual system and the external world. The ego is simply a modification of a portion of the id. The ego functions as the guide for adequate coping with the world and governor of the instinctual energy of the id. As such the ego represents the rational element of man.[3]

It must not be assumed, as my account and most other accounts indicate, that the id was understood by Freud as simply irrational energy. What he means by id is simply the non-conscious instinctual energy of the physiological organism.[4] As such the id "is capable of being inherited" and thereby in it "are harboured residues of the existences of countless egos."[1] Thus the id and the ego are not as antithetical as the characterizations irrational and rational suggest. Indeed Freud writes: "One must not take the difference between ego and id in too hard-and-fast a sense, nor forget that the ego is a specially differentiated part of the id."[2] With this understanding of the id, it would seem that it must in some sense be characterized as rational. Thus the task of making the id into ego would not be too difficult.

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[1] Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans. Joan Riviere, ed. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1962), p. 15.

[2] Ibid., p. 46. [3] Ibid., p. 15. [4] Ibid., p. 14.

However, this is not the whole story. Problems develop because of the libidic character of the energy of the id. The reasons for considering this energy to be libidic are: (1) the need for some basis or principle for the dynamic feature of binding, of uniting and (2) the prominent place of sexual matters in clients Freud treated. The decisive reason is of course the second, for a number of principles might do for the first. We shall have occasion later to challenge Freud's first reason and to suggest an alternate which will be consonant with the second.

In any event, because the id is libidic the theory holds that there develops a libidic desire on the part of the child for the parent of the opposite sex. But such desire cannot be fulfilled by the son with respect to the mother so long as the father retains his position. This is what Freud speaks of as the Oedipus complex. In this anxiety and tension resulting from the three-way relationship, where Freud posits the unconscious fear of castration in the child, the desire for the mother is repressed. This is somewhat more complex, for Freud holds that nearly everyone is probably bisexual.[3] Thus there is repression with regard to two desired objects. It must be remembered that the mechanism of repres-

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[1] Ibid., p. 28. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 21f.

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sion is automatic according to Freud and wholly unconscious.[1]

The crucial point is that here we have the development of the super-ego. This comes about through the ego's intensifying its identification with the father in repressing the erotic desires for the mother. Identification is a process that has many varied forms, but it is the process where the object identified with is internalized in the ego. For Freud the identifications resulting from the Oedipus complex in its bisexual character really result in the two identifications becoming one, and this modification of the ego "confronts the other contents of the ego as the ego ideal or super-ego."[2] The super-ego is demanding in terms of what to do and what not to do.[3] A notable feature of the super-ego is "its compulsive character which manifests itself in the form of a categorical imperative."[4] It appears that it is in virtue of this inner guidance system and its categorical form that Freud believes he has located the source of the higher nature of man. The super-ego is for Freud the basis of religion, morality and social feeling.[5]

The source of the compulsiveness of the super-ego is explained in terms of the two instincts of the id--the life instinct (eros) and the death instinct. The life instinct or eros (the instinct in terms of which Freud accounted for the tendency toward unity in things) is the dominant instinct and as such holds the death instinct in check until it loses its hold. It loses its hold in the struggle it (the erotic libido) has in the Oedipal crisis. Through this struggle with erotic

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[1] Collected Papers IV, pp. 13-21 & 84-97, cited in Jones, p. 40.

[2] Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 24. [3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 25. [5] Ibid., p. 27.

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libido the ego produces desexualized energy (ego-libido) which it may employ.[1] But through this crisis the aggressiveness of the death instinct is released and is available to the super-ego, because the super-ego has a primary relation to the id through its origin by way of the id. It is this aggressive energy available to the super-ego that accounts for its compulsiveness.

If I understand Freud correctly, everyone necessarily goes through such a development. To be sure other identifications are made but none so fundamentally resistant to influence and of such lasting influence as the Oedipal identifications.[2] Later identifications "affect only the ego, they no longer influence the super-ego."[3] Therapy supposedly is the process whereby one can hopefully gain some degree of control over the power of the super-ego.

A major question that faces us is whether Freud is right in maintaining that the super-ego is or at least takes on the function traditionally known as conscience. The question turns on what one means by conscience. In my judgment the understanding that Freud has of conscience in its moral context (exclusive of his own thought) is that conscience is some kind of internal moniter that operates automatically and is its own reason, which is to say it does not appeal to or present reasons in terms of the reality principle. In other words, Freud is arguing against what he takes to be an essentially irrationalist position as this is manifest in religion, and against super-sensible views of morality including the Kantian understanding of conscience. I believe this is amply indicated by the fact that Freud speaks of religion, morality and a social sense as "the higher nature of man"[1] which psychoanalysis had been accused of neglecting. Thus to the extent that conscience is understood in a "super" or transcendental manner, then Freud believes he has found its locus in the super-ego. The logic of Freud's position entails that the super-ego is unconscious and that it should be overcome by the ego for behavior to be rationally creative. I realize that there is some ambiguity in the literature on this,[2] including Freud's own work where he seems at points to hold that the super-ego is sometimes not pathological.[3] In terms of the logic of the ideas involved, it is my conviction that conscience must for Freud always be regarded as pathological. I believe this to follow strictly from the unconscious character of the super-ego. For a good super-ego is a contradiction in terms, since it would not be rational, where by rational is meant open to ego scrutiny. The moment such rational scrutiny takes place, that element scrutinized becomes a conscious portion of the ego. I realize Freud assimilates the normal conscious functioning of conscience with his account of the super-ego,[4] but clearly such can only be legitimate when one leaves unexamined the rational basis (in terms of the reality principle) of the ego-ideal involved. On the other hand, one

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 34f.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 38.

[3] Freud, _New Introductory Lectures. . ._, p. 64.

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[1] The Ego and the Id, p. 27.

[2] Cf. Granrose, p. 97ff, for a review of some of the material as to whether the super-ego is the same as conscience and whether for Freud conscience is always pathological.

[3] Cf. for instance The New Introductory Lectures. . ., p. 67f.

[4] The Ego and the Id, p. 40f.

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would want to admit immediately that it would be impossible to scrutinize everything involved. Thus there is a sense in which one might feel compelled to say all behavior, as well as conscience, has pathological features. This will be taken up in Chapter 4.

I want to return to an aspect of Freud's thought already mentioned. Recall that for Freud the id was not just irrational instinctual energy. There is this element, to be sure, and in The New Introductory Lectures he states that the id "has no organization, produces no collective will, but only a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle."[1] Elsewhere Freud indicates that the pleasure principle is really more the avoidance of pain. The positive character of the id would seem to reduce, then, to erotic libido. At the same time, it will be recalled, Freud held the id to be modified by the experiences of countless past egos.[2] Earlier I noted that this would seem to mitigate against the strictly irrational character of the id, since the ego is formed in response to the reality principle. With this element of implied rationality we may also question why erotic libido should be thought of as so irrational if its purpose is that of binding, of uniting. I think Freud's answer would be something like this:

> The logical laws of thought do not apply in the id, and this is true above all of the law of contradiction. Contrary impulses exist side by side, without cancelling each other out or diminishing each other: at the most they may converge to form compromises under the dominating economic pressure towards the discharge of energy.[3]

Freud's view of rationality is that structured by the philos-

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[1] P. 73. [2] Supra, 57f. [3] New Introductory Lectures, p. 73f.

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opher's law of contradiction as if that were the only possible form of rationality. Therefore it follows that since this form of rationality does not structure the id, it must be non-rational. Freud of course does make appeal to the basic biological needs that aim for tension-reduction, such as hunger and thirst. It is not clear just how these are supposed to support the non-rational claim, however. For the body is a highly ordered system. Psychologically there may be problems in coming to deal adequately with this reality, but it is not clear how these instincts produce non-rational needs.

My point in pressing this issue is that it is not clear that the id must be understood in a non-rational manner. There may well be a rational character to it that escapes Freud's notice because (1) he was dealing with sick people and (2) because the only available form of rationality was inconsistent with his findings. If a model of rationality can be developed consistent with the clinical material with which Freud dealt, then a conception of conscience may be worked out whereby the super-ego as modified by an unconscious drive for rationality may take on quite a different theoretical character. In this reformulation the significant distinction Jones makes between security feelings and moral feelings will be seen within a framework whereby hopefully their relation will be clear. These problems will be taken up later in the dissertation.

The Empirical-Rational Conscience

For several reasons I want to present this type of conscience by focusing upon the work of Ernst Troeltsch. First, Troeltsch is a neo-Kantian and thus comes at the problem of conscience in terms of the

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general stream of the empirical/rationalistic blend. Second, Troeltsch's effort to bring the two streams together is quite self-conscious and so allows for relative ease of explication. Third, in terms of the dissertation, Troeltsch has intrinsic value, first because he wrestled with the problem of historical relativity and the problems it raised for theological construction; and second because he was concerned with the problem of ethical construction, and the relationship between this and his theological work can be shown with some explicitness. Finally, the major problems in working out a constructive view of conscience can be spelled out with some degree of specificity in Troeltsch.

The approach will be to make first some general remarks about the general structure of Troeltsch's thought and from these to become more specific, so that the fundamental structure of his constructive theological program is spelled out. Next his approach to ethical problems and conscience will be made out and how these are related to his constructive theological program. Finally, it will be shown just where the breakdown occurs in Troeltsch's program so that it may serve as a key for my own work.

The general outline of Troeltsch's thought can be approached through the following concerns of Troeltsch. He is concerned with the problem of validity that has been raised by modernity--the rise of the special sciences and in particular historical understanding. Troeltsch was convinced in this regard that only something absolute--where absolute means what it meant in the philosophical tradition, i.e., unchangeable--can serve as the basis for validity. He is quite clear about the fact that he holds with the Platonic tradition's emphasis upon absoluteness/

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unchangeability as the only basis for validity.[1] Troeltsch is also clear that he holds with the tradition in regard to the passions or instincts that drive men. They are essentially irrational.[2] Man "becomes" as he conquers his irrational instincts through the governance by rationality. Thus we see in Troeltsch a dualism which serves him in dealing with another of his major concerns, historical relativism. Historical relativism means for Troeltsch that no reality of this world is exempt from historical conditionedness.[3] This is based on his understanding of the task of history which in its theoretical aspect is "to explain every movement, process, state and nexus of things by reference to the web of its causal relations."[4]

> The causal explanation of all that happens, the setting of the individual life in its true relations, the interpretation of events in their most intricate interaction, the placing of mankind in a rounded system of cease-less change--these constitute the essential function and result of modern historical reflection.[5]

For Troeltsch the basis of this relativism lies in the nature of man as a dualism of the irrational, instinctual versus the rational, which tension never allows the rational to be perfectly realized in history.[6] This relativism and its brother, relative approximation of the rational in history, are simply the way things are.

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[1] Cf. for instance Ernst Troeltsch, "Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion," Harvard Theological Review, V (October, 1912), pp. 404f, 407f, 419; and Christian Thought, ed. Baron von Hügel (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), pp. 67ff.

[2] Christian Thought, pp. 71, 85-90.

[3] Ernst Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte (2nd ed.; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1912), pp. 24f, 52.

[4] Ernst Troeltsch, "Historiography," in Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (New York: Scribner's, 1914), Vol. VI, p. 718.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Christian Thought, p. 90.

Troeltsch worked basically in terms of Dilthey with some modification through Weber. But he was unable to follow Dilthey finally in Dilthey's union of psychology and history. This is not to be taken to mean that Troeltsch had no use for psychology. Rather it means that he came to see that one could not arrive at validity from an epistemology based upon psychology.[1] Troeltsch views the psychologistic tendencies in historicism as the source of relativism (in its non-normative sense).[2] He refused to take any non-historical way out of the problem despite refusing the psychologistic path. He saw the historicist point. There is no escape from the historical, no flight to an Hegelian spirit or to Absolute Reason. Thus Troeltsch writes that we must overcome history (meaning the problem of historical relativism) with history. His effort in this respect is essentially a Kantian transcendental deduction.

One more word is necessary with regard to the ground or basis of validity. Since for Troeltsch this basis had to be unchangeable, it could be conditioned by nothing temporal. As such it must lie not in history but beyond history. Therefore it is accessible only to intuition and faith.[3] But how does Troeltsch hold the Absolute and the relative together in a rational way which is accessible only to intuition?

Troeltsch's solution to the problem is two-pronged. On the one hand he posits the Absolute as "hovering before" history, calling as it were the historical to itself (the Absolute).[4] From this perspective the Absolute is always beyond history. On the other hand the Absolute is in history in a relative way. This is seen in the historical production of values.[1] Troeltsch holds that the great value systems of the world are approximations of the Absolute in history.[2] He posits no necessary rational development that human understanding could plot. Things can go many ways when one takes into account man's freedom and his instinctual energies. Finally it must be clear that the Absolute is never actualized in history--there are only relative approximations.[3] Now the question must be asked of how the Absolute hovering before history and the historical approximations are held together. What is the point of connection? How is the Absolute relatively in history?

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[1] "Empiricism and Platonism. . .", p. 420. [2] Christian Thought, p. 72f.

[3] Die Absolutheit. . ., p. 15. [4] Ibid., p. 58f.

For Troeltsch the answer is to be found in the nature of human consciousness. This consciousness contains an a priori structure reflective of the inner rational necessity of the Absolute.[4] It is in virtue of this grounding of consciousness in the inner necessity of the Absolute that historically conditioned values can claim any degree of validity.

This clearly is the Kantian method of dealing with the collapse of the rationalist tradition. Kant, it will be recalled, attempted to restore the situation he had so well critiqued. What he did was to introduce through the transcendental deduction the a priori conditions for experience to be at all. In effect we are cut off from the ideal forms--from any super-senuous reality known through pure reason. Nevertheless we can posit the objective reality of a specific range of phenomena if it is a necessary and indispensable form of experience, and seek through a transcendental deduction its categories, which simply means a determination of what the necessary elements are. Kant carried this out in respect to theoretical knowledge and ethics. He included religion under ethics. Understandably, some theologians who might otherwise go along with Kantian philosophy might demur at this reduction of religion to ethics. One way of solving the problem of such a reduction is simply that of extending the general Kantian approach to religion and so thereby introducing a religious a priori. While the old rational theology had been cut off to these theologians, they could argue the fundamental character of religious experience. This meant, of course, a transcendental deduction must be performed in order to determine the categories for religious experience to be in general the kind of experience it is. The ground of such necessary elements in the religious consciousness would, of course, be God. As Troeltsch writes,

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 60. [3] Ibid., p. 98.

[4] "Empiricism and Platonism. . .", p. 419f.

> Finally, and above all, justice to the religious sentiment is done only by a theory which does not put usefulness in the place of truth, nor substitute a quasi-physical action in the subconsciousness for the presence of God in the human spirit. In religion a relation to a whole, to an absolute, to something possessing inner necessity, is always indispensable.[1]

But by going to the a priori hasn't Troeltsch jumped beyond history to a non-historical answer? Troeltsch did not think so; at least, initially he did not think so. He believed these a priori structures to be revealed in the movement of history. His point was that one should, for instance, in regard to religion take the produced religions of the world and analyze them. Those religions and value systems that are enduring have endured precisely because they more closely approximate the Absolute. Therefore, in these enduring religions the a priori structures, categories, should emerge with some clarity.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 419.

We have here in germ the basic elements of the theological structure of Troeltsch. He is able, through the autonomous religious a priori, to hold the world and God together and to take account of the relativity of values through their differing approximations to the Absolute. The theological structure is most explicitly made out in Troeltsch's article, "The Dogmatics of the 'Religionsgeschichtliche Schule'."[2] Before spelling out this program I want to draw attention to the third aspect. This portion was composed of two sections, the metaphysical-religious statements on the one hand, and on the other the historical-religious statements. The metaphysical statements are those necessitated by the positing of the relation of the historical to the Absolute through the autonomous religious a priori--Troeltsch specifies the relation between God, man and the world.[3] Such metaphysical statements give structure and a normative character or standard for the ordering of the historical statements as these are determined through historical research and ordered through the particular essence selected for dogmatic construction. We will come back to this in a moment.

At this point I want to draw attention to the fact that it was in terms of the metaphysical statements, the religious a priori, that Troeltsch believed the relative absoluteness of Christianity in comparison to other world religions could be established.[4] For in this conception of things the relative autonomy of religion from its cultural setting allowed, Troeltsch believed, for the comparison of religions exclusive of their context. This is a crucial point to remember. Troeltsch makes the comparisons he does of the great world religions on the basis of the metaphysical in terms of the autonomous religious a priori. But the norm for the construction of the metaphysical statements comes from the Western tradition, so it is no wonder that Christianity appears to do justice most fully to the metaphysical statements.

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[1] Die Absolutheit. . ., p. 60ff.

[2] The American Journal of Theology, XVII:1 (January 1913).

[3] Ibid, p. 15.

[4] Ibid., p. 10; and Die Absolutheit. . ., p. 88.

What has just been gone over is the first part of Troeltsch's theological program, to wit, the establishment of the superiority of Christianity over other world religions.[1] The second part consisted of the determination of the peculiar "essence" of Christianity to be used in theological construction.[2] There could be no scientific determination of the essence according to Troeltsch as there could of the other aspects of the program.[3] Indeed his criticism of Schleiermacher, Hegel and Harnack, among others, was precisely on this basis--they each specified a universal essence to Christianity which according to Troeltsch's historical analysis would not hold up.[4] Troeltsch's own investigations of the history of Christianity revealed to him that the essence differed with the historical epochs. Therefore he defined the essence of Christianity formally as "the productive power of the historical Christian religion to create new interpretations and new adaptations."[1] Thus the actual material essence used to work out a constructive theology after Troeltsch's manner will be determined by what appears to be the meaning of Christianity for a particular time. This clearly would not be arbitrary, for a criterion could be worked out in terms of what would make life creative, etc. But it would seem to follow that various constructive theologies could be worked out for a given epoch on this basis.

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[1] It may be worth noting that Troeltsch did not believe that Christianity could not be surpassed, only that its emphasis upon personality would necessarily survive. (Die Absolutheit. . ., p. 91.)

[2] "Dogmatics. . .," p. 10.

[3] Ibid., p. 16.

[4] Ibid., p. 12. See also Die Absolutheit. . ., p. 27f.

The third task of the theological program was that of setting out the content of Christianity structured around the particular essence selected for constructive purposes.[2] We have already seen that there are two main types of statements. First are the metaphysical-religious statements which in addition to the Christian conception of God, world and man contain "also the mutual relations of these in the Christian conception of redemption; and, finally the outcome of redemption in the Christian conception of communion and 'the last things'."[3] Second are the historical statements which have to do with the particular determination of Christian piety and community with reference primarily to Jesus.[4]

With this outline of the structure of Troeltsch's constructive theological program I can make out his approach to ethics and the nature and function of conscience in his thought. Troeltsch is critical of what he takes to be a one-sided approach in ethics on the part of Kant. For in his mind Kant is much too formal in his almost exclusive emphasis on what Troeltsch refers to as the "morality of Personality and Conscience." While this is for Troeltsch "the one and only thread which guides us into the realm of standards beyond the reach of time or history,"[1] more is necessary for an ethic adequate to the modern situation. What is lacking according to Troeltsch is what traditional ethics referred to as goods or ends and which Troeltsch refers to as "cultural values" or the objective side of ethics in contrast to the ethics of personality and conscience as the subjective side.

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[1] "Dogmatics. . .", p. 12.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 13.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 15.

[4] _Ibid_.

What does Troeltsch mean by the "morality of Personality and Conscience"? Briefly put, we have a kind of transcendental deduction "from the nature of the moral consciousness."[2] The consciousness will have to include the fact that morality is always an action carried out by a moral personality. The end of action must be taken into account and such an end Troeltsch holds is the free personality.[3] "The idea of personality is the decisive idea. Out of the flux and confusion of the life of the instincts, the unity and compactness of personality has first to be created and acquired."[4]

The "ought" of moral experience, then, is understood as the distance between the instinctual and the perfected unity. Such perfected unity is understood as a purely "formal end, with the unity, centrality, homogeneity, consistency, and purity of intention of the personality, all considered as characteristics which ought to exist."[5]

Troeltsch goes on to indicate that there is a double direction involved here--with respect to oneself, and to one's neighbor. He adds

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[1] Christian Thought, p. 95. [2] Ibid., p. 77. [3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid. [5] Ibid., p. 78.

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further that these formal characteristics apply as a demand made not only of "single men but also of communities, so that not only individual but also corporate personalities are required."[1]

What Troeltsch is asserting here is that not only are men individually unities or have their individuality to the degree of their unity, but that the same holds for groups if not for actuality as a whole.

If I understand Troeltsch aright, conscience has its basis in the ought--the demand upon one to be a unified self. Thus under the conditions of existence where no perfect unity is possible, conscience is the act of working out the best unity of personality that is possible under the changing circumstances. Conscience is always a creative compromise between the conflict of nature and reason.[2]

As noted already, Troeltsch is clear about the fact that man does not live a purely formal existence. Rather he lives in the concrete historical world of change. Therefore the question of the substantive ends of ethics arises. Troeltsch makes these out in terms of the major institutions of society, i.e., "the Family, the State, Law, the economic control of Nature, Science, Art, and Religion."[3] The relation of these to ethics is the following. Each is studied by a science peculiar to it which attempts to understand in the most comprehensive way the data relative to the institution. The particular sciences attempt to understand (1) "the universal tendency which underlies the development of their spheres of life," and (2) "the character which they should assume, in the present and in the future, in virtue of these developments and of our insight."[4]

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 79. [2] _Ibid_., p. 90-92. [3] _Ibid_., p. 103. [4] _Ibid_., p. 104.

For Troeltsch these are "sciences of pure understanding and historical investigation," and as such "they have no concern with Ethics."[1] While this seems questionable with regard to (2), it is Troeltsch's position. On the other hand he holds that both (1) and (2) are of concern for ethics.[2] The merger of these spheres with ethics raises the question of common origin and aim,[3] that is, the question of the rational unity of moral experience. The cultural values in Troeltsch's understanding represent various ways in which society has channeled instinctual energy.[4] Thus there is always a driving irrational background to these values which precludes the possibility of setting out the unity of cultural values in any deductive way.[5] Thus while we may believe that they do have a common root, this does not help us. Rather our task is that of the "welding together of these cultural values into a homogeneous whole for the Present and the Future within a given area of Culture."[6]

How is this to be done? Troeltsch is clear that the instinctual energies are the driving force and that such unity as comes about is largely unconscious.[7] Nevertheless it is his conviction, based upon historical analysis, that cultural unity comes about partly through the emergence of a "single central value" which serves as the unifying value for the other values, and partly through the inner tendencies of the cultural values.[8] Troeltsch believes that the central task of ethics, then, is that of understanding (1) the inner tendencies at work in a given institution or culture and (2) determining a central value in terms of which the given culture can be relatively unified. Troeltsch believed that for all its difficulties, (1) was a scientific determination while (2) was more of a personal determination or creative act, much as the determination of the "essence" of Christianity for a particular time.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid., p. 106f.

[5] Ibid., p. 114f. [6] Ibid., p. 115. [7] Ibid. [8] Ibid., p. 116.

I want now to set out the structure of ethical theory that I see in Troeltsch. It is my conviction that Troeltsch would do this in the same general way he set out his program for constructive theology. First of all there is no single essence that pervades each and every cultural epoch that can be deduced in any way. Therefore the theory must be historical; but for validity it must be metaphysical. We have seen that the metaphysical-religious statements in the theological program "set forth the Christian conceptions of God, of the world, and of men, also the mutual relation of these in the Christian conception of redemption" as well as the "Christian conception of communion and of 'the last things'."[1] If this is limited for the moment to the conceptions and relations of God, man and the world, I suggest that what we have are statements that can qualify in the ethical program as the metaphysical-ethical statements. It is to be noted that the key for understanding such statements lies in Troeltsch's "morality of Personality and Conscience."[2] It will be recalled that the historical-religious statements of the theological program had to do with the particular determination of Christian piety and community. The corresponding historical-ethical statements of the ethical program come from the determination of the particular tendencies at work in the institutions of society. Both of these operations are for Troeltsch scientific. It is only when we come to the determination of the peculiar essence to be used in theological or ethical construction that the project takes on a confessional or intuitive character. The reason for this is not difficult to see. It follows strictly from the fact of relativity where history is understood as dynamic; or, as he says of Christianity, "the essence of Christianity can be understood only as the productive power of the historical Christian religion to create new interpretations and new adaptations."[1] Thus the element of indeterminism, of the openness of the future, requires a creative response in terms of the real forces (the cultural values) already in motion.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 71.

[2] *Supra*, p. 72.

Clearly, it would seem, the general structures of ethics and theology are the same for Troeltsch. The really substantive point of connection, in my judgment, is that of the particular material essence one would single out for the constructive effort. On Troeltsch's terms the rest is subject to scientific determination, though to be sure the fact of standing in the Christian faith and choosing to work out a theological program is a matter of decision. (Troeltsch had, however, argued to his satisfaction that while Christianity may not be the final religion, it is the highest that has emerged.[2]) Troeltsch describes this essence in a particular epoch of Christianity as

> the subjective, personal interpretation and synthesis which present thinking derives from the entire situation with reference to actual living issues and for the purpose of directing future activity. Thus there is involved a general historical feeling and understanding, but also a subjective and creative interpretation and construction.[3]

This is substantially what Troeltsch says regarding the determination of the "central value" for ethical construction.[1]

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[1] Supra, p. 70f. [2] Die Absolutheit. . ., p. 88.

[3] "Dogmatics. . .", p. 13.

Given this substantive connection, what is the difference between theology and ethics for Troeltsch? For Troeltsch the difference is made out in terms of the dualism between the instincts and reason. Morality is concerned with controlling and channeling the instincts,[2] which struggle never ends in history. The Christian faith has its focus upon the end of the struggle, upon the perfect rest which cannot be comprehended under the conditions of existence. "This is the reason why the religious always transcends the moral; why the highest ideal is elevated to an incomprehensible other-world of Love or to a passionless supra-moral peace of the spirit."[3]

The point I want to draw attention to is that the posited difference turns upon the general Platonic schema of the difference between the world of change and the unchangeable. An important question arises then as to the difference between ethics and religion if in terms of Troeltsch's thought the standards are derived from history itself.

A final word is in order about the function of conscience. We have already seen that conscience in Troeltsch is the act of creative compromise between the ideal and the real circumstances of life. For Troeltsch conscience "connects the system of cultural values with that of the morality of conscience."[4] Thus the unity of the two aspects of morality and the supposed springs for creative life are functions of conscience. In this way, then, conscience functions in the moral program as the autonomous religious a priori functions in the theological program.

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[1] Christian Thought, p. 117ff.

[2] Ibid., p. 88.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 119.

We turn now to the location of the breakdown in Troeltsch's program. Such statements are grounded in the autonomous religious a priori. These served to determine the supreme validity of Christianity among the religions of the world. They constitute the conditions for religious experience and account for the relative validity of judgments about the various religions. Because of their nature as conditions for religious experience and their function as making out conceptually the connection between God and man, they form the basic backbone of a dogmatics worked out on Troeltsch's version of a history of religions model. The same basic structure holds for the program in ethical construction. The function of the metaphysical statements, the a priori, is to make out the universal unchangeable rational structure. Once these go, the heart is taken out of the program. Troeltsch came to see that

> the idea of Personality, which, in the form of Freedom, determines everything in the morality of conscience, and, in the form of Object, everything in the ethic of values--this idea is, after all, a Western belief, unknown in our sense, to the Far East, and pre-eminently and peculiarly the destiny of us Europeans.[1]

What Troeltsch thought he saw is that the morality of personality and conscience is not universal, and so therefore the metaphysical character of the enterprise was lost. The same can be written about the autonomous religious a priori. The autonomy posited for the religious a priori fell for the same reason, namely that culture and religions are not so easily separable as Troeltsch had earlier thought. They turned out to be an inseparable unity where each conditions the other. Thereby religions could not be compared in terms of a metaphysical structure conditioned by Western culture, for such is just one more relative structure.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 120f.

The conclusion to be drawn, in my judgment, is that the autonomous religious a priori can no longer be viewed as autonomous. If one is to operate in terms of a priori structures, one of these structures will clearly have to be relativity.

Summary

What is to be learned from the analysis of the major types of conscience thus far reviewed? In broad sweeping terms the following can be said. The experiences of affliction and oughtness seem to be the reason conscience has been taken up in moral theory. Such experiences were made out in rationalistic terms, in an understanding of the ultimate nature of things that is characterized fundamentally as unchangeable. Thus the rationalistic type of conscience is that large interpretive framework for the experience of conscience in the Western tradition. The general types of conscience singled out have all been responses within that general framework to what have been felt to be inadequacies of the rationalistic type. All of these inadequacies from Aquinas on down have turned on an increasing appreciation of the natural which seemed alien in various ways to the rational, most especially because of its changeableness. In the intuitive form of conscience it was seen that while the rationalistic approach was set aside, the requirement of certainty seemed necessary for adequate moral judgments. This predilection for certainty appears to have its basis in the deductive mathematical thought which is so closely allied with the rationalistic tradition. For Hume conscience in the moral sense moves into the naturalistic altogether. Thus he has no basis, not even intuitive, for any "necessary connexions". Additionally with Hume it was seen that the substantiality

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of the self in the rationalistic tradition could not be maintained. With Freud the naturalistic is pushed even further, to the point that even the self that is emergent emerges from an irrational id. But here too, as was seen, the judgment derives apparently from the rationalistic conception of rationality. Finally in Troeltsch there was seen the sustained effort to hold the naturalistic and the rationalistic traditions together. Troeltsch was convinced of the necessity of both. There was no escape in his mind from the conditionedness of all things. But to understand this in psychologistic terms meant for Troeltsch the impossibility of making valid ethical judgments. His intuition that such judgments depend on something unchanging is explicit. As was seen, however, his effort to work out an adequate schema of ideas for holding the rational and the natural together came to naught.

The major conclusions to be drawn from all this are the following. First, as was seen in the analysis of Troeltsch, relativity must be regarded as fundamental rather than as a derivative principle. Second, the bias against the naturalistic, especially in regard to the instinctual and the psychological, must be set aside and the possibility of the naturalistic _as_ rational should be explored.

This approach has not been taken by any of the types of conscience examined, though one might want to make a case for Butler and Hume. It has been explored however by some modern thinkers and constitutes the last view to be examined. It can be referred to as the social-psychology view where social carries the freight of relativity as a fundamental principle. Its decisive feature is that in contrast to the substantial self of the naturalistic tradition the self is thought of as fundamentally social. The basis of judgments then is the social structure of the self and its world.

There are a number of variations within this general understanding of conscience. Most prominent in the non-theological disciplines is probably the "humanistic conscience" of Erich Fromm,[1] while in the theological realm H. R. Niebuhr appears to have been the leading exponent of such a view of conscience.[2] Before going any further in summary of the results of this chapter I will present briefly Niebuhr's view of conscience as typical of the social-psychology conscience.

With respect to the types of conscience singled out, Niebuhr may be said to move most closely in terms of the empirical and the empirical/rationalistic. With respect to the empirical side there is a marked difference, for he employs the social nature of the self as worked out by George H. Mead.[3] He does this because he believes the social understanding of the self provides a conceptually adequate basis for making out the logic of the internal moral debate so characteristic of matters of conscience. What Niebuhr singles out in Mead's social understanding of the self is the idea that the self only experiences, knows itself indirectly through others. At the same time Niebuhr is critical of Mead's alter as a "generalized other" which is supposedly "a sort of composite photograph which the self makes of the associates in his society."[4]

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[1] Erich Fromm, Man for Himself (New York: Fawcett World Library, 1968), esp. Chap. IV, Sec. 2.

[2] H. R. Niebuhr, "The Ego-Alter Dialectic and the Conscience," Journal of Philosophy, XLII:13 (June 21, 1945); and The Responsible Self (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), esp. Chap. 2.

[3] Niebuhr, "Ego-Alter. . .", p. 353. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 354.

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The criticism Niebuhr makes of the "generalized other" is that such a concept does no justice to the plurality of the communities of the self. Thus Niebuhr substitutes for the "generalized other" particular others. Once this substitution is made it becomes clear, if it had not already been, that such an understanding of the dialectic of conscience does not provide a basis upon which valid judgments can be made. Such judgments are relative to the others and their commitments. Niebuhr is not unaware of this problem.

At this point two features of Niebuhr's view of conscience are worthy of special note. First, this position provides a way for spelling out how conscience might be thought of as the voice of God along with many other voices as well. For the authorship of conscience is always a joint project of the other(s) and the self. All that remains, then, is to spell out how it is that God is included among the many.

Second, this understanding of conscience, grounded as it is in the social nature of the self, really by-passes the older conception of the tension in the self (or dialogue) as based on a conflict between the higher (rational) self and the lower (instinctual) self. Niebuhr doesn't appear necessarily to have explored the possibility I suggested above of thinking of the instinctual and psychological as rational, though he appears to come close with respect to the latter. He comes even closer when he takes up the problem of validity in his later work.

Niebuhr's way of raising the problem of validity in the article being considered to this point is in terms of authority. His question is, "if it is true that the self exists in many societies and in this sense has many consciences, is there one society or one other whose judgment is final from which there is no appeal?"[1] By way of answer he suggests that the unity of the self and the one behind the many go together. In other words, the unity of the self has its basis in the universal one or God. An immediate response to this is that the unity of the self may simply be in terms of some arbitrarily chosen perspective as providing the unity amid the many. This response in turn raises the issue of a rationally consistent and coherent understanding of the ultimate one behind the many. Just how this may be carried out will be gone into later in the dissertation.

Niebuhr returns to this question in the context of conscience in his Robertson Lectures.[2] The treatment of conscience differs little from that of the earlier work, but he does give substantially more space to the question of the one behind the many. For Niebuhr the one is understood as the radical action by which I am. By "radical" he means simply that it is an action that "cannot be classified in that series of actions of finite powers to which we respond in accordance with our more or less enlightened interpretations."[3] Concerning this radical action by which we are, Niebuhr writes that "it seems truer to say that I am being lived than that I live."[4] I will come back to the problems ingredient in this in a moment. Suffice it to say at this point that Niebuhr's primary concern is not so much with an adequate understanding of this radical action by which we are as with our response to this radical action. The response may be to ignore it,[5] to interpret it as inimical[1]--both responses of distrust--or to trust it.[2] For Niebuhr these are all forms of faith. He then draws attention to the critical place given by some psychologists to the trust/distrust response as basic in the development of personality.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 357.

[2] Posthumously published as The Responsible Self.

[3] Ibid., p. 115. [4] Ibid., p. 114. [5] Ibid., p. 115f.

Niebuhr's criterion for validity in judgments of conscience turns then on what goes into being a responsible self, and basic to this is the trust/distrust response. Niebuhr is clear that this is only the subjective side of the problem of how the self is one in all its plurality. The objective side "is the problem of discerning one action, one intention, one final context of all action upon me."[4] But clearly Niebuhr runs into problems on the objective side. For in terms of his understanding of the radical action by which we are as meaning that "it seems truer to say I am being lived than that I live," this justifies too much. All actions in the world are God's actions, thus making God responsible for all things in a categorical way.[5] This seems to violate the basic responsiveness of the system. But again this is another manifestation of the problem seen in Troeltsch with respect to God.

Concerning the subjective side Niebuhr appears to be in basic agreement with the conclusions reached from the analysis of conscience. In this respect I would only say that it should be pushed much further in terms of the work of psychologists of growth. Such an extension would

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 117f.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 118.

[3] _Ibid_. I suspect that he has in mind here the work of Erik Erikson, esp. "Growth and Crises of the Healthy Personality," _Identity and the Life Cycle_ (New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1959), pp. 50ff (originally published in 1950 in _Symposium on the Healthy Personality_, Suppl. II).

[4] Niebuhr, p. 125.

[5] _Ibid_., pp. 125f & 173f.

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add materially to the understanding of conscience.

In terms of the problematic as seen in Niebuhr there are at least two directions one might take. First one might choose to spell out in greater detail Niebuhr's thought and substitute a more adequate conception of God such as that worked out by process thinkers. Having made the substitution one might then draw out the theoretical implications this has for reshaping Niebuhr's understanding of conscience. Or, second, one might appeal to the social sciences for a fuller understanding of conscience and then draw forth the import of such for a more adequate conception of the radical action by which we are. I have chosen the latter approach first because it is more consistent with the psychological line being introduced,and second because the analysis of the history of conscience has driven us to the same point **that** the analysis of the problem in Lehmann did, to wit, to psychology. Thus the concern for an explication of maturity and an adequate conception of conscience both turn on a psychological understanding of the self.

In order to explore the possibilities in the psychological approach I propose to examine the systematic work of Gordon Allport. The choice of Allport is determined by the following factors. First, he is aware of the historical problems relative to an adequate understanding of the self. Second, he has given considerable time to wrestling with the problems lifted up by Freud. Third, he does have his own proposal for an understanding of conscience. Fourth, the eclectic nature of his thought lends itself easily to being supplemented by the work of other thinkers. Finally, his approach is most promising because of his self-conscious effort to take all the data into account without being reductive.

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Before concluding this chapter and moving on to a presentation of Allport's understanding of personality, I want to draw attention to what have appeared from the analyses of the major types of conscience as essential factors to be taken into account by any proposed conception of conscience. The first thing that comes to mind is the authority of conscience. The analyses dealt with authority for the most part in terms of the rational basis for judgment. A major problem in the construction of an adequate conception of conscience will be to show with some precision the nature and basis for the authority of conscience and how this is experienced. The experience of conscience witnesses especially to the affliction or experience of guilt. While that may be made out with some ease, Freud has clearly shown that not all guilt has a creative or reality-principle quality to it. Thus there is presented the problem of adequately distinguishing healthy from pathological guilt.

At the same time there is the problem of understanding the experience of "oughtness" or imperativeness to which the legislative conscience drew special attention. Freud, it will be recalled, has serious criticisms of the experience of conscience in its guiding form, and so again it will be necessary to make out criteria for the healthy and pathological forms of the legislative experience of conscience. I take it this has been the rather consistent concern of moralists. Plato, as has been noted, called for the "cultivation" of the moral virtues. They had to be tended to. All of this only points to the complexity of understanding the nature of a healthy conscience. The witness of the tradition has been consistently in terms of a responsible moral agent. The factor that needs to be stressed and made out with

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some clarity is the feature of agency. In other words, the nature of the self that emerges must not be one reduced to nothing more than a reflection of man's social condition. Rather, room must be left for his own transcendence or agency with respect to his conditioning.

A word is in order concerning the popularly held view that conscience is considered infallible by those who hold to conscience as authoritative. The analysis has indicated that infallibility has not been characteristic of the general types of conscience except for the intuitive type. My impression is that popularly held views of conscience in the tradition have come closest to the intuitive type. I think this especially true of the sectarian groups of Protestants which ruled out any rationalistic approach and relied solely on the Bible and their own consciences. For if you rely on conscience without any other criterion than your own interpretation of the Bible, then it surely must be difficult to avoid the imputation of infallibility to conscience--especially with the views the sectarians held with respect to the Bible.

Despite the fact that the tradition has rarely held to the infallibility of conscience, and despite the fact that reasons have been specified for its occurrence, I do not believe it should be dismissed so wholly out-of-hand. Rather it would seem that those who have held to it have done so for some more compelling reason. In my judgment any adequate conception of conscience must give account of the phenomenological basis for such a claim in ways that go beyond those so far indicated.

It may be well to recall the conditions Hume set out if one were to work out a rational morality. First, the connection between the rational and the will must be pointed out; and second, this connection necessarily characterizes "every well-disposed mind."[1] If I am right in my judgment, the exploration along the lines indicated will fulfill Hume's conditions.

I will now connect the analysis of the historical types of conscience with the material of the first chapter. While I may agree with Lehmann that conscience is in need of a context, I understand this more in the sense of a conceptuality adequate for the understanding of man in his world in terms of which valid (rational) moral judgments may be made. In terms of this understanding it is difficult to see how the Koinonia can provide such a needed basis for judgments. For if my analysis in the first chapter is correct, the Koinonia is in as bad a shape as conscience in this regard.

It has been seen that the rationalistic interpretation of conscience has been the weak point in understanding the phenomenon of conscience, even while it has been noted that some rational basis is necessary for valid judgments. I suggest that this parallels the understanding of principles and abstraction in Lehmann. Lehmann, as was pointed out, thinks of principles and abstractions in terms of categories analogous to those of mechanics which are predominantly static. Lehmann's argument against principles and abstractions is largely based upon his stress on dynamics. In the analysis of conscience it was seen that the rationalistic understanding has its ground in intuitions drawn from mathematics which stress the unchangeable or static aspects as ultimate. The stress upon the natural that emerges in the history of conscience corresponds to Lehmann's stress upon dynamics. It can be seen thereby that there is a close approximation between the problem of conscience and the problem of Christian ethical and theological construction as found in Lehmann. The effort then to work out a schema for holding the empirical and the rational together in forming an adequate conception of conscience should throw light upon the way this can be done formally in Christian ethical and theological construction.

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[1] Hume, p. 465.

A major problem here is that reductionism must be avoided so that Christian ethical and theological constructions are not reduced to conscience but are seen as possessing their own relative autonomy. How this is possible will be seen in the constructive work on conscience and in the constructive theological efforts.

In Lehmann it was seen that a major problem in ethics is that of the gap between principle and act. This reduces to a problem of motivation, and Lehmann held the Koinonia to contain the solution to the problem of motivation.[1] The analysis of the types of conscience in the Western tradition has revealed, I believe, that the problem of overcoming the gap has to do with the energies of life. To the extent that these are thought of as irrational, it is difficult to see how there can be any solution to Lehmann's problem of the gap. This is all the more true for one like Lehmann who puts his emphasis upon dynamics or energy. This is not to say that there may not be resources in the Christian faith for healthy motivation; there doubtless are. My point is that without some basis for judging healthy motivation, the risk of severe problems is all too present.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 22.

It is difficult to see how such a basis is to be found without turning to the personality disciplines.

With regard to the problem of theological construction, the analyses of conscience, in particular that of Troeltsch, have revealed a different view of things from that found in Fletcher and Lehmann. Fletcher stressed the relativism of modernity as precluding an ontological avenue to moral principles or knowledge of God. Lehmann's point in this respect can be simply summarized by saying that for him the dynamics of God preclude conceptual knowledge of God. In the analysis of Troeltsch, however, it was seen that the problems of adequate moral principles and knowledge of God were not a result of relativism but rather of a failure to make use of relativity as a principle and to apply it consistently even to moral theory and knowledge of God. Thus in the constructive efforts of this dissertation whereby we have already concluded that the instinctual and psychological must be understood as rational (a move which the tradition could not or would not make), this same schema must be used in reference to God.

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PART II

CHAPTER 3

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY

This part of the dissertation is devoted to an analysis and systematic exposition of Allport's theory of personality as this is contained in his major work on personality, Pattern and Growth in Personality. This analysis and exposition will take up Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 5 Allport's own theory of conscience will be explicated and extended through the analysis of Chapters 3 and 4.

This chapter will begin with a consideration of the general approach of Allport as contrasted with those theorists, especially Stimulus-Response theorists and Freud, and orientations which Allport finds inadequate. The making out of these distinguishing features will reveal something of the characteristic emphases of Allport and will therefore lead naturally into the second task of the chapter, that of setting out the fundamental assumptions of Allport's thought. Finally, there will be a presentation of the basic structure of personality for Allport.

Allport's Fundamental Assumptions

First a few words are in order as to what I mean by fundamental assumptions and as to problems raised by Allport's eclecticism. By fundamental assumptions I mean those assumptions which form the basis of a man's thought in such a way that when you have reached them there is nothing behind them. They are not grounded in anything beyond themselves. They form the background which gives form and shape to everything else the author does. None of this is meant of course to indicate that fundamental assumptions are arbitrary. Rather such assumptions are justified in terms of their rational coherence with each other and their adequacy for illuminating experience. Often enough an author is not clear about his fundamental assumptions. Hence the advantages of proceeding in this way are obvious; for one may, through such an approach, state the author's material better than he did. With Allport, however, the case is somewhat different. The work being examined was written late in Allport's career and constitutes the culmination of a life of work. He is fairly clear about his fundamental assumptions. These seem most evident in his own statements about his effort and how he differs from other perspectives and theorists. There is however a problem raised by his eclecticism. I will first give Allport's rationale for his eclecticism and then come back to the problem that it raises with respect to my purposes.

One of the major concerns of Allport is to present a theory of personality that will take in all of the data of personality without being reductive. He refuses to be methodologically bound to anything but the data. A direct import of this for Allport is that it makes all the difference what conception of man a psychologist starts with. For if this matter is left unconsidered, as Allport contends it is in most psychology texts, it will be answered in hidden form in terms of the requirements of the particular methodology used in the study of man.[1] Thus only that will be allowed as real about man which fits the methodology. In this way the methodology determines the nature of man in a particular work.

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[1] Gordon W. Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1967), pp. xi, 84.

Allport, on the other hand, insists that it is the methodology which must yield to the reality of man.[1] This has the positive value that Allport can look upon all the work in psychology as valuable within its limits, appreciate it for what it is, and integrate it into what he believes to be the larger framework determined by placing primacy on the full reality of man.[2] It is this basic stance which accounts for Allport's self-conscious eclecticism. He writes, "By eclecticism in psychology I shall mean a system that seeks the solution of fundamental problems by selecting and uniting what it regards as true in the several specialized approaches to psychological science."[3]

In a moment a few of these "specialized approaches" will be singled out to show both Allport's appropriations and his reservations. Right now I want to indicate the problem that such eclecticism raises for analyzing Allport's thought. Too often, in my judgment, Allport fails to come to a systematic statement of the subject treated. What he does is to examine the material of various theorists on a subject, parsing it according to its contributions and limitions. By and large Allport's fundamental assumptions, which grew out of his attempt to take seriously the full reality of man, form the basis upon which such judgments are made. This means then that in many cases Allport does not employ his fundamental assumptions in a constructive way. This means that in my own analysis and exposition of Allport's theory of personality, I will in some cases go beyond what he says, but hopefully I will be doing this in terms that are consistent with his over-all thrust. Thus it is important that some attention be given to his fundamental assumptions so that extending his thought has legitimacy. It will also provide the basis upon which further eclecticism may be practiced.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 84, 249f. [2] Ibid., p. 572.

[3] Gordon W. Allport, "The Fruits of Eclecticism: Bitter or Sweet," The Person in Psychology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 5f; originally in The Congress Proceedings, in Acta Psychologia, 1964, 23, pp. 27-44.

With these preliminaries now out of the way we can proceed to single out a few of the "specialized approaches" which Allport finds helpful, but concerning which he also has serious misgivings. The first to be singled out is the approach of the Stimulus-Response theorists. According to Allport's understanding, S-R theorists concentrate in the area of learning, and structure their research in terms of the mechanical models that have been so successful in understanding inanimate nature.[1] Thus the mechanical model used by the S-R theorists has the net effect of generating a conception of man as one with inanimate nature because only such data as fit the methodology are recognized. Allport does not reject the research of such theorists which he regards as immensely valuable, but he does question its **suitability** with respect to the full reality of personality. **He points out** that the mechanical principles are at best only "quasi-mechanical". For as he puts it, "no psychologist can completely fit human conduct to measures of centimeters-grams-seconds; nor to the functions found in biochemistry, in electronics, and in 'thinking machines', although attempts of this order are often made."[2] Hence according to Allport mechanical principles at best can be only quasi-mechanical.

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[1] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 86. [2] Ibid.

In addition to the fact that S-R theories fail in the final analysis to meet the demands of the mechanical model in a wholly satisfactory way, Allport specifies a more substantive limitation to these theories. It is that the mechanical model systematically eliminates the purposive aspects of man by methodologically treating him as an "empty organism".[1] Allport reviews the general character of the S-R approach which on his account envisions man as characterized by drives demanding tension-reduction.[2] This is often tied in with the physiologists' concept of homeostasis as the basic principle of motivation. While this concept is more purposive than the concept of tension-reduction, in that there is a direction of preservation, still it falls far short of reaching the reality of man. The basic criticism that Allport levels is that such a theory simply does not take into account the fact that the healthy child and adult are continually building up tensions, in the form of new interests, and are going beyond the basic safety level of homeostasis.[3]

The conclusions relevant for my purposes from Allport's critique of S-R theories are the following. First, he regards the S-R research and its principles of learning as necessary for understanding personality but not sufficient. But even acceptance of them is qualified, for as was noted they could at best be only quasi-mechanical. Second, Allport's critique on the basis of a failure to take into account the purposive aspect of man reveals one of the fundamental features of his work.

The second approach to be considered is that of Freud. Allport's critique of Freud's thought is somewhat more difficult to set out without first having a fuller view of Allport's own thought. The reason for this, in my judgment, is that Allport's critique of Freud is not well formed. Allport knows in part what elements he objects to in Freud in terms of his own emphasis upon the full reality of man, but in other ways he does not push the issue sufficiently. The demonstration of this will come out later in the dissertation.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 90.

Allport sees the problem with regard to Freud in the following way:

> The issue is this: Does the conscious layer (Freud calls it the ego) have an autonomy and function of its own, or does it always serve the purposes and motives that are deeply embedded in the unconscious?[1] . . .
>
> Does the unconscious (with its primitive and archaic character) dominate the structure and functioning of personality, or does the conscious stratum do so? If both are effective, under what conditions and in what proportion does each take control?[2]

The key here is the last sentence. Allport is willing to go along with Freud a good way, but insists that the reduction of the conscious layer of personality to unconscious forces simply will not wash in the face of normal healthy development.[3]

Allport is also critical of Freud's conception of an id that "never changes".[4] This is closely related to an observation made almost incidently in a summary to the effect that "there is also a serious question whether the unconscious is furnished as exclusively as Freud depicts with anti-social impulses and destructive thought."[5] It is my judgment, as seen in Chapter 2, that this characterization of the id is the decisive issue which must be dealt with. Allport's critique of Freud may be justified, but it does not go far enough in my judgment. This issue will be taken up later and worked out in terms of the fundamental assumptions of Allport's thought. For it is my judgment that Allport's theory of personality is adequate to the problem.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 144. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 145. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 155.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 148. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

For the present the conclusions to be drawn are parallel to those drawn from the critique of the S-R theories. Again we see the stress upon the conscious purposive character of man in contrast to a too exclusive emphasis upon that which denies this element, in this case an emphasis upon unconscious factors. But again Allport does not want to deny the relative validity of the emphasis upon the unconscious; he seeks to incorporate it in a larger framework along with the conscious element.[1]

The third approach important for understanding the direction of Allport's thought is not so much a theory as a particular view of the nature of science. The view of science that Allport finds alien to the study of man is that of science as concerned only with the universal and not with the particular. The thesis is that only the universal is susceptible of lawful understanding. The unique is simply beyond lawful understanding.[2] At this point it may be worthwhile to point out that this understanding of scientific law would be supportive of Lehmann's major point to the effect that the uniqueness of experience is not amenable to a principled approach. Thus Allport's challenge to this understanding of science is critical for the over-all purposes of this dissertation.

It is clear that Allport must challenge such an understanding of science, for otherwise he has no way of approaching the nature of personality that does justice to what he believes essential in the reality of man. For Allport, while each personality is unique by comparison to other personalities, the uniqueness or individuality of personality is not adequately understood as the sum of all these individual differences.[1] Rather, for Allport, the individual is to be understood as an "internally consistent and unique organization of bodily and mental process."[2] The task of psychology is not to deny the lawfulness within the uniqueness of personality but rather to develop ways for understanding the organization of patterned individuality. The starting point according to Allport should be the manifest fact that human behavior is relatively lawful.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 151ff.

[2] Ibid., pp. 7-10.

The problem with the nature of scientific law is closely connected, in my judgment, with some fallacies that Allport draws attention to. The first is the individualistic fallacy. This fallacy "views personality as a unit in isolation and makes no reference to its setting in, and dependence on, the social environment."[4] Unless I am seriously mistaken, this fallacy is grounded in the version of law that Allport believes inadequate. This is not to say that this fallacy views the individual as unlawful but that it understands the person in terms of universal law. For this view the person is a "character structure, fixed organization, unchanging traits and a closed selfhood."[5] We saw the intellectual home of this view, in my judgment, in the rationalistic view of man which rested upon a substantial understanding of the self.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 7. [2] _Ibid_., p. 8. [3] _Ibid_., p. 10f.

[4] _Ibid_., p. 192. [5] _Ibid_.

The other fallacy, the culturalistic fallacy, is clearly shaped by the universalistic understanding of law. For this view assumes that personality or the unique is really nothing more than "a product of the social, cultural, situational forces"[1] which supposedly are amenable to lawful understanding.

A third approach places "the social" and "the individual" in dialectical opposition. This is not sufficient for Allport either. In reference to all three approaches Allport insists that "nothing in personality is purely 'social' and nothing purely 'individual'. There is no such concrete separation."[2] He goes on to write:

> Personality, in short, is "an aggregate within an aggregate, a structure within, and constituting a part of, a larger structure." It is futile to ask which structure is more "real". . . .
>
> Personality is a system within a matrix of sociocultural systems. It is an "inside structure" embedded within and interacting with "outside structures". The outside (collective) structures could not exist at all if the constituent personality systems were destroyed. But neither could any given personality system be what it is, or endure for long, without the environing collective systems.[3]

Thus it is seen that for Allport the individual is always to be understood in his individuality as also social. His own unique organization of personality is not fixed but rather is emergent, reflecting his own response to his social setting.

This brief consideration of Allport's critiques of other theories and perspectives has revealed the following distinguishing features that Allport holds out for. First, there is clearly an emphasis upon the purposive element in personality; second, there is his naturalism as seen in his relative agreement with the S-R theorists; third, there is his emphasis upon the inner organization of personality; and further there is as just seen the social nature of personality. These together with a fifth are the fundamental assumptions that give structure and movement to Allport's thought.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 192. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 193.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 193-4. The quote is from F. H. Allport, *Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure* (New York: Wiley, 1955), p. 107.

I will now give more careful consideration to these assumptions. Allport has a statement near the beginning of his major work which comes close to setting out in two sentences his fundamental assumptions.

> Our purpose is to discover general principles of development, organization, and expression of personality, even while we emphasize the fact that the outstanding characteristic of man is his individuality. He is a unique creation of the forces of nature.[1]

While the essential sociality of personality is not evident in these lines, the title of his major work evinces the assumption of development in the term "growth".

We have already seen something of the meaning that is carried by the fundamental assumption of the essential sociality of personality. For Allport this means that the personality literally emerges out of its relations, biological and otherwise. He agrees with George H. Mead for instance that the self "is predominantly a social product."[2] Whatever else might be meant by this for Allport, it is clear that for him the personal is always understood as social or, put in other terms, the relations of personality to its environment are not external but internal. They make a real difference to personality.

This leads quite naturally into the assumption of individuality or autonomy. This is clearly one of the over-riding assumptions of Allport. This is seen in his insistence upon the purposive element of per-

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[1] Ibid., p. 4. (Italics mine.)

[2] Ibid., p. 121.

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sonality which we saw in his critiques of S-R theorists and Freud. But such emphasis must not be overdone. For autonomy goes hand in hand with sociality and hence the autonomy is always a conditioned autonomy. Concerning the point of individuality Allport writes:

> All sciences, including psychology, tend to neglect this paramount fact of individuality. . . . In daily life, on the other hand, we are in no danger of forgetting that individuality is the supreme mark of human nature. All during our waking life, and even in our dreams, we recognize and deal with people as separate, distinct, and unique individuals.[1]

As indicated, this fundamental individuality is not a will-o'-the-wisp individuality but is patterned. Allport puts it thus: "The organization of the individual life is first, last, and all the time a primary fact of human nature."[2] Or again this assumption is expressed when Allport writes that "the essential nature of man is such that it presses toward a relative unification of life."[3] Such unity or organization is not in terms of some abstract eternal ideal but is rather in terms of the requirements and purpose of the individual in coming to terms with his environment. Thus his organization is continually being modified as it responds to changes in its relations. Such emergent organization will always have the vast past to insure continuity of the person, and this accounts for the lawfulness that Allport points to in human behavior. To be sure it is not a perfect lawfulness, for otherwise there would be no room for an individuality other than self-sameness.

That Allport means an individuality which is more than self-sameness is clearly seen in his emphasis upon growth, development, creativity, novelty and becoming, among other terms used to designate the dynamic character of personality. The fundamental place of growth is seen also in the title of one of Allport's earlier books, Becoming. Personality is always a becoming, a new creative unification of the many relations which bear in upon it.[1]

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 4. [2] _Ibid_., p. 15. [3] _Ibid_., p. 252.

Finally there is Allport's naturalism as a fundamental assumption. As he put in an earlier article:

> Human personality has a locus--within the skin. To be sure, its imagination and memory range far and wide, but these acts are well grounded in a psycho-physical matrix of some order. On another plane of existence, personality may be freed from its space-time bondage; but on the plane where the psychologist dwells, it must be viewed as an organic unity, accessible to study through its acts, its verbal report and even its reflex and physiological functioning.[2]

While this assumption may not appear to loom large in Allport, it does structure all of his thought. There is no reference in the personality that is not in terms of the physiological system. All reasons are in terms of things actual. This assumption means that whatever abstractions Allport employs will have reference to some form of concreteness. This has the positive effect of requiring justifications for abstractions, for instance those of the S-R theory, in terms of the concrete reality of man rather than forcing the concreteness of man to fit the abstractions of S-R theory. The reason I say this assumption may not appear to loom large is that despite the fact of all the emphasis upon it in the early pages of Pattern and Growth in Personality,[3] and despite Allport's qualified use of the principles of S-R theories, he notes nevertheless that the biological and physiological sciences have not developed sufficiently in the area of personality for the specificity necessary for conceptually adequate reference to personality.[1] Because of this lack of specificity, the naturalistic side is not always obvious in Allport's work.

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[1] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 569f.

[2] "The Psychological Nature of Personality," Personality and Social Encounter (Boston: Beacon, 1960), p. 20.

[3] Pp. 5f, 28, 33ff, 57-82.

Personality Defined and Characterized

Allport presents the following definition of personality:

> PERSONALITY IS THE DYNAMIC ORGANIZATION WITHIN THE INDIVIDUAL OF THOSE PSYCHOPHYSICAL SYSTEMS THAT DETERMINE HIS CHARACTERISTIC BEHAVIOR AND THOUGHT.[2]

Allport states that this definition is self-consciously formed as "essentialist". This requires some explication. The term "essence" is often thought of as having its home in the rationalism of classical thought, which was reviewed in the last chapter. Allport does not mean to go back to this tradition in any other way than to stress, as it did, the organization or order of things--in the case of personality, the organization of personality. The crucial difference from the classical rationalistic tradition, as will come out in this chapter and the next, is that the organization of personality for Allport is always emergent. There is no static or unchanging content to personality as seemed to be the case with the classical tradition.

A few comments are in order concerning Allport's definition of personality from the perspective of his fundamental assumptions. The definition in its emphasis upon "individual", "determine", "psychophysical systems", "characteristic behavior and thought" and "dynamic organization"

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 33 & 73.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

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gives ample place to the fundamental assumptions of individuality, organization and naturalism. Sociality and growth, however, appear to be slighted. It might be argued that "dynamic" covers the element of growth. This may be so, but I do not see how sociality can be accounted for. Simply in terms of Allport's fundamental assumptions, something like the following definition would seem more appropriate:

> Personality is the growing dynamic organization within the individual inclusive of his interaction with the environment of those psychophysical systems that determine his characteristic behavior and thought.

While this change may not seem to be very substantial, it does exemplify in a sense my point that Allport does not sufficiently employ his fundamental assumptions in shaping up his constructive work. While this instance may seem innocent, it is typical of Allport's constructive work, and later on it will be seen that substantial changes will result from applying his fundamental assumptions consistently.

One of the major keys to Allport's theory of personality rests solidly upon his fundamental assumptions. In line with what one would expect from an assumption of growth, personality is fundamentally a process of growth. The abstract character of this growth is that of a continuous differentiation and integration.[1] The differentiation follows from the internal relatedness of personality to its environment, for such relatedness necessarily means the incorporation of new relations or, stated otherwise, the making of new distinctions. At the same time the assumption of unity or order means that the differentiation is not the final word, is not arbitrary in character, but is always taken up into a higher integration. Allport's way of putting it is that "From the many there emerges the one."[1] As will be seen in Chapter 4, this process is not always a smooth transition. In fact inadequate integration will be one way of accounting for problems in personality development.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 97ff.

Allport is clear that the categories of differentiation and integration do not really apply to the infant in respect to the psychological side of personality.[2] Rather the differentiation and integration only apply as personality emerges in the infant. The basis of such differentiation and integration appears to be the organization of the bodily organism.[3] The assumption of individuality or relative autonomy of each emergent unity will come out clearly in the exposition.[4] The essential point for present purposes is simply the central fact that for Allport one of the major keys to personality is growth where this is understood in terms of a progressive differentiation and integration.

Personality and Learning

Allport turns to learning theory in order to understand growth in differentiation and integration. Before going into the principles of learning that Allport sets out, I want to make some observations concerning the basis upon which these principles are grouped. Allport sets out three groups of principles: quasi-mechanical (S-R), cognitive, and participation principles.[5] The quasi-mechanical principles take into account to a major extent the assumptions of naturalism, sociality and development.

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[1] Ibid., p. 99. [2] Ibid., pp. 98 & 100. [3] Ibid., pp. 97 & 100.

[4] The naturalistic ground for such in Allport's theory lies in his understanding of each organism as genetically novel.

[5] Pattern and Growth. . ., pp. 91f, 101-7.

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The factor that distinguishes the cognitive prinicples from the quasi-mechanical is the basic place that Allport gives to organization, which he sees as the distinctive feature of cognitive learning. The participatory, on the other hand, is distinctively characterized by its emphasis upon the place of the individual in the learning process. None of this is to say that the fundamental assumptions do not structure each kind of learning. All that is meant is that some are more to the fore in a specific kind of learning theory. This is seen most readily in reference for instance to the quasi-mechanical principles, which are quasi precisely because of the basic character of individuality which works havoc with a strictly mechanical understanding of such principles. I believe that with this understanding of how the fundamental assumptions come into play in the various kinds of learning principles that Allport sets out, the bases for his judgments will become somewhat clearer.

Allport's emphasis upon the naturalistic basis of personality means that the principles of learning worked out by S-R theorists will be important for the early emergence of personality. Allport singles out a number of principles from S-R learning which he regards as acceptable and important. The qualification of such principles however is that they are at best only quasi-mechanical. The quasi-mechanical learning principles he singles out are: registration, conditioning, stimulus generalization, reinforcement, frequency, primacy and recency. I will give explanations only of the ones more important for our purposes rather than presenting Allport's understanding of each of these principles.

A general feature to note about all of these principles is that they supposedly operate on what might be called an automatic or unconscious level. The person is not viewed as having a personally acting center of consciousness.[1]

The first of the quasi-mechanical principles I want to draw attention to is that of registration. Allport writes that a mechanical theory, like any theory, must assume that the nervous system is capable of retaining some faint copy of the original experience.[2] Evident here are the assumptions of naturalism and sociality--the modifications of the system by the environment. All modern learning theory of course is constituted by growth; indeed learning theory appears to be usually used to understand personal growth. The point of the principle of registration is that the environment is continually impressing itself on the nervous system. Allport writes:

> It is conceivable that the infant's mother, as well as other features of its environment, becomes imprinted in such a way that the baby early comes to "identify" with the mother, and also comes to regard its familiar environment as a safe and desirable frame of life.[3]

It is difficult to understand why Allport qualifies this with "conceivable". It seems clear that some process of identification is taking place with the **infant**. Possibly Allport puts in the qualification he does because of his conviction expressed elsewhere that the nervous system at birth may not be "mature enough to bear a lasting impression of the birth event"[4], or because he simply wants to be careful in the acceptance of quasi-mechanical principles. The more important point to note is that impressions are continually being assimilated into the system.

The second principle to be singled out is that of conditioning.

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 86. [2] _Ibid._, p. 91. [3] _Ibid._, p. 92.

[4] _Ibid._, p. 254.

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Concerning this principle Allport writes:

> Whenever a stimulus has a motor outlet, any stimulus occurring simultaneously will tend to acquire the same motor outlet; after sufficient repetition (sometimes one occasion is enough) the second stimulus alone will suffice to produce a discharge in that motor outlet.[1]

As one can easily intuit, this principle would appear to have the effect of leaving the person at the mercy of his early conditioning. Allport is willing to go along with this principle to quite an extent especially in respect to animals and infants, but he has definite reservations about its applicability to many forms of adult behavior.[2]

The third principle to be singled out is that of stimulus generalization. By this Allport means the phenomenon of treating "many different objects. . .as if they were one."[3] Allport cites the example of the baby who has learned "daddy" and who then applies it to all men. Correct stimulus generalization, Allport notes, is quite important, while incorrect generalization can bring about severe problems in personality development.[4] I will come back to this in the next chapter when I take up normal development.

We turn now to cognitive learning. It is worth while to recall again Allport's understanding of S-R theory to the effect that consciousness and certainly self-consciousness do not play a role in its theoretical work. This is seen in the S-R theorists' assumption of a passive organism or, as Allport puts it, they assume that man is an "empty organism".[5] Or again, S-R theorists "leave out the role of conscious weighing, understanding, intention, and ego-relevance."[6] When Allport turns to cognitive learning he does not immediately jump to consciousness. Rather there is an overlap of unconsciousness or at least of non-self-consciousness between quasi-mechanical and cognitive types of learning. Something of this can be seen in the first principle of cognitive learning that he considers, to wit, "learning sets". By "learning sets" he means that "certain broad postures of learning may influence the whole course of development."[1] He specifies in this regard trust and distrust as basic attitudes that may affect what one learns. As will be seen later, the function of such basic attitudes is more appropriately seen as something that is done not consciously but unconsciously, and so may be accounted for on S-R principles. While Allport's point is clear enough that such sets do affect development, his way of setting the matter out might lead one to suppose such sets are consciously formed. More attention will be given to such formation in the next chapter.

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[1] Ibid., p. 92. [2] Ibid., p. 93. [3] Ibid., p. 94.

[4] Ibid. [5] Ibid., p. 86. [6] Ibid., p. 101.

Allport distinguishes broad learning sets from those of narrower scope, such as the attitudes one may develop towards a particular subject, e.g. mathematics. But again it would seem that such identifications can easily be accounted for in terms of S-R principles, especially the principles of registration and conditioning.

If I understand Allport correctly in these matters, his point is not so much the matter of consciousness vs. "the 'unknowing' level of learning"[2], as he at times misleadingly indicates, as that of the internal organization of the subject. Allport's understanding of the S-R theorists is that they do not take account of the internal organization; and so I surmise that this internal organization is the ground of Allport's judgment.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 102.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 101.

Thus a fuller sense of sociality comes into view, for the person is no longer understood as a merely passive organism but is responsive in terms of his particular organization of personality. Again if I understand Allport correctly here, there is really no hard and fast line between S-R principles and cognitive principles. Allport might well have argued that the only problem with S-R principles, at least in respect to learning sets, is that they need expansion through the inclusion of the feature of the organization of personality.

The remaining principles of cognitive learning do move more in the realm of consciousness. The first of these is the principle of insight. Allport gives the following meaning for his use of insight:

> Insight has been defined as the process of forming a mental structure that corresponds to some outside structure in nature. When we suddenly see how the parts of a Chinese puzzle fit together, we have insight. It has been sometimes labeled as the "ah ha" type of learning.[1]

The meaning Allport attaches to insight on the basis of the above would suggest that order plays a prominent place in such learning. This is clearly the case in all the examples Allport cites, but it would appear equally the case that individuality comes into play in an important way. It is the person's desire to comprehend that comes through in the examples. This seems most obvious in those cases where the comprehension and reproduction of a set of events is not of a set of events that have been pleasurable.[2] The person therefore is not determined by simple pleasure and pain but by a conscious effort at understanding.

The principle of identification requires some extended treatment. It will be recalled that "the baby's identifying with the mother" was mentioned as an example of the principle of registration. From what was indicated of the structure of Freud's thought in Chapter 2, it should be clear that what Freud means by identification is largely to be understood under the principle of registration, at least in terms of Allport's manner of setting things out. To be sure there are differences and some of these will come out later. The point I want to give emphasis to is that the really important identifications in Freud's way of seeing things are largely unconscious. Allport's principle of identification, on the other hand, is almost wholly consciously shaped, witnessed by the types of examples he uses such as "Daddy, what are _we_?"[1] Curiously Allport seems to believe that his principle of identification takes account of what Freud means by identification. I would say it does so only of the conscious identifications. For both Allport and Freud it would seem that identifications can be both unconscious and conscious. The character and force of identification will differ accordingly, the unconscious identifications working blindly while the conscious ones are more open to critical scrutiny and legitimate generalizations. The issue here is one of some importance. Allport is concerned to stress the place of consciousness and especially self-consciousness in understanding personality. His tendency therefore would be to play up consciousness and self-consciousness at the expense of unconscious factors. The point would seem to be that one cannot help but form identifications. As was seen in the S-R type learning, that is simply the way the nervous system is constituted. Of course such input can be rejected (in a variety of ways, not necessarily consciously), but the fact remains that one would then be shaped by one's rejections. There simply is no escape from identifications, positive or negative, in virtue of the assumption of sociality. Thus the infant unconsciously makes identifications which later may come to be consciously examined, and as he grows up his identifications hopefully will be made through conscious evaluation.[1] The importance of the stress here given to identification will come out in the next chapter.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 103f.

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 104.

Finally under cognitive learning Allport specifies the principle of subsidiation. Allport has in mind under this head the drive of the organism for completeness, for the completing of the task, of the organizing character of all cognition. Recall for instance the way an unfinished problem may haunt one. Allport puts it in the following way:

> We are saying. . .that thought-processes to some extent contain their own motivation: they insist on forming firmer structures, on completing unfinished business, on putting bits and pieces of experience into systems of meaning.[2]

Here is easily seen the place of order. A point to remember in regard to this principle is the connection of motivation with thought-processes. As will be seen later, the fundamental character of order manifests itself in a drive for unity as a basic motive of the system.

The third group of principles Allport singles out as necessary for an adequate understanding of learning is that of participation or biographical learning. As already indicated, the assumption of individuality comes more to the fore in this type of learning. And because the individuality is always social, so does sociality. The principles All-

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 105.

[2] *Ibid*.

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port specifies are those of attention and intent to learn, task-involvement and ego-involvement.

By "attention and intent to learn" Allport has in mind the fact that any one will likely learn more if he gives his attention and intends to learn rather than simply going through the motions.[1] The point is clearly upon the orientation of the person which Allport believes is neglected by the S-R and cognitive theories.

The second principle, that of task-involvement, goes beyond that of the above principle in that the above may envision only a mentally attentive learner who is physically uninvolved. Thus this second principle has in mind the physical involvement of the learner in actually working something out.[2] The model here would appear to be John Dewey's emphasis upon learning by doing. Again the reason for the importance of this type of learning over passive learning is not simply the emphasis upon the person but upon the person in terms of a more complete involvement of his total neurophysiological system.

The third principle, that of ego-involvement or personal relevance, turns again on the assumption of individuality and the particular organization--or that which is central in the organization--of the self.[3] But none of this would be the case were it not for the fundamental sociality of the person; participation can only be crucial if man is in some sense fundamentally participatory.

Before I conclude this chapter, Allport's general schematic for personality must be set out and the major issue to be taken up in the next chapter must also be specified, for it can most clearly be seen by a consideration of his general schema and the principles just enumerated.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 106. [3] Ibid., p. 107.

It has already been noted that personality emerges from the homogeneous biological system of the infant. This comes about through exposure and the resulting increase of differentiation and integration. Such differentiation and integration take place at all levels of personality. Allport sets out the following hierarchy of integrative levels.

> *Conditioned reflexes*, the simplest learned forms of adaptive behavior. Responsiveness to a substitute stimulus becomes integrated with an innate reflex system.
>
> *Habits*, integrated systems of conditioned reflexes, involving expecially "reinforced" responses.
>
> *Personal traits*, more dynamic and flexible dispositions, resulting, at least in part, from the integration of specific habits. Belonging to this level are dispositions called sentiments, values, needs, interests.
>
> "*Selves*," systems of traits that are coherent among themselves, but likely to vary in different situations. (Cf. the statement of William James that a man "has as many different social selves as there are distinct *groups* of persons about whose opinion he cares.") An extreme example would be the case of "multiple personality" as represented in Robert Louis Stevenson's fictional story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.
>
> *Personality*, the progressive but never complete integration of all systems that deal with an individual's characteristic adjustments to his various environments.[1]

Allport presents the following diagram to represent his integration theory of personality.



Figure 13. Schematic Representation of Integration[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

The diagram of course is meant to indicate both the differentiated and the integrated characters of personality. In terms of this schematic of the differentiation and integration of personality, some considerations with respect to the coherence of the principles of learning that Allport sets out are in order. It should be clear from the exposition of the principles of learning that Allport does not spell out their mutual coherence. From the manner in which they are set out in Allport's work they could be looked upon as separate. Allport evidently does not understand them as separate but as working simultaneously and as in a system. Thus the question of their mutual coherence is posed.

In my judgment, what Allport has done is to have selected from the various types of research done on learning those principles of learning which are consistent with his fundamental assumptions, which in turn have been formed through his attempt to take seriously the full reality of man. This is a particular manifestation of what I indicated earlier in this chapter[1] to be a general limiting feature of Allport's work. Part of the problem in setting out the mutual coherence of the principles of learning is that for the most part they are set out abstractly from the development of personality in any full sense. Since the principles of learning are for Allport actually primary principles in development of personality, it should be clear that their mutual coherence must be made out in terms of the unity of personality.

In my judgment it is not necessary for the purposes of this dissertation to set out in any definitive way the coherence of the principles of learning. However it is necessary to set out Allport's understanding of personality. For the principles of learning are abstracted from the unity of personality for the purpose of understanding the development of personality; therefore the problem of their mutual coherence is not extrinsic to my purpose. I do not believe their actual coherence needs to be spelled out for my purposes. Rather, attention needs to be given here only to the general considerations for and something of the nature of that coherence.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 93f.

The development of personality, as already indicated, is to be understood in terms of the emergence of psychic differentiation and integration and the increase of such. The ground of such emergence is the neurophysiological organism. In my judgment the unity of the principles of learning in terms of Allport's thought lies in the manner in which the organism is understood. Allport's quarrel with S-R theory is really deeper than personality. It finally has to do with the proper characterization of the organism. This can be seen in Allport's critique of S-R theory in respect to drives.

> The error of S-R theory lies in its old-fashioned image of neural organization in terms of a bundle of myriad specific drives and reinforced separate habits. Just as physics has ceased to think of nature as a composite of centimeter-gram-second units, so modern neurophysiology turns away from the specific reinforced habit to the dynamic neural field that has primacy over specific response habits.[1]

With this critique in view it should be clear that Allport holds to an understanding of the organism as fundamentally a system. This is of course what is to be expected on the basis of his fundamental assumption of organization. As the physiological system develops, (maturation), personality likewise develops. Allport's quarrel with respect to S-R

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[1] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 248; see also p. 345, n. 12.

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theory and its learning principles is that such theory neglects the fact of organization. By this he means to include the energies of the neurophysiological system, though this is not always clear in the way he proceeds. Once this is clear it means that the S-R principles must be so formed as to take account of this organization and the modifications of the system that result from contact with the environment. Allport's way of doing this is simply to point out that S-R type learning is never as mechanical as it is supposed to be. It is always quasi-mechanical. This results from ignoring the fact of the organization of the individual and the individuality of the organism. He speaks of the growth that occurs on this level as "opportunistic", by which he means:

> . . .the learning of myriad subsystems that aid our adjustment but never seem to enter the central lattice of life. Such subsystems include automatic biological adaptations, partially reflex in character (respiration, digestion, and the like), as well as many of our tribal conformities (e.g., the wearing of clothes, or brushing of teeth); likewise many of our skills, including the use of our native language.[1]

The central point is that in all of the early learning what is taking place is the growth of differentiation and integration of personality. Each development then qualifies the rest. The data of the environment will be "gated" according to the developed systems and unity of personality.[2] Hence each level in the hierarchy of personality in Allport's schematic of integration should be examined for the general kind of transformation that the new level introduces to personality.

Let us return to the principles of learning. All principles of learning for Allport are grounded in the neurophysiological organism, which is itself in the process of maturation. The neurophysiological organism is to be understood as characterized in terms of the fundamental assumptions. This in fact is only a restatement of Allport's fundamental assumption of naturalism. As the organism is in the process of physical maturation, so personality is in the process of development. Allport believes the S-R learning adequate so long as confined to animals and young children, but inadequate for more sophisticated forms of organization and self-consciousness. While such may be the case, this serves to blunt Allport's efforts to set out the principles of learning in any systematic way. For the way Allport sets the principles out, it is as if there is a priority to the S-R principles. Yet his misgivings about them are in terms of his fundamental assumptions. Hence they cannot have priority without serious problems--such problems as, for instance, explaining the emergence of organization and individuality. Rather, the organism must be characterized in terms of the fundamental assumptions in order that these features may become of major importance in learning. Instead of beginning with S-R principles, I suggest that all organisms be viewed as fundamentally social in character, so that all learning is participatory and in terms of the unique organization and individuality of the organism. Within these categories, early learning is still of course subject to quasi-mechanical principles, but these should be reshaped to make proper allowance for the factors of organization and individuality, however slight these might initially ~~be~~. As personality is transformed through the emergence of higher levels of differentiation and integration, so personality takes on new dimensions of range and degree; and this likewise means a transformation in range and degree of the principles of learning and not simply a more sophisticated form of S-R learning, as S-R theorists would argue.[1]

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[1] _Becoming_, p. 63. [2] _Pattern and Growth_. . ., p. 248.

The major transformation that occurs in the development of personality is that introduced by the emergence of self-awareness. The unconscious drive for unity (integration) that has characterized the organism to that point gives way partially to self-conscious direction whereby all systems within personality stand to be qualified by the degree and range of this self-consciousness. The next chapter will give special attention to the emergence of self-consciousness and what this means for personality. Right now in regard to the mutual coherence of the principles of learning all I want to stress by way of summary is the following. All learning is fundamentally social of a neurophysiological organism that is characterized by growth, organization and individuality. The organization is always emergent, consisting of increasing differentiation and integration on both the physical and psychic levels. It proceeds from unconsciousness to the emergence of some consciousness and some self-consciousness, each of which introduces changes in the organism. Learning principles should probably be formed in such a way as to be reflective of one or the other of these aspects of the organism. Early development is undoubtedly opportunistic and much of it unconscious as will be seen in the next chapter. In early development unconscious learning is to the fore, with identification and broad learning sets prominent principles. But just as personality is a developmental process, so also learning must be so viewed. In this respect then learning theory should be formulated in terms of the emergence and increasing range and degree of intensity of the final trans-

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[1] _Ibid_., pp. 95, 247f.

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formation within personality, to wit, the emergence of conscious self-direction.

I trust that this serves to indicate something of my reservations regarding Allport's manner of setting out the principles of learning as well as indicating the manner in which I believe his problem of the mutual coherence of the principles of learning can be resolved in terms of his own fundamental assumptions. As already indicated, the actual resolution and systematic exposition of their mutual coherence is not my problem. Rather I am concerned with the development of the mature personality--or with what is normative in personality development. The key to the development is the emergence of a relatively autonomous self, for this constitutes the final transformation of personality. In the next chapter the consideration of personality as a personally acting directive system will be taken up.

Summary

Before moving on I want to summarize briefly the importance of this chapter. First, the fundamental assumptions of Allport's work have been set out and something of the way in which they function, as well as something of Allport's failure to use them fully. We will have occasion many times to come back to these assumptions in the over-all purpose of this dissertation.

Secondly, the general outline of Allport's theory of personality has been presented. This is crucial for the substantive work of the dissertation, and especially for the next chapter.

Thirdly, a number of principles of learning have been reviewed. These will be helpful later in the dissertation in working out a con-

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ceptually adequate view of conscience and in the chapters on theological construction. The most important of these principles are registration, learning sets, identification, personal relevance and subsidiation.

PART II

CHAPTER 4

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-DIRECTIVENESS IN PERSONALITY

As indicated in the last chapter, Allport's concern is to set out a theory of personality which does justice to the full reality of man—which means for Allport an inclusion of the self-directive character of personality. Since the emergence of this self-directive character is transformative of personality and is one of the keys to the mature personality, its emergence and character must be made out. Allport does the former under the rubric of "The Evolving Sense of Self" and the latter under "functional autonomy".[1] The concern, of course, is with normative growth and maturity in self-direction. The assumption is that the former leads to the latter and that non-normative growth will likely inhibit maturity.

The procedure for making out Allport's understanding on these matters will be the following. First, Allport's understanding of the development of the sense of self will be made out, with special attention given to his treatment of the problems raised by Freud in this regard. Secondly, the character of the self will be made out in terms of Allport's treatment of motivation.

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[1] *Ibid.*, Chapter 6 and Chapter 10.

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Aspects of the Sense of Self

Allport begins the account of the evolving sense of self with the infant. The infant is not aware of himself as a self.[1] Self-consciousness is only gradually acquired according to Allport in the first five or six years of life and continues to deepen, hopefully, in range and degree throughout a person's life.[2] Allport singles out seven aspects of the process: (1) sense of bodily self; (2) sense of continuing self-identity; (3) self-esteem; (4) extension of self; (5) the self image; (6) self as rational coper; and (7) propriate striving. I will briefly indicate something of what Allport means by each of these aspects.

1. Sense of bodily self -- Allport understands the bodily self as emergent from the strains of the physical organism, its encounters with objects, etc., together with the maturation of the requisite equipment of the nervous system for memory.[3] He cites evidence that the bodily sense is not simply the first aspect of the sense of self to emerge but that it is "a lifelong anchor for our self-awareness."[4] Infants kept from outside stimulation seem slow to develop, and older persons similarly deprived begin to lose, a sense of self.

2. Sense of continuing self-identity -- By a sense of continuing self-identity Allport means to single out the experience of identity through change that everyone has. So despite the fact that one is years away from his childhood, he still believes himself to have an identity that is continuous through that span. The emergence of the sense of self-identity begins in the second year and is occasioned, Allport believes,

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 111. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 111f. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 113. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

largely by the factor of language.[1] "When the child can speak and think in terms of toys, or his shoes or daddy, he has tools for relating the it to the I. By sometimes leaving and sometimes returning to the object and by speaking its name, the inference grows that the I is the continuing factor in these intermittent relationships."[2] Allport indicates that this early sense of self-identity is one that can easily come and go. Only as the child develops does this sense become firmly established. Hence the importance of healthy development.

3. Self-esteem -- By self-esteem Allport means to single out the child's emerging desire to do for himself. Allport indicates that it is really more an "exploratory drive" which when thwarted calls forth a response like that of personal injury. Through experiences of this sort "the child becomes acutely aware of himself."[3] Such development often takes the form of negativism to the suggestions of others.

4. Extension of self -- Allport means by "the extension of self" to cover the phenomenon of the relations with others and things we gradually come to appreciate.[4] The process of extension is naturally enough minimal at first, but gradually may come to extend for some people to the cosmos.

5. Self-image -- The self-image is also rudimentary for the child. It is given shape through the interaction process with others, most especially with the child's parents. The self-image determines for the child the perception of the expectations others have for him and in terms of this image he may judge his own behavior.[5]

6. Self as rational coper -- The "self as rational coper" has reference

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[1] Ibid., p. 115. [2] *Ibid*. [3] *Ibid*., p. 118.

[4] *Ibid*., p. 122. [5] *Ibid*., p. 123.

to the intellectual development of the child. While the child has been solving problems from early childhood, he gradually comes to think about thought itself and himself as one who thinks.[1]

According to Allport the major factors involved in the emergence and intensification of these aspects of the self are, in addition to physical and nervous maturation, the acquisition of language and the structuring of the socialization process, which is normally marked by entry into school in Western society.

7. Propriate striving -- The final and key aspect to the development of the self is that of propriate striving. By propriate striving Allport means the process of determining one's future in terms of occupation, goal, etc. This is the process of becoming self-directive, of planning one's future. As Allport puts it, "until youth begins to plan, the sense of self is not complete."[2]

The Unity of the Self

Allport chooses the term "proprium" to refer to the unity of these seven aspects of "the me as felt and known."[3] Allport is aware that most writers would choose the term "self" to refer to the unity of these aspects of selfhood, but he prefers not to because the self or ego is often used in special ways and because there is the philosophical problem of the self as knower that remains.[4] I take it that what Allport is getting at here is the distinction between the self as known and the self as active knower. For the problem of the self is not of the self as known and felt, which Allport refers to as the proprium, but with the self as active knower. What finally is questionable is the characterization that is to be given to the knower. Allport is cautious at this point and indeed never, to my knowledge, comes out with an understanding of the self as knower. All he does is to indicate considerations relative to the self as knower that must be taken into account. These do have the effect of eliminating the understanding of the self as some transcendental or substantial self, or mysterious agent within personality.[1] If there is to be a solution to the problem of the self as knower, according to Allport it must be in terms of the structures and processes of personality if it is to be useful for psychological purposes.[2] I will return to these issues after the discussion of motivation.

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[1] Ibid., p. 124.

[2] Ibid., p. 126f.

[3] Ibid., p. 127.

[4] Ibid.

The Status of the Unconscious

From this brief introduction to the emergence of the sense of self in personality I want now to turn to the problems raised by Freud in his analysis of personality. It will be recalled that for Freud the conscious layer of personality was virtually at the disposal of the irrational pleasure-governed id, the demands of the external world and the aggressive super-ego. We have already noted how Allport posed the issue between himself and Freud.[3] To orient the present discussion I will repeat here Allport's statement.

> The issue is this: Does the conscious layer (Freud calls it the ego) have an autonomy and function of its own, or does it always serve the purposes and motives that are deeply embedded in the unconscious?. . . .[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 129.

[2] Ibid., p. 130.

[3] Supra, p. 96.

[4] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 144.

> Does the unconscious (with its primitive and archaic character) dominate the structure and functioning of personality, or does the conscious stratum do so? If both are effective, under what conditions and in what proportion does each take control?[1]

I want to come immediately to what I regard as the heart of the problem. In my judgment Allport often grants too much to Freud. That is to say, he appears most often to go along with Freud's characterization of the unconscious as irrational and pleasure-governed.[2] He notes almost incidentally that this might be challenged. However, as I read Allport he never challenges this characterization in any fundamental way. As should be clear from what has already been covered in this dissertation, Allport's fundamental assumptions point to another characterization of the unconscious. Stated directly, it is the following. The instinctual energies of the organism are to be understood as social, as ordered uniquely to the individual and as creative. This means that they are always pressing for a relative unity or balance on the level of biological functions, while on the cognitive level for intellectual completeness, and on the psychic level for self-actualization.

The energies of the body are in many respects highly organized when the infant is born. The organism functions exceedingly well and develops in quite an orderly way. Organization is the first word with regard to the organism. There is no need therefore to introduce a sharp distinction between the conscious and the unconscious aspects of personality. The conscious is simply the unconscious become conscious, in some respects, and self aware, so that personality becomes self-directive in the drive for unity. Thus the self for Allport is not to be thought of as imposing order or reason upon the irrational, instinctual energies of man from outside, but rather as the conscious self-direction of the fundamental drive for unity that already characterizes the organism.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 145.

[2] _Ibid_., pp. 145f, 152.

Freud argued that the ego has no energy of its own; Allport contests this.[1] The basis of Allport's argument is not too clear to me. His ploy is to stress that the self or ego must have energy of its own so that it is not necessarily at the mercy of the unconscious. My guess is that he sees this energy in cognitive processes which seem to "contain their own motivation,"[2] and in ego-involvement which also is motivated toward self-actualization.[3] But nowhere to my knowledge does Allport account for this energy. He apparently is willing to go along part way at least with Freud's account of the unconscious, but insists that the ego has its own energy. My own judgment, of course, is that strictly in terms of his own system Allport has a more coherent solution. The ego does not have any energy apart from the unconscious. It does not need any, for there is no need for a sharp discontinuity between the unconscious and the conscious in Allport's theory.

If what I have been saying is true, then the issue is joined at another point. Freud's theoretical understanding entailed that everyone is neurotic; for everyone is dominated by the unconscious with its irrational desires which of course create problems when dealing with the world.[4] Freud's effort in psychoanalysis was that of replacing id by ego or helping a person overcome his necessary neurosis. A great problem with Freud is that of accounting for normal healthy development.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 148-50.

[2] Ibid., p. 105.

[3] Ibid., p. 107.

[4] Supra, p. 59f.

This is no problem for that portion of Allport that I have thus far presented. What is a problem in terms of the last few pages is how to account for neurosis if what I have said on the basis of Allport is correct. It is this issue which must be faced. Indeed it is the primary issue to which Allport addresses himself in respect to Freud. He puts the issue in the following form.

> . . .Freud felt that psychoanalysis offered the "entire foundation" for the science of psychology. He felt that his formulations were not confined to "morbid processes", but characterized all human mental life. It is precisely this position we challenge.[1]

I will now set out Allport's solution to the problem posed by Freud. Following this I will make some theoretical proposals on the basis of this solution which will be consistent with the overall thrust of Allport's thought. I will then return to the development of the self-system and review it in light of these matters as well as other material from Allport and Erik Erikson.

Allport concedes that neurotic and normal people partake of many of the same symptoms. "Ego-defense mechanisms are present in all personalities."[2] His criticism of Freud is that while this is true, there is nevertheless a considerable difference between the processes making for normality and for abnormality.[3] Allport notes that in a neurotic or abnormal person is found a compulsive imbalance;[4] that "the truest and most general statement about the neuroses seems to be that they are a reflection of uncontrolled self-centeredness."[5] He goes on to write:

> Normal people may be selfish, anxious, and demanding. It is not the quality of an act that makes it neurotic. The distinction

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[1] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 150. [2] Ibid., p. 164.

[3] Ibid., p. 153. [4] Ibid., p. 151. [5] Ibid.

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> lies rather in the automatic, compulsive, dissociated character of neurotic conduct.[1]

Allport understands this "automatic, compulsive, dissociated character of neurotic conduct" as the operation of unconscious factors in personality.[2] Concerning this he writes, "A neurotic system of motivation is blind, largely unconscious, automatic, and disconnected from the remainder of life."[3]

In the normal life, Allport argues, the processes making for balance have the upper hand, while in the abnormal life the processes making for imbalance have the upper hand. In a moment we will take a look at the respective processes. In order to illustrate the relative continuity and discontinuity between the symptoms and processes making for normality and abnormality respective to consciousness, preconsciousness, and unconsciousness, Allport presents a diagram adapted from Kubie.


Purposive planning and reality testing
Normal creativity and imagination
Creativity in the neurotic
Distortion of reality in the insane
Consciousness
Preconsciousness
Unconsciousness

Figure 17. Varying Proportions of Conscious and Unconscious Dominance in Personalities[4]

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 152.

[3] *Ibid*.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

Allport means this diagram to indicate the considerable difference between lives shaped consciously and those "driven" by unconscious neurotic factors. Additionally it calls attention to the preconscious and suggests its importance for creativity. Important for my purposes is the following:

> The diagram also recognizes a continuous series of personalities from those almost completely dominated by their conscious purposes and in continuous contact with reality, through personalities with less insight and less integration and somewhat more dominated by both preconscious and unconscious functions, to the clearly abnormal cases whose lives are more and more controlled by dissociated and unconscious systems.[1]

Allport goes on to point out that one can easily see a sense in which Freud is right that there is a continuity between abnormality and normality. But this is a continuity of symptoms as already noted. There is a delicate balance, Allport argues, between normality and abnormality, and when this balance is tipped in favor of the unconscious then the factors that govern the unconscious dominate personality. Allport's vision seems to be that unconscious factors are irrational, automatic, compulsive, etc. For reasons that should be apparent, I find this inconsistent with the basic thrust of Allport's thought. The reason different processes come into play will come out as I proceed.

Allport singles out a number of polar processes making for normality and abnormality. Among the most important of these polar processes are confrontation and escape. It is normal and healthy for one to confront the world and deal with it appropriately, rather than to attempt to escape from it. The latter would be a process of abnormality. Allport is clear that we all do some escaping, but escape is not dominant in the normal personality. On the other hand, the dominance of escape leads to lack of integration and indeed to disintegration of personality and inability to deal effectively with the world.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 152f.

Allport lists the following polar processes that lead to abnormality or normality:[1]

Making for abnormality	*Making for normality*
escapism (fantasy)	confrontation (reality testing)
ineffective repression (with troublesome aftereffect)	effective repression (total exclusion of unwanted impulses and thoughts. . .)
self-deception	self-insight
disintegration (dissociation)	integration (progressive organization)
narrowing thinking to concrete adjustments	abstraction (ability to think *about* things)
uncontrolled impulsivity	frustration tolerance
fixation at juvenile level	autonomy appropriate to age and experience

It is Allport's conviction that such processes leading to abnormality are the result of bad developmental experiences. In this he is in agreement with Freud to some extent.[2] An interesting feature of Allport's analysis is his assessment of the mechanisms of ego-defense that Freud posited. He singles out such mechanisms as repression, denial, rationalization, projection, fixation and regression, reaction formation, sublimation and compensation. Allport agrees with Freud that these are "protective strategies we all employ in order to guard our self-esteem."[3]

If I understand Allport aright, what he is suggesting in his account of these mechanisms is that they all turn on the fundamental reality of the individuality of personality. When the self-system is

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 154. [2] *Ibid*., p. 151. [3] *Ibid*., p. 155.

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unable to maintain itself in the face of others, it may resort to such mechanisms for protection. When such mechanisms gain the upper hand, the situation makes for abnormality. Allport's point, however, is that these mechanisms only illustrate his fundamental assumption of individuality; for if the individuality of personality is not properly developed, the defense mechanisms will become dominant, thereby causing severe personality problems.

In a moment I will take up the subject of proper or healthy development of individuality or the self-directive aspect of personality. At this point I want to reflect on what we have just gone over and make some proposals, on the basis of Allport's fundamental assumptions, for understanding this material in a systematic manner.

In terms of the account given by Allport of normality/abnormality in personality, it has been seen that the Freudian view of the universal neurosis of mankind is a misreading of the data. On Allport's reading, the developmental process is open; personality may develop along a wide spectrum of normality or abnormality. But if this is so then a more adequate understanding of the factors leading to personality development must be given than that of Freud. This has already been done to some extent through the specification of different developmental processes making for normality and abnormality. At this point I want to focus upon Freud's account of the unconscious. I have noted that Allport seems to go along at points with Freud's account of the unconscious, and seems to indicate its possible invalidity only at one point.[1] I have already indicated that in terms of his fundamental assumptions

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[1] *Supra*, p. 127.

Allport must view the organism and its energy as organized and yet open for differentiation, always with a drive for unity.

If this is correct then I believe I am in a position to indicate the fundamental problem in Freud's conceptuality. There is no need to introduce two different instincts--the life and the death instincts--as Freud does. Rather the energy of the organism is to be thought of as fundamentally social in character. Thus the developing organism literally requires others for its development. To the extent that this requirement is fulfilled, personality may develop normally. To the extent that such meaningful relations do not obtain, personality may develop in abnormal ways, such as developing a positive disdain for others or as Allport indicates "will do anything to be loved except to make himself (herself) lovable."[1]

I believe this addresses directly the clinical data upon which Freud rested his case. The clinical data that Freud turned up were often sexual in nature or at least seemed to yield not unnaturally to an erotic interpretation. In part such personality disorders are to be understood as culturally conditioned, given the kind of moral tone prevailing in Freud's time. But additionally this data, as Freud thought, may well be indicative of the fundamental structure of personality, though not quite in the manner Freud posited. For in the way I have been moving in terms of Allport, Freud's clinical data may be accounted for just as adequately if not more so by regarding personality as fundamentally social; and the deepest expression of such sociality being in the experience of the sexual dimension, it is no wonder that bad experiences in this dimension may result in psychic disorders. I believe this account squares much better with the clinical data than does Freud's. Recall how often the data in the hands of a Freudian seems forced into sexual imagery. Consider for instance the case Erikson cites of the attractive dancer who "developed the annoying symptom of having to hold her torso so rigidly upright that dancing became awkward and ungainly."[1] Without going into the details of the case, the symptom was seen as related to her inadequate relations with her father who had paid her little attention while giving much attention to his sons, insisting upon an erect posture from them but not requiring it of his daughter. Ordinarily one would say she was still living out the neglect of her father. Erikson clearly demonstrates this in an otherwise apparently quite subtle analysis. Nevertheless, evidently because of his Freudian framework, he asserts that "the analysis proved her hysterical erectness to be a break-through of a penis envy."[2] I simply ask if the fundamental characterization of psychic energy as social, and her frustration in this regard by a significant other, would not make more sense of such data.

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[1] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 151.

I want now to draw out an implication of this social character of psychic energy. In terms of Allport's fundamental assumptions this sociality must be viewed in conjunction with his other fundamental assumptions, especially growth and relative autonomy and the necessary ever-new integration of personality. A crucial factor in this development then will be how personality perceives its world. There is in this theoretical understanding no escape from this fundamental sociality. The only

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[1] _Identity and the Life Cycle_, p. 29. [2] _Ibid_.

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question is how the emergent unity of personality is to be qualified. For instance, does the pervasive unity of personality allow it to deal effectively with--that is, appropriate--its world in a realistic manner? For personality development a major question is what experiences foster a rich and realistic form of sociality and which a poor and unrealistic one. According to the fundamental assumptions of Allport, a personality cannot help but be unified in some sense.[1] Such a unity can only be realistic if the particular manner of the unity of personality allows the personality to deal effectively with its world.

This introduces an element into the analysis of personality that has been lacking thus far in any full sense. What I am getting at falls under the rubric of sets[2] or personal dispositions[3] in Allport's way of setting things out. Traits, sets, dispositions are all terms used in roughly interchangeable ways by Allport. They are used particularly to get beyond habits and the like to the more integrative or organized aspects of personality.[4] In understanding personality there is clearly more than the imput of data, their relations, the decision of personality and new integration. There is the affective tone, how the data are felt and so how they are unified by personality.

Allport does not appear to have used any special terminology for this type of trait or set. It is clear, nevertheless, that this aspect of personality is not left out in his treatment of personality.[5] The affective tone of personality is clearly crucial in the development of

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[1] When unity is wholly lacking, it is questionable as to whether we should speak of personality.

[2] Pattern and Growth. . ., pp. 102, 259ff. [3] Ibid., Chap. 15.

[4] Ibid., p. 345ff. [5] Cf. for instance Ibid., p. 271.

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personality, for it determines how one perceives. How personality is affectively toned therefore will be a major factor in one's potentiality for dealing with his world.

With these observations in mind I want now to return to the subject of the normal or healthy development of personality. We have seen that the organism is understood as energies basically geared toward the achievement of a relative unity and that this unity may become self-directive through the emergence of self-consciousness. Through self-consciousness and the exercise of cognitive capacities, personality deals more effectively with its environment and so achieves a more realistic and richer unity. The possibility of such, however, is grounded upon the adequate development of affective tone. Basic to such adequate affective tone would appear to be a sense of trust. Allport speaks of the trust/distrust spectrum in regard to early development[1] and learning sets.[2] He does not appear to make much of this directly, though it is clearly just under the surface in much of his work. His citations are usually to Erik Erikson on this subject; therefore I now turn to Erikson for understanding the importance of the trust/distrust spectrum.

Erikson understands this spectrum as constituting the first decisive developmental stage in personality. For future healthy development, it is necessary that personality come through this on the side of trust. Trust is meant here to include self-reference as well as reference to the world of one's experience. According to Erikson, trust should be understood as a basic attitude which is all pervasive. It transcends the distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness, for instance. Such attitudes "are ways of conscious experience, accessible to introspection (where it develops); ways of behaving, observable by others; and unconscious inner states determinable by test and analysis."[1] Thus I take it that what Erikson means by basic attitude here is included in what I have singled out as affective tone.

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[1] Ibid., p. 78.

[2] Ibid., p. 102.

It is important to note that the formation of a basic sense of trust or distrust, or any of the basic attitudes, is not something we consciously work out. Rather such formation is largely unconscious and formed in the early years--hence the crucial importance of the early years in development. At this point it might be worth observing that such development is gradual and to a large extent open-ended. Neither Allport nor Erikson is as fatalistic or deterministic on this point as Freud. The reason for this, in Allport at least, lies in the fact that the neurophysiological is in the process of developing also. This leads, for instance, to his discounting the possibility that the birth event itself is a trauma of such strength as to leave a lasting scar upon personality.[2] For it is questionable, according to Allport, as to whether the nervous system is sufficiently developed for such to happen.

This means now that there is always an openness to the basic attitudes. They may be formed in various ways early, but as development proceeds they may be transformed into more healthy or more pathological attitudes. The point however is that all development is social. Therefore those responsible for the development of the child need to create an environment that is relatively stable, in the sense that it can be counted upon to fulfill the basic needs of the infant in terms of safety, love, food, etc. Erikson points to the importance of the quality of such care.

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[1] Erikson, p. 56.

[2] Allport, p. 254.

> Mothers create a sense of trust in their children by that kind of administration which in its quality combines sensitive care of the baby's individual needs and a firm sense of personal trustworthiness within the trusted framework of their community's life style.[1]

The immediate implication is that it takes relatively healthy persons as the responsible agents in nourishing infants into healthy personalities. The import of this will come out later.

Erikson goes on to indicate a number of later stages as decisive in the development of the healthy personality throughout the total life cycle of a person.

Early childhood	Autonomy	vs.	Shame, doubt
Play age	Initiative	"	Guilt
School age	Industry	"	Inferiority
Adolescence	Identity	"	Identity diffusion
Young adult	Intimacy	"	Isolation
Adulthood	Generativity	"	Self-absorption
Mature age	Integrity	"	Disgust, despair[2]

It is not my intention to go into these stages. I only note them to indicate something of the developmental stages that form the basis of personality. There is, of course, some overlap with the seven aspects of the evolving sense of self reviewed earlier. The point of the present discussion however is with the qualitative character of such development; whether for instance the evolving sense of self is one that is characterized by initiative or guilt, industry or inferiority.[3] The first five are more germane to my present point about affective tone or qualitative

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[1] Erikson, p. 63.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 119ff.

[3] For the importance Allport attaches to this factor in personality see his discussion of inferiority, *Pattern and Growth*. . ., p. 130f.

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character. These stages may be distinguished from the aspects of the evolving sense of self by a consideration of what might appear to be an obvious overlap. Allport writes that what he means by propriate striving is what Erikson means by self-identity.[1] I think this is correct. On the other hand, Erikson distinguishes between ego-identity and self-identity while Allport uses ego and self interchangeably and hence may not have made Erikson's distinction. Now my point is that ego-identity in Erikson corresponds more closely to the qualitative character that I am getting at. By ego-identity Erikson does not mean the actually achieved identity of a person, but rather he has reference to ego functions, to the strength of a person's self-directive functions which really are a summation of the earlier stages into a unity. This ego-identity is a sense of surety about oneself.[2]

The importance of this qualitative character can be seen in Allport's discussion of cognitive fixedness and flexibility.[3] He notes that from various quarters the following conclusion has been reached: "some people are chronically unable to change their sets when objective conditions demand it; others, by contrast, are flexible."[4] The flexible are designated as field-independent while the fixed are labelled as field-dependent. What investigators have found out is that the field-dependent persons "lack ability to initiate, are in many respects passive, and submit readily to the forces of authority; they are not insightful regarding their inner life, and fear their own aggressive and sexual impulses; they tend to have low self-esteem and low self-acceptance."[1]

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[1] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 124.

[2] Cf. Identity and the Life Cycle, pp. 147ff, and Identity: Youth and Crisis, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1968), p. 210f.

[3] Pattern and Growth. . ., pp. 267ff.

[4] Ibid., p. 267.

Field-independent persons on the other hand "have initiative and organizing ability; they are active and want to achieve; they are aware of their own inner life and accept their impulses even while they have good control over them; they have high self-esteem and self-acceptance."[2]

Thus the importance of the affective tone of personality is seen. For as Allport puts it, the basic requirement "laid upon all men is to handle the world competently enough to survive. Unless we keep reasonably close in tune with 'reality', we die."[3] Therefore it is necessary for a full life that the affective tone be such that we can deal realistically with the world.

Motivation and the Self

In order to complete the understanding of the self I turn now to a consideration of motivation. In a real sense all of the issues Allport has been arguing come to a head on the subject of motivation. Motivation is, as Allport puts it, the "go" of personality.[4] Or again, "By motive we mean any internal condition in the person that induces action or thought."[5] In terms of our previous analysis it should be clear that Allport will find inadequate all theories which he believes deny a relatively autonomous motivational character to personality. He does not disappoint us.[6] At this point I am not so much concerned with Allport's critique of other views as with his own constructive position. It will be worthwhile to recall for a moment the general types of learning principles Allport singled out--the quasi-mechanical (S-R), the cognitive and the participatory. To each of these there is, it would seem, a corresponding general type of motivation. To the quasi-mechanical there is homeostasis, to the cognitive there is cognitive completeness (subsidiation), to the participatory there is self-actualization. I am not saying Allport would necessarily endorse this as his position, especially if made out in a restrictive way, but it does correspond to his over-all thrust. Just as Allport finds something valuable in each of the general types of learning principles, so he finds something right about each of these views of motivation if understood properly, which means they must be understood within their proper limitations. From what we have already shown it should be clear that Allport will nevertheless have reservations about the S-R theorists' understanding of motivation. For according to Allport, S-R understanding of motivation does not allow for growth[1] and hence is more appropriate for a closed system than for personality which for Allport is an open system.[2] It is in this respect that Allport insists upon a theory of changing motives over against the more prevailing theories of unchanging motives.[3]

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 268. [2] _Ibid_. [3] _Ibid_., p. 261. [4] _Ibid_., p. 218.

[5] _Ibid_., p. 196. [6] _Ibid_., pp. 198-212.

Allport is quite guarded in regard to instinct, need, drive, etc., theories of motivation on the basis that these operate unconsciously and thus do not allow for conscious self-direction. It is not the push of the organism from the past that is decisive for Allport's theory of motivation, but the future envisioned, planned and striven for by the person. Thus Allport sets down the following requirements for an adequate theory of motivation. Such a theory must (1) "acknowledge the contemporaneity of motives";[1] (2) allow for motives of many types;[2] (3) "ascribe dynamic force to cognitive processes--e.g., to planning and intention";[3] and (4) "allow for the concrete uniqueness of motives."[4]

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 89. [2] _Ibid_., p. 568ff. [3] _Ibid_., pp. 198-217.

By the requirement of "contemporaneity" Allport means that whatever moves one must be effective in the "present state of the organism."[5] In this sense the past is only important to the extent that it is presently active.[6] Allport's point is that it cannot be said that the past automatically determines the present. The open-endedness of personality that Allport stresses means that there is always room for change. And while present motivation is related to the past, it is not a strict implication from the past.

By his emphasis upon the plurality of motives Allport wants to draw attention to the vast variety of motives and to insist that those theorists who try to reduce motives to a single type are over-simplifying the actual state of things. Allport writes that

> motives are so diverse in type that we find it difficult to discover the common denominator. About all we can say is that a person's motives include all that he is trying (consciously or unconsciously, reflexly or deliberately) to do.[7]

The insistence upon the ascription of dynamic force to cognitive processes is far-reaching. For Allport it means that "we should not sharply separate. . .cognitive motives from those that are traditionally called conative or affective."[8] As was noted earlier in reference to the cognitive learning principle of subsidiation, thought processes contain their own motive force. Allport believes that intentions do in fact indicate the fusion of desire and reason.[1] He asserts that the re-introduction of the concept of intention into motivation theory allows for the following four important features:

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 220.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 221.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 222.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 225.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 220.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 221.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 223.

> 1. The cognitive and emotive processes become fused into an integral urge.
>
> 2. The intention, like all motivation, exists in the present, but has strong future orientation. Use of the concept helps us to trace the course of motivation as lives are actually lived--into the future and not, as most theories do, backward into the past. It tells us what sort of future a person is trying to bring about, and this is the most important question we can ask about any mortal.
>
> 3. The term has a flavor of "tension-maintained" and thus reflects the true condition of all long-range motives.
>
> 4. When we identify major intentions in a life we have a device for holding subsidiary trends in perspective.[2]

Allport is clear that he does not mean to say that one is always aware of his own intentions.[3] But when one is not aware of his predominant intentions, then according to Allport something may be seriously wrong.

The stress Allport puts upon the concrete uniqueness of motives is meant to give precedence to the uniqueness of each personality. Concreteness is emphasized here in contrast to the abstract motives posited by other theories of motivation. Some of the examples Allport gives are:

Concrete	Abstract
Mary has a strong desire to become a professional nurse.	She is cathecting an aim-inhibited sexual wish (Freudian)
William hopes to become a top-notch mechanic.	He is thus expressing his need-achievement (Need theory)

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 224.

Thomas hopes to be elected president of his club.	The wish for mastery is the motive.[1]

The criticism that evidently has been leveled at Allport for this move is that if such be the case then how is a science of motives possible? Generalization must be possible for there to be a science. Allport's response basically is that what is needed are principles (generalizations) that "help us to understand how uniqueness comes about."[2]

The concept by which Allport believes his theory of motivation hangs together is that of functional autonomy. "'Functional autonomy' refers to any acquired system of motivation in which the tensions involved are not of the same kind as the antecedent tensions from which the acquired system developed."[3] A favored example of Allport for illustrating what is meant here is that of the son who follows in the footsteps of his politician father. In his early years the boy may have identified with his father's political activities such as speech making. This may have been a real influence in his early development. But is that what motivated his chosing the political realm for a career and continuing in it in the present? Concerning this point Allport writes:

> Is it his earlier father fixation? Conceivably yes, for Joe may never have outgrown his Oedipal complex (trying to be like daddy in order to win his mother's affection). If Joe's political activity today is of this neurotic variety we shall probably find him behaving in a compulsive, rigid, even maladaptive manner. The chances, however, are that his interest in politics has outgrown its roots in "father identification". There is historical continuity but no longer any functional continuity. Politics

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 225f.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 226.

[3] Allport specifies two levels of functional autonomy, perseverative (p. 230ff) and propriate (p. 235f). For my purposes I can ignore perseverative functional autonomy and so therefore I will use "functional autonomy" to mean propriate functional autonomy.

> is now his dominant passion; it is his style of life; it is a large part of Joe's personality. The original seed has been discarded.[1]

The concept of functional autonomy is shaped in terms of Allport's fundamental assumptions. The organization of personality is always emergent from the past, but it is not a function of the past in the strict sense. Rather the emphasis of individuality means that such organization is peculiarly a work of the personality itself. The place of growth in personality together with the stress upon individuality means that personality must be an open system. It is this that is expressed in the concept of functional autonomy. In the example above, Joe's mature personality (to the extent that it is normal) is organized around his present and future political concerns.

Allport sets out a number of quasi-mechanical principles which he believes important for indicating how functional autonomy comes about.[2] For my present purpose I believe this can be ignored and I can move on to the three additional principles Allport thinks necessary for spelling out how functional autonomy comes about. These all turn for him on the "purposive nature of man".[3] The first principle he specifies is that of "organizing the energy level".[4] By this he means that it is the nature of the healthy person to always do something with his energy--not simply to rest content with past accomplishments but to continually develop new interests.[5]

The second principle he specifies is that of mastery or competence.[6] This principle as distinguished from the first focuses more on the growth

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[1] Ibid., p. 228f.

[2] Ibid., pp. 245-9.

[3] Ibid., p. 250.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., p. 251.

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of capacities than on the necessity for continued interests to channel energy. Clearly, however, they are closely related.

The third principle, and the most important for my purposes of making out the nature of the self in Allport, is that of propriate patterning.[1] By this Allport means that the motives in the healthy person are not autonomous from each other but constitute an interrelated hierarchical system. He writes that "functionally autonomous motives are highly propriate, i.e., well anchored to the self. Indeed, to a large extent they constitute the self."[2]

At this point Allport is careful to insist that he does not mean there is a self as "a mysterious inner agent (a soul)" that explains functional autonomy.[3] Rather he writes that he prefers "to say that the essential nature of man is such that it presses toward a relative unification of life (never fully achieved)."[4] In terms of this understanding of the essential nature of man no self would appear as necessary. The structure and processes of man are such that a relative unity is a requirement for the organism to be at all. The self is simply an emergent within the growth of personality. It evidently is Allport's position that the self emerges as a modification of the nervous system in response to the need to deal more adequately with the environment.[5] Such development means of course that the system can integrate more data into itself, that it can postpone immediate gratifications for the achievement of long-term goals, and so plan more realistically in terms of a larger world. Such a development thereby offers

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 252.

[2] _Ibid_.

[3] _Ibid_.

[4] _Ibid_.

[5] _Ibid_., p. 149f.

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the opportunity for a richer--in terms of the amount of data integrated--unity of experience.

It has already been seen that Allport holds the sense of self to emerge through the encounter with others where "others" is meant to be inclusive of persons and things. For Allport the possibility of such an emergence is dependent upon a certain sophistication of the nervous system.[1] For Allport it will be recalled that the sense of self comes after the awareness of the other.[2] This is an important sequence. The sense of self becomes, grows as it experiences its world. For Allport the sense of self leads finally to the propriate functions mentioned earlier which "to a large extent constitute the self"[3] and so the unity of personality. Since personality and the self are emergents from encounter with the world, this means that the unity of personality and the self must in some sense be reflective of the unity of the world. As has been seen Allport is quite clear about this.[4] Thus the possibility of the emergence of a unity to personality and self is dependent upon the unity of one's world. This has already been noted in a slightly different context. Without the experience of continuity and qualitative concern from the other, the healthy development of personality is endangered.[5] The emergence of the sense of self then is dialectically related to the unity of the world of its emergence, and initially at least to the significant others around it. The wider one's world becomes,

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[1] Ibid., pp. 113, 121. [2] Ibid., p. 113. [3] Ibid., p. 252.

[4] Supra, p. 99. To be sure for Allport the peculiar unity of personality is always a function of personality and not a mere reflection of the world.

[5] Supra, p. 138f.

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the richer in degree, range and intensity the self may be, which means at the same time the greater must be the unity of the world. The world is necessarily, for Allport, like personality, an ever-emerging system which provides man with the possibility for an ever-enriching experience of self.[1]

It has already been seen that Allport draws a distinction between the unity of the various aspects of the evolving sense of self, or the proprium, and the self as knower.[2] Unless I am quite seriously mistaken, what Allport means by the proprium is usually covered by the "empirical self", and what he means by the self as knower must also include the self as agent or intender. It was noted earlier that there is a problem about the self as knower, for "we are directly aware of the proprium in a sense that we are never directly aware of the knower."[3] I want to address myself to the problem of the knower in terms of Allport's understanding of the empirical self in the light of the material on motivation.

It has already been noted that for Allport propriate striving is the final and key stage in the developing sense of self.[4] The material on motivation indicates that *the self-system is best thought of as the structure of intentionality of personality*. This is one reason why Allport refuses to say the ego or self is co-existent with either consciousness or unconsciousness.[5] For while consciousness and self-consciousness come and go, there is a continuity to the self that seems necessary to account for. This manner of accounting for the continuity of the self does not obviously at any rate require a substantial self in the sense of something unchangeable. For clearly the whole account in Allport's hand means that this structure of intentionality is not one of pure identity through time, but that such structure is always emergent from the past and the new situations and the unique responses of the person.

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[1] *Pattern and Growth*. . ., p. 569ff. [2] *Ibid*., p. 128; *supra*, p. 125f.

[3] *Pattern and Growth*. . ., p. 127. [4] *Ibid*.; *supra*, p. 125.

[5] "The Ego in Contemporary Psychology", *Personality and Social Encounter* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 89.

More important than accounting for the continuity of the self, thinking of the self as structure of intentionality has the distinct advantage of emphasizing the unity of the person. This is because, as has been seen, intention is the fusion of the vital energies of life with the cognitive aspects.[1] The energies of the organism have already been characterized as always pressing for a relative unity or balance of the system.[2] The structure of this unity I suggest can be thought of as the pre-intentional ground of intentionality. With the emergence of consciousness and self-consciousness, the drive for unity takes on intentional character. The structure of intentionality may, of course, be narrowly formed in terms that deny for instance the rights of others. This would not mean the person is not highly integrated, but it would mean that with respect to the direction of the widest sense of unity (the intention of God), his specific unity may not be well formed. The importance of this turns on the posited assumption that personal unity derives from the unity of the other. Thus the richest sense of unity will derive from creative encounter with the widest unity or with the direction of reality taken as a whole.

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[1] _Supra_, p. 144.

[2] _Supra_, p. 127.

I turn now to the problem of the self as knower/intender. Allport does not pretend to solve this problem. His only point is that a satisfactory solution to it will be formed within the structure of personality and not outside it.[1] Strictly in terms of Allport's thought, I believe the following can be said by way of tentative solution. It is the nature of the organism to press for unity and to strive for increasing differentiation and integration. Decision is a part of this process. That is to say, there is growth, some options are taken and others excluded, however this takes place. With the emergence of self-consciousness, decision becomes a conscious function of man. The only change is that options now may be consciously considered. The apparatus for such and therefore for the self as knower would appear to be crucial in the emergence of the sense of self.[2] More could be made of this, in my judgment. For it is through the symbolizing process that man gains distance from himself and so thereby can be reflective about himself. Remember that for Allport personality is an open system. I suggest that the self as knower/intender can best be understood as the drive for unity become conscious, and this consciousness is to be located in his language at the open edge of personality.[3] To be sure, such openness and linguistic character have their corresponding possibility in the nervous system. I suggest that this understanding of the self as knower/intender makes conceptual sense of the fact that the empirical self is known directly in a way that the self as knower is not. For the self as knower/intender lurks in the openness of personality and so in a sense is not yet. The moment it moves out of the "not yet", it has become a part of the empirical self. The self as knower/intender then is always the deciding that unifies, completes each new moment of experience. Because of the distance it can attain from itself and from the world through language, the essential nature of the organism as pressing for a new integration takes on the proportions of conscious self-direction. An essential element for the emergence of the self as knower/intender is that of the openness of personality--or Allport's fundamental assumption of growth. For without the openness there would be no location for the self which would avoid a deterministic behaviorism. Thus I suggest that this tentative solution to the self as knower/intender does justice to Allport's basic thought as well as to his emphasis upon growth and individuality.

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[1] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 130. [2] Ibid., p. 115; supra, p. 123f.

[3] A somewhat fuller account of a view similar to this may be seen in Gibson Winter, Elements for a Social Ethic (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 104-9.

Summary

In this chapter I have set out the manner in which self-directiveness comes about in personality on the basis of Allport's thought. This has necessitated the specification of a number of factors of personality development that will be of help in the constructive work of this dissertation.

The distinction Erik Erikson makes between ego-identity and self-identity in order to single out the processes involved in the formation of affective tone from everything else, is made by Allport through the use of the categories of sets, disposition and traits. Ego-identity refers to the processes involved in the formation of affective tone while self-identity refers to the actual achieved identity that a person may have at any one time. This is an important distinction and one which will be utilized as I proceed.

It has been shown how it is theoretically possible to hold the instinctual and the rational together in respect to both the lowest and the highest levels of personality. In doing this I have shown how the issues raised by Freud can be effectively dealt with. This will be of some importance in the constructive work of the dissertation.

It has also been shown how the unity of personality is related to the unity of the cosmos. This will be of major importance in the extension of Allport's view of conscience and the constructive theological work.

PART II

CHAPTER 5

MATURITY AND CONSCIENCE

In this chapter I will present Allport's criteria for maturity and his view of conscience. His fundamental assumptions and a number of the principles I have presented from his theory of personality will be used in developing a fuller understanding of conscience. First, however, some remarks are in order concerning the problem of arriving at normative judgments.

The Problem of Normativeness

Allport manifests a good deal of caution in setting forth his criteria for the mature personality. "Psychologists," he writes, "cannot tell us what normality, health, or maturity of personality mean."[1] The stated reason Allport gives is that normality, etc., in these matters is not simply a matter of psychology but of ethics as well. If I understand Allport correctly, his reasoning on this matter is that the major issue to which ethics must be addressed is that of cultural relativity. How are normative judgments possible given the phenomenon of cultural relativity? Thus Allport is found to be writing much in the way that Troeltsch wrote after the collapse of his constructive program.[2]

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[1] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 307; see also p. 275.

[2] Supra, p. 78; Allport, pp. 116, 119, 276, 307, 382.

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I suggest that Allport's theory of personality has ingredient in it the possibility of overcoming, to some extent at least, the problem of cultural relativity. The basic problem in efforts to set out rational or universal criteria, or metaphysically adequate criteria in general, turns on the precise point that Allport objects to in so much contemporary psychology. The point is this: in the effort to be scientific, psychology has ignored the factors of individuality and has sought instead the general or universal as the only valid basis for scientific laws.[1] This assumption that generality or universality must ignore individuality should be compared with the Platonistic tradition of Troeltsch.[2] Allport insists against this understanding that there is the possibility of another kind of law just as scientific. He is concerned therefore to develop the general or universal principles by which individuality comes about.[3] His work is largely an effort to indicate the considerations that must go into personality theory in order to begin to formulate the laws by which individuality comes about.

I suggest that Allport's move essentially consists of universalizing individuality and understanding it as universally social in character and continually emergent from the social integration of the past. Applying this to scientific laws, I believe something like the following results. The unity to be achieved must always have a physical base. This base can only be found in the organism's past and its appropriation from among the many influences upon it. The emergent order is always necessarily a function of the order of the past actual world. The nature of order clearly is not static. It is always an achievement. To be sure, on low levels of organism the order may be, for all practical purposes, static much in the way the biological needs of man are quite stabilized. The laws of physics for instance are to be regarded, in terms of the generalization of Allport's position, as particular abstractions from the obtained order of the physical universe. That order is always emergent means that such laws are the massive statistical correlations of the obtained relations and organizations between the actualities of the world. As there are many types of actualities and relations, so there are many types of laws that can be abstracted. Because some actualities have achieved highly stable kinds of order, it is possible to ignore for most purposes the statistical character of law and the factor of individuality. However, it may be worth noting that the conception of the nature of the laws of physics is changing. From the long-held conception of eternally fixed laws there is emerging a conception of the laws of physics more consonant with the view just set out.[1] The suggestion is that for some purposes, at least, it is important to formulate the laws of physics in such a way as to take account of the temporal element in them despite their high degree of stability.

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[1] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. xf, Chap. 1, and supra, p. 97f.

[2] Supra, pp. 64f, 68.

[3] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 10.

For Allport the person is a lawful organization. His lawfulness is a function of the larger social order of which he is a part. This accounts for the success in predictions from actuarial data.[2] This

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[1] Stephen Toulmin and June Goodfield, The Discovery of Time (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1965), p. 263ff.

[2] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 19ff.

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data however does not tell us what a particular person will be likely to do; it only tells us about what a group will be likely to do. Allport's point is that if we know enough about the internal organization of the particular, we will be able to make reasonably accurate predictions about his behavior.[1] On the other hand, because personality is open-ended there can be no strict prediction except within limits.

It is not my purpose here to work this out into a metaphysic. My only concern is to indicate how individuality can be universalized in a lawfully understandable way so as to address the problem of normativeness.

The first thing that needs to be said is that clearly the social structure of one society cannot be the norm for all societies. The optimum order for any society will always be a function of its past and present conditions.

The second thing that needs to be said, however, is that, in respect to personality, the factors that make for growth in all its dimensions must be the norm for personality. That is to say, if self-consciousness has developed in order for the person to deal more effectively with his world--that is to say, if personality is fundamentally a unique emergent from a fundamental sociality--then it is crucial for personality that the processes by which this emergence comes about operate maximally. This I submit is what can be meant by normativeness in personality. This is an ethical concern, for as we have seen it would appear that only the healthy personality is in the position to make veridical judgments. Put in Erikson's terms, it is not self-identity that is normative but rather ego-identity. In Insight and Responsibility, Erikson begins to spell out something of the possibilities for ethical construction in terms of his reflections on ego-identity.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 21, 389f.

[2] Supra, p. 140f.

Finally it should be added that such an approach to normative judgments is always subject to revision on the basis of new evidence. Nevertheless it does provide a way of approaching the problem of normativeness which may be more fruitful than past efforts.

Maturity

The material of the last section indicates that the criteria for maturity must be made out with respect to the factors that make for a strong ego-identity, rather than agreed-upon modes of behavior that may be fitting only for a particular culture. Allport sets out six criteria for maturity that in my judgment are relatively well formed in terms of the factors that make for ego strength.

1. Extension of the Sense of Self -- Throughout life the sense of self continues to expand as one's experience becomes broader. For such experience contributes to the self as it is integrated into the self; and given the fundamental sociality of the personality, there is little choice but to be shaped by one's response to experience whether positive or negative. The person who is negative toward experience suffers truncation of self as a result of that negativity. This is not to say one should not reject some data, but if the balance is negative then one suffers. "Unless a person develops strong interests 'outside himself' (and yet still a part

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[1] Insight and Responsibility (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1964); see especially Chapter IV, "Human Strength and the Cycle of Generations".

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of himself)," Allport writes, "he lives closer to the animal level than to the human level of existence."[1]

This criterion follows directly from the fundamental sociality of personality which literally demands that one be concerned with cosmic dimensions in order to be fully integrated.

This can be seen from another perspective. The more data effectively integrated, the greater the person's potentiality for dealing with his world. Stated in terms of skill, Allport writes: "A person having only one skill, knowing only one solution, has only one degree of freedom. On the other hand, a person widely experienced and knowing many courses of conduct has many more degrees of freedom."[2]

Allport also lays stress upon the extension of the self into abstractions. "Indeed, a mark of maturity," he writes, "seems to be the range and extent of one's feeling of self-involvement in abstract ideals."[3] The context clearly indicates that this means more than ideals.

2. Warm Relating of Self to Others -- Allport specifies two different kinds of warmth, both of which he claims as marks of the mature person. These are a capacity for "great intimacy in his capacity for love" and "a certain detachment which makes him respectful and appreciative of the human condition of all men".[4]

I submit that this criterion takes into account some of the elements of the qualitative character, or affective tone, requisite for

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[1] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 283.

[2] Becoming, p. 85.

[3] Ibid., p. 45.

[4] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 285.

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one's own ego-identity and the up-building of that of others.

Concerning that quality of personal attachments that this criterion is concerned with, Allport writes: "It is safe to assert that no one, mature or immature, can ever love or be loved enough. But it seems that the less mature person wants to be loved rather more than he wants to give love."[1] I suppose a corollary to this would be that the mature person is one who has a style of giving love in his relations in a way that is concernful, rather than fulfilling a compulsive need to love in order to be accepted. At the same time it would also seem to follow that the mature person would have no problem receiving love.

3. Emotional Security (Self-Acceptance) -- This criterion is directly related to that of "warm relating of self to others". For a lack of emotional security will likely result in distorted relations with others, if not cumpulsive relatedness or unrelatedness to others. Self-directiveness is clearly impaired if a person is not emotionally secure, for he then is too worried about himself to be realistically self-directive in his situation. As Allport puts it, "The immature adult, like the child, meets them [irritations and thwartings] with tantrums of temper, or with complaining, blaming others, and self-pity."[2] The mature person on the other hand can put up with frustrations and deal with them effectively.

Allport seems to indicate that what he is getting at in this criterion is what Erikson means by ego-identity.[3] He specifically singles out the importance of the formation of a basic trust in childhood as important for maturity.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 286. [2] Ibid., p. 288. [3] Supra, p. 131f.

[4] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 288.

4. Realistic Perception, Skills and Assignments -- The meaning here should be fairly clear. Allport writes that "although we often find skillful people who are immature, we never find people without problem-pointed skills."[1] Here Allport is simply specifying as one of the criteria for maturity the second principle of how functional autonomy comes about (i.e., mastery and competence)[2] and the importance of qualitative character for realistic perception.[3] His point is that the mature person is one who has good effective touch with the world both in perception and in competence in dealing with it.[4] Survival in any full sense depends on realistic assessment.

5. Self-Objectification: Insight and Humor -- What Allport means to designate here is self-knowledge or realistic perception of oneself, which falls under the requirement of cognitive adequacy for normal processes.[5] Concerning the inclusion of humor along with insight, Allport writes:

> The reason why insight and humor march hand in hand is probably because at bottom they are a single phenomenon--the phenomenon of self-objectification. The man who has the most complete sense of proportion concerning his own qualities and cherished values is able to perceive their incongruities and absurdities in certain settings.[6]

To this point Allport cites studies that indicate that people of less intelligence and low esthetic and moral values are lacking in a sense of humor based on real life relationships.[7]

6. The Unifying Philosophy of Life -- In my judgment this criterion

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 289f. [2] *Supra*, p. 146f. [3] *Supra*, p. 140f.

[4] *Pattern and Growth. . .*, p. 290. [5] *Supra*, p. 140f.

[6] *Pattern and Growth. . .*, p. 293. [7] *Ibid*.

expresses the central place of propriate striving in personality. The mark of maturity is that of self-directedness which is unified rather than cutting in so many different directions that there is no unity. Another way of expressing this is in terms of the distinction I have used between ego- and self-identity.[1] It is essential for maturity that a person have a realistic self-identity in terms of his situation. Such a self-identity is only possible if there is a healthy ego-identity. The two go hand-in-hand.

Allport speaks of the criterion from three rather similar perspectives: those of value, religious sentiment and generic conscience. In the next section I will take up the matter of conscience as a criterion for maturity which will in a way summarize the criteria discussed in this section.

Before moving on to the next section, there are a few more things to note under the subject of maturity. By maturity it should be asserted that Allport does not mean a conforming to the expectations of society. Rather he means something more like a creative response to reality.[2] This is the basic meaning of expansion of the sense of self and of realistic perception as criteria for maturity. The point is that the self as fundamentally social thereby partakes of a world that is also fundamentally social. To ignore the larger world of one's relations is to ignore factors that are shaping one's more narrow world. Hence there is a basic requirement upon man to be creatively responsive to the shaping factors of his world. Maturity, far from being a conforming to the expectations of society, may actually require a quite critical stance over against the expectations of society. This is not to say, of course, that every one taking a critical position against the establishment is manifesting maturity.

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[1] Supra, pp. 140, 157f.

[2] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 261.

On the other hand, the more mature person's realistic perception of things may demand of him a self-conscious stance to move in some sense contrary to some aspect of society, and by so doing he may be risking his psychic balance. Concerning such Erikson writes:

> . . .a peculiar malaise can befall those who have seen too much, who, in ascertaining new facts in a spirit seemingly as innocent as that of a child building with blocks, begin to perceive the place of these facts in the moral climate of their day. "We physicists have known sin," Oppenheimer has said; but it does not take the use of scientific data for mankind's material destruction to make a scientist feel or behave as if he had sinned. It is enough to have persisted, with the naiveté of genius, in the dissolution of one of the prejudices on which the security and the familiarity of the contemporary image of man is built. But a creative man has no choice. He may come across his supreme task almost accidently. But once the issue is joined, his task proves to be at the same time intimately related to his most personal conflicts, to his superior selective perception, and to the stubbornness of his one-way will: he must court sickness, failure, or insanity, in order to test the alternative whether the established world will crush him, or whether he will disestablish a sector of this world's outworn fundaments and make place for a new one.[1]

To be sure, Erikson is not writing here of maturity but of creativity. Nevertheless it would seem that his judgment might well hold in the case of maturity. Thus I believe that it must be held open. Maslow writes of maturity under the rubric of self-actualization. Concerning self-actualizing persons he finds that they are relatively independent of their culture and environment. In Allport's term, they are field-independent.[2] Maslow's findings indicate that this independence

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[1] Insight and Responsibility, p. 22f.

[2] Supra, p. 140f.

"means a relative stability in the face of hard knocks, blows, deprivations, frustrations, and the like. These people can maintain a relative serenity and happiness in the midst of circumstances that would drive other people to suicide. . . ."[1]

At the same time Maslow also notes that such people may also manifest neurotic features for some of the reasons Erikson indicates.[2]

On the basis of the material just reviewed I believe it must be said that there may sometimes at least be a positive relation between maturity and neurosis, especially in the creative person or in a society whose cultural identity is out of line with reality. This would mean that the charge by society against its prophet that he is sick or neurotic may not always be without some real substance.

Finally I want to take a look at Lehmann's contention that the New Testament understanding of maturity evidently necessarily differs from psychoanalytic understanding. Stated again, the difference Lehmann specifies is that the "psychoanalytic theory defines maturity as self-realization through self-acceptance," while the New Testament understanding is that "maturity is self-acceptance through self-giving". Lehmann believes that psychoanalytic theory cannot recognize this distinctive New Testament understanding because it is a gift from God and psychoanalytic theory is confined to man and his world. I take it that Lehmann's point is not one confined to psychoanalytic theory, but is one which would apply to modern psychology as well.[3] With respect to some psychoanalytic theorists and some psychologists, at least, it must be said that Lehmann's assessment of the difference simply will not wash. Or to the extent that he wants to maintain rigidly that the "New Testament understanding of maturity is self-acceptance through self-giving", just to that extent his assessment must be judged wrong in respect to both the New Testament and to the kind of psychological understanding manifest in Allport as well as in Maslow, Frankl, Lynd, Erikson and Perls, to name just a few.

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[1] Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), p. 214.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 228f.

[3] *Supra*, p. 14ff.

Without going into the New Testament understanding of maturity, a simple observation should be sufficient to show the inadequacy of Lehmann's assertion. For the New Testament, the kind of self-giving Lehmann speaks of is a result of a prior receiving of God's gift of His Son. Indeed, this receiving is not simply a reflection of a once-for-all Christ-event experienced by the initial Christian community, but is continually manifest in fellowship through God's gift of the Holy Spirit. To leave out the matter of receiving in the New Testament understanding of maturity would be to ignore God's gift.

With regard to the kind of psychological understanding of personality that is the concern of this dissertation, it must be said that the fixation upon self would be a sign of sickness rather than maturity. The whole direction of personality development, grounded as it is on a fundamental sociality of personality, means that self-realization and self-giving are dialectically related. In healthy people, one is not present without the other unless there are special reasons. Allport explicitly lists "extension of the sense of self" and "warm relating of self to others" as criteria of maturity, and he lists these before self-acceptance.[1]

Lehmann's point in attempting to stress the distinctiveness of the New Testament understanding of maturity over against other understandings is a specific manifestation of the general traditional Christian view that there is something unique about the revelation of God in Jesus Christ which is available only in Jesus Christ. I believe the tradition is fundamentally correct in this view but that Lehmann is wrong in the way he tries to make this out. I will come back to this in Part III.

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[1] I realize that there does seem to be a marked usage of the terms "self" and "ego" by writers like Maslow, Allport and Erikson. But the terminology of self-actualization in my judgment will not yield to the kind of criticism offered by Lehmann, nor even to that of a professional in the field of the stature of Viktor Frankl. Frankl understands the language of self-actualization to indicate a "self-centered interest" which means a devaluation of the world and a kind of valuational vacuum. (Viktor Frankl, "Beyond Self-Actualization and Self-Expression," Journal of Existential Psychiatry, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1960, p. 12f.) What is missing in Frankl's understanding of self-realization and self-actualization is the theoretical understanding of man as fundamentally social. (For the fundamental social character of man in Maslow, see Chapter 3 of Motivation and Personality.) Once this is understood then it can be seen, in my judgment, how mistaken it is to make the kind of charges Frankl does of such thinkers. (Supra, p. 148f.) The heavy emphasis upon realistic perception, expansion of awareness and warmth of relation with others as criteria for maturity should be adequate witness to allay the fears expressed by Frankl.

The essential point however of the attention given to the self by these thinkers--i.e., Allport, Maslow, Erikson, etc.--is that if the processes of the self-system are not functioning in a healthy manner, then serious problems result. Such problems have social consequences. I have tried to indicate something of the import the work of such thinkers has for value, and in the next section I will explore this further. Needless to say, Allport, Maslow and Erikson have all devoted much of their work to wrestling with the nature of value. (Cf. Erikson, esp. Insight and Responsibility; Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954); and Maslow, Motivation and Personality, Chapter 17; Toward a Psychology of Being (2nd ed.; Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1968), Part V; Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1964); editor and contributor to New Knowledge in Human Values (New York: Harper & Row, 1959).

Conscience

This section will take the following form. First I will review Allport's view of conscience and indicate where I believe it to be inadequate. Second, I will make out what I believe to be a more adequate view of conscience by employing Allport's understanding of personality as already made out. Third, I will treat a number of problems raised thus far regarding conscience.

As might be expected, Allport views conscience developmentally. He raises the question as to whether conscience is inborn.[1] His answer is both yes and no. The capacity for conscience is inborn, but no specific ideas of right and wrong are inborn.

Also as might be expected, Allport is critical of Freud's understanding of conscience as the super-ego.[2] He agrees with Freud that in the early stages conscience is "due to the internalization of tribal and parental rules."[3] But as against Freud he regards this as only a stage in the development of personality. For Allport it would be a sign of arrested development for one not to progress beyond the super-ego stage of conscience. Allport characterizes this stage as a "must" conscience[4] evolving largely from parental "No! No!"'s. The internalization of these external voices is the super-ego stage where the child can comport himself appropriately without external supervision.

As the child matures, his self-esteem, self-image, value system and goals develop so that he becomes self-directive. In this process, Allport argues, "conscience gradually shifts its center from specific habits of obedience to the proprium."[1] This shift means that conscience no longer operates out of fear of punishment but from the sense of one's own values.[2] The basic sense of the adult conscience is not the "must" of childhood but the "ought" of one's mature values.[3]

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[1] The Individual and His Religion (New York: Macmillan Co., 1961), p. 86f.

[2] Ibid., p. 88f.

[3] Pattern and Growth. . ., p. 135.

[4] Ibid., p. 134.

The development of conscience for Allport, then, is one with the development of the sense of self and matures in the unity that results in propriate strivings. This means for Allport that conscience can be said to be a "normal development within every human being", with the exception of "a few 'psychopathic personalities'."[4] It also means that "there is as much unity of conscience as there is unity of personality."[5] As already noted, conscience is a patterning of a number of aspects of the proprium. Allport specifies self-esteem, self-image and propriate striving. In a moment I will extend his understanding of conscience through giving emphasis to another of the aspects of the proprium, the extension of the self. First, I want to stress one immediate implication of this view of conscience. For conscience to be an adequate guide in life the personality must be relatively healthy or mature. In terms of this posited relationship between conscience and personality, it should be possible to specify the factors involved in the development and operation of conscience. A second immediate implication of this view of conscience is that all the factors involved in the development of the mature personality are involved in the development of the mature conscience.

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[1] Ibid., p. 136. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid., p. 134, 302.

[5] The Individual and His Religion, p. 90.

The question that must immediately arise from this understanding of conscience is whether there is any need to speak of conscience at all. Why not simply speak of maturity of personality? For clearly conscience cannot be a special agent of some sort within personality. Allport has made that clear in his remarks about the self as knower.[1] He specifically applies this to conscience. "Conscience should not be reified. It is not a 'man within the breast', nor is it a separate department of personality."[2] Allport, as noted, regards conscience as a patterning of a number of the aspects of the proprium. Essentially, however, this pattern comes into play only when it has been violated. "A good conscience seems not to have a sharp configuration. When our conscience is 'quiet' or 'at rest' we go on functioning in our normal way. . . . But a 'bad' or 'outraged' conscience nags us and tells us we have somehow violated our preferred style of being."[3] Thus it would seem that for Allport conscience is the patterning of our system of values which normally works automatically, providing a sense of ought when necessary and disturbing through guilt or shame or otherwise when transgressed. This appears to be Allport's justification for speaking of conscience. I will take up what I believe to be such justification later in this section.

In my judgment there are a number of inadequacies with this view of conscience simply in terms of Allport's own theory of personality and the revisions I have indicated as necessary in terms of his fundamental assumptions. Three of these are of central concern to my own constructive

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 125f, 147, 149. [2] *Individual*. . ., p. 89.

[3] *Pattern and Growth*. . ., p. 134.

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work with regard to conscience. These are quite interrelated and turn on an aspect of Allport's thought we have already covered. First, as Allport sets out the stages in the development of conscience, he concedes too much to Freud by employing uncritically Freud's idea of the unconscious and so of the super-ego as one stage in the development of conscience. Second, Allport's view of conscience does not appear to be operative in the production of the value system of the person. Rather it appears to function more as a signal that something is wrong in terms of the person's "preferred style of being". Third, Allport's view of conscience is inadequate because of the particular structuring he posits for it by a person's value system. The value system appears to occupy an uncriticized position in the view of conscience as set out by Allport. The second and third problems I have set out are obviously of a piece. For if conscience is understood as operative in production of a person's value system, then the value system comes under the purview of conscience. The possibility of conscience being understood as productive is connected with the first problem, that of Allport's uncritical assumption of so much of Freud in regard to the unconscious and in this respect of the super-ego. For if the organism is thought of in terms of Allport's fundamental assumptions, as I have indicated earlier,[1] then the fundamental urge for unity can be understood as the basis of a productive understanding of conscience.

I propose to reshape Allport's view of conscience by overcoming what I believe to be weaknesses in his view. It should be clear from the over-all thrust of the understanding of personality presented that these weaknesses can be overcome in terms of Allport's own thought and the reshaping that I have done in terms of his fundamental assumptions. Additionally I propose to expand his understanding of conscience by making use of Allport's conception of the extension of self.

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[1] Supra, p. 127-133.

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It will be remembered that for Allport the infant has no sense of self, because there is not yet sufficient differentiation in the nervous system for such to have developed. Therefore the infant will have no conscience. On the other hand, as I have indicated, the energies of the organism must be characterized as fundamentally social, always with an urge for unity.[1] I suggest that this urge for unity and the fundamental sociality of the organism constitute the organismic basis of conscience in personality. This accounts for Allport's observation that the capacity for conscience is inborn. This inborn capacity constitutes the internal basis of conscience. This basis may be compared with the morality of personality and conscience as presented by Troeltsch.[2] The major difference is that the ideal of unity here is always that of the most realistic integration of the data of the world. Hence unity is a formal requirement of personality while the actual material unity is always a function of the data. For Troeltsch, however, the formal ideal of unity seemed to indicate an ideal unity which always served as the goal but which could never be achieved under the conditions of existence. Troeltsch evidently could not envision the possibility of the ideal of unity as always emergent.

I will move now to the external basis of conscience with the understanding, of course, that personality is social and developmental, so that the development of the internal aspect goes with the external. First I will present some of the more important external factors in early development in reference to their importance for the internal aspect of conscience. Then I will set out three propositions that I believe to be central for an adequate understanding of conscience.

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[1] Supra, p. 132f.

[2] Supra, p. 72f.

Those caring for the infant and the over-all surroundings are of significant importance for the development of conscience. All of the principles of learning covered in Chapter 3 come into play because conscience is a development. The earliest registrations are crucial in providing the groundwork for the development of a basic sense of trust[1] and the bodily sense of self.[2] These are the major early stages of development, and it is at these stages of development and to these particular accomplishments that quasi-mechanical learning principles are, in my judgment, most appropriate. For once these stages have been passed one way or the other, the nervous system has been modified such that these accomplishments condition further development. It is worth noting that such learning is largely unconscious, especially in the formation of the sense of trust/distrust if not in all of the processes involved in the formation of ego-identity. It is to this dimension of personality, I suggest, that the quasi-mechanical principles are most appropriate. For what is being shaped is not so much a collection of skills--which later, at least, if not initially can become quite conscious--but the very way one perceives the world, which is not something one easily becomes conscious of.

The sense of self that is emerging is a response to the environment. The extent to which the environment of the child is unified will mark the unity that develops in his own personality. The successful development of a basic sense of trust is crucial for the extension of the self. For if distrust develops as a basic attitude of personality, one's world of experience will be severely limited. If trust develops, then extension of the self may be quite broad.[1]

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[1] *Supra*, p. 138f.

[2] *Supra*, p. 122.

The other(s) provide the child with language. I have already indicated that Allport regards this as a major factor in the development of a sense of continuing self-identity.[2] I suggest that language is a major factor not only in the development of a sense of self but also in the development of conscience. This can be seen through the following considerations. I have already indicated that the unconscious urge of the organism and its fundamental sociality constitute the organismic basis of conscience. The concrete shaping of this basis in its early stages is, as already indicated, largely unconscious and so in this sense has some affinity with Freud's concept of the super-ego. Yet the difference is great in that here the early stage is not thought of as irrational but at worst pre-rational and fundamentally social. The acquisition of language provides the means for the further development of conscience from the unconscious to the conscious dimension. This comes about because, as I have suggested earlier,[3] personality has the possibility of gaining distance from itself and so of becoming self-conscious and reflective about what it does. The value of such a development in conscience is clear. For in reflection the past can be evaluated and future alternatives assessed in terms of a more realistic integration of the data. The emergence of reflection constitutes therefore a key development in conscience.

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[1] _Supra_, p. 140f. [2] _Supra_, p. 123. [3] _Supra_, p. 150.

The extension of the self and self-consciousness provide the setting in which Allport's learning principle of identification may be appropriate. Allport placed it under cognitive learning. More likely it is a principle of participatory learning. For with the extension of the self through the exposure to different groups and ideals, the question of one's own identity is raised. This question is hardly asked for cognitive reasons. It is raised out of self-relevance. The answer to such a question and the acceptance of the specified identifications adds to the assimilation of values the child has gained through his primary others. The nature of the values in the primary identifications marks a further critical phase in the development of conscience. For the continued healthy growth of conscience, it is vital that such values contribute to the expansion of the sense of self, to self-esteem, and to a positive self-image.

These early registrations and identifications largely determine the future course of the development of conscience. The extension of the sense of self, as will be seen more clearly below, is critical for the formation of a healthy conscience. For without such extension the possibility of realistic integrations is severely truncated. Key factors in the extension of the sense of self are the formation of the basic sense of trust, self-reflection and identifications that foster healthy growth. If these are successfully established, then the person is well prepared for the possibility of the development of maturity of conscience.

Before moving on I want to draw attention to a feature of the development of conscience that will be important for the work of theological construction. It should be clear from everything that I have written that no personality, and so no conscience, develops without some form of concrete influence. A major portion of Allport's theory of the development of personality turns precisely upon the quality of such influence.

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I will now state three propositions which I believe set forth the essential character of conscience. I will state them and then set out their unity and meaning. First, conscience is the functioning of the system of values of a person. Second, conscience is the functioning of the organismic requirement of unity. Third, conscience is the functioning of the world's requirements for a realistic unity necessary for survival.

The first proposition needs little explication. This is basically the only proposition necessary for understanding the functioning of Allport's view of conscience. "It [conscience] is the knife-edge," Allport writes, "that all our values press upon us whenever we are acting, or have acted, contrary to these values."[1] But clearly this is insufficient by itself. Probably everyone has some sense of a value system, however ego-centered and warped it may be. The question must be raised concerning the adequacy of the values which the first proposition posits. My judgment is that this question can be answered adequately only be reference to propositions two and three.

The thesis that I wish to set forth in these two propositions is that conscience is the key to the production and critical evaluation of a person's system of values. By this I do not mean to indicate simply those values which we might think one ought to hold. Rather I mean that whatever the value system one may hold, this has been the productive result of his conscience. The import of this is that clearly there are various levels of conscience. The development of conscience may be arrested through a defective establishment of a basic sense of trust. If such is the case, a person's values will undoubtedly be unrealistically formed to some extent and it may be that he will not have sufficient trust of himself to evaluate critically his system of values or individual values that he holds. My point is that the adequacy of conscience in the production and critical evaluation of one's system of values is directly related to the strength of one's ego-identity. To the extent to which a person has a strong ego-identity he may feel more ready to risk his attained self-identity for the greater good involved in the achievement of a new unity of the self.

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[1] Individual. . ., p. 89f.

I will now try to exemplify this in terms of the second and third propositions about conscience. I have already noted that for Allport the unity of personality is an emergent response to the unity of the data given by others.[1] The organismic requirement is that one be relatively unified. The achieved unity of a person indicates his system of values, whatever values he may otherwise profess.[2] A person's values are formed in virtue of the internal requirement for a relative unity. Not everything can be given the same ranking. Decisions must be made. These decisions literally are the values a person holds. Hence values emerge in the process of growth. In this respect, then, it can be said that a person's value system is necessitated by the requirement for unity. The achieved unity will always be reflective of the values that are operationally effective in his life. These values may be narrowly formed, which is to say there may be little extension of the self. This may raise serious problems, because such narrowly formed values may well be out-of-joint with the dominant factors shaping one's society and world. Thus in various ways the personality or society with narrowly formed values may be "bumped" by reality. This of course is not to say that such will necessarily happen. I suppose a person's values may be inadequately formed in terms of reality in any number of ways and still he may have a relatively happy and fruitful life from his own perspective.

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[1] _Supra_, p. 148.

[2] Interesting problems of course arise when a person sees a difference between his professed values and those actually operating in his life.

The phenomenon of being "bumped" by reality exemplifies in part at least what I mean to indicate by proposition three. It is not the case that one's unity can be purely an arbitrary affair of one's own. This is clearly precluded by Allport's assumption of the fundamental sociality of man. A person's own unity must therefore be formed in respect to the larger unities of which he is a part.[1] In this way the generalization of the fundamental sociality Allport posits with regard to man entails a sociality to one's conscience, thereby exhibiting how conscience may be understood as the functioning of the world's requirements for a realistic unity necessary for survival. Again, it should be noted that in order for this aspect of conscience to function appropriately it is necessary that a person have a relatively healthy ego-identity. Otherwise he is not open to an adequate appropriation of the impingement of the world.

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[1] To be sure this allows for a wide variance, witnessed to by the differences in contemporary society--though there is indication that the wide variance we are currently experiencing is bordering chaos.

I believe the experience of conscience can be amply exemplified in the kind of experience Huck Finn had with his conscience. Recall that Huck had a problem with his conscience for not reporting the runaway slave, Jim. His conscience, which told him he should report Jim, was formed in terms of the values of his society. But his own feeling of decency kept him from obeying his conscience. He concludes that "conscience ain't got no sense":

> . . .it don't make no difference whether you do right or wrong, a person's conscience ain't got no sense and just goes for him anyway. If I had a yeller dog that didn't know no more than a person's conscience does I would poison him. It takes up more room than all the rest of a person's insides, and yet ain't no good, nohow. Tom Sawyer he says the same.[1]

What is witnessed to here may be understood as the conflict of values held by one person--or the bumping of Huck's attained system of values by the necessity to integrate his feelings for Jim with respect to human decency. However this is interpreted, the point is that conscience "takes up more room than all the rest of a person's insides." It does this or appears to do this because it is the valuational system of the person--it is his unity. The experience is, in my terms, his conscience pushing for a relative unity. Something must give way. The past values exert themselves. Unless they can be integrated with the new data, transcended by a new perspective or somehow repressed, there will be a troubled conscience. In this way conscience is productive of new values for the individual.

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[1] Mark Twain, Huckleberry Finn (New York: Collier & Son, 1918), p. 321.

Because of the fundamental sociality of man, there is always the requirement to be creatively responsive to the basic direction of reality, or perish. Of course there are usually any number of appropriate responses to what is going on in one's world. For instance, take the racial problem in which we are presently involved. Clearly there is no one response that is required other than a general sense of concern for racial justice, which could take concrete form in a variety of ways for any one individual person. Circumstances of course might so close in at any time that it would seem at least that some one action must be done.

The direction of reality in its concreteness is not static but a cosmic drive for unity in terms of the total state of things at any given time. The achieved unity of the cosmos is like that of personality, also a newly emergent integration of the data. The self-identity of a person must be realistically formed in terms of the achieved unity of the cosmos. Just as this cosmic unity is always emergent so also must be the self-identity of personality. The process of the integration of the new data into this new self is what I designate as conscience. In this sense then it can be said that conscience is the process whereby through self-reflection a person comes to a relative unification of personality with respect to the unity of his world.

Returning now to the first proposition, it should be clear that the value system of conscience must be adequately formed in terms of the large sense of unity if it is to have any kind of rational validity. In terms of this kind of understanding a number of moral principles might be formulated. The most comprehensive of these would be, I should think, those that bear most on the developing and sustaining of the factors

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involved in ego-identity. Beyond these one of the more important principles would be one designed to indicate that views which one has reason to dismiss because of his own position should be taken seriously for the judgment they may render for one upon his own position. This is simply another way of expressing the central significance of the expansion of the self.

Conscience is the experience of the personality of the requirement of unity both from within and from without. The validity of the voice of conscience will depend upon its integration of the fundamental direction of the shaping factors of one's world. The general possibility for such an integration depends upon the strength of the process of ego-identity which in turn depends upon the factors contributing to such development. Generally speaking it should be the case that the stronger the ego-identity the more realistic will be the integration or the more rational validity will the voice of conscience have. Pathological forms of conscience can be accounted for in the same way that Allport accounts for pathological personalities.[1]

The above analysis of conscience means that the voice of conscience will be unique to the individual because of his own uniqueness. On the other hand, because of the fundamental character of sociality the voice of conscience reflects the larger social dimension of which the individual is a part. It is in terms of this social dimension of conscience that it should be possible to speak of the conscience of an institution. The general possibility of such is that the institution, like the individual, is a part of a larger structure and possesses a kind of relative autonomy of its own and through its members/directors has a self-directive character much as the individual personality. Again the possibility of such is grounded in the fundamental character of sociality, such that the members/directors of the institution constitute the institution and the institution, in part at least, constitutes the individuals. I take it that what I am pointing to here is the manner in which conceptual sense can be made of the demand of institutions today that they be responsive to their place in the social fabric such that they help bring about a realistic unity within themselves and society.

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[1] Supra, p. 129ff.

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I will now address myself to a number of issues that have come up in the course of this study. First, in the analysis of the psychoanalytic view of conscience I noted that David Jones faulted Freud for failing to distinguish moral feelings from security feelings.[1] I believe Jones to be right. However, I believe that there is a fundamental continuity that also needs to be stressed. This can be seen, I believe, from the material on the unconscious in Chapter 4. What both sets of feelings turn on is the unity of personality. It is the requirement of unity and the direction of the comprehensive unity of reality that my advance of Allport's account takes as basic in its theory of conscience. Thus security feelings are not unrelated to conscience. The problem with the examples of security feelings used by Freud is that they are generally drawn from pathological cases. I am not so much concerned with the precise relation of security feelings to the phenomenon of conscience as with what the separation of moral and security feelings might lead to. Security feelings clearly are protective devices for preserving the unity of personality. These devices may get out of hand and become controlling factors, in which case personality will probably develop abnormally.[1] The problem in separating without at the same time indicating the relation between moral and security feelings is that a dangerous risk is then run (dangerous in terms of the understanding of personality shaping this dissertation). The risk is that of continuing the more fundamental error of Freud, that of splitting the rational and the irrational, which in Freud's hands had the result of de-emphasizing the rationality of man.[2] The result may be that in splitting the rational and the irrational, moral feelings will too easily be placed with the rational, and security feelings with the irrational. This would mean that the tie of the moral with the energies of life would be cut. Conscience then would be no more than what the general empiricists view it to be: simply a function of the values one chooses.[3]

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[1] _Supra_, p. 56.

Holding to such an understanding of conscience results, I believe, in viewing the history of conscience in the manner presented by Paul Lehmann. Conscience is without any adequate rootage. Thus it may be constituted variously and hence may be arbitrary and destructive. The conclusion to be drawn is that conscience is clearly in need of a context. Lehmann suggests the Koinonia. I have argued that the Koinonia is in as bad a shape as conscience.[4] I suggest that a proper context for conscience is that of a comprehensive vision of reality which includes the energies of life in its view. In terms of such an understanding of conscience, the problem of the gap between principle and act is overcome at least in conceptual terms through the posited relation of the energies of life with the unity of personality. There is always the problem on the existential level, but here the problem is that of maturity of development of personality and therefore not the same gap that Lehmann specifies. To the extent that a person's values, goals, etc., are not relatively unified within him there will be a gap reflecting that lack of unity. On the other hand there is also the gap introduced between one's obtained structure of intentionality of personality and the new situation which may call for revision of values and goals. But here the problem is not so much that of a gap as that of the achievement of a new unity that will focus anew the energies of life. I do not mean to indicate that this is an easy thing to do. I only want to point out that the problem of the gap is not so much that of principle and act as of appropriate unity of the self with respect to the direction of reality, and that this is what releases the energies of life.[1] This is because there is congruence between the person and the real factors shaping life.

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[1] _Supra_, pp. 129-33.

[2] _Supra_, p. 62f.

[3] _Supra_, p. 50f.

[4] _Supra_, Chapter 1.

I suggest that in part at least it is at this point that the problem of evil may be treated. Lehmann it will be recalled argued that the rational Good could not give direction and valuation to human good.[2] Lehmann's point, if I understand it rightly, turns on an inadequate understanding of the nature of generality. Lehmann argues that

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[1] Such expression is not found in quite this way to my knowledge in Allport. It derives from the work of Frederick Perls, the Gestalt psychologist who argues that realistic contact with reality results in release of energy [Frederick Perls, Ralph Hefferline, Paul Goodman, Gestalt Therapy (New York: Delta Publishing Co., 1951), pp. 411ff.]

[2] *Supra*, p. 17f.

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the reason the rational Good cannot carry the required function is that the rational Good presupposes the possibility and applicability of ethical generalization to the structure of human self-determination. He understands this to mean that evil is excluded from rational generalization and argues that it cannot legitimately be so excluded. I agree with ~~him~~ that it cannot be so excluded. My own judgment is that the principles of the rational Good, at least as Lehmann envisions them, are formed in terms of a substantialistic version of man which pictures man in his ideal state. Thus evil is excluded by definition. Allport on the other hand provides us with an understanding of man which takes seriously the full reality of man, whereby with his stress on development and sociality and individuality some account of evil is possible. Clearly inadequate development of the personality will result in the poor integration of the data of the world and so thereby result in action that is destructive, even if well intentioned. Through the fundamental sociality of reality such evil will operate causally on that which follows, and so it becomes a part of the fabric from which others must weave their own new unity. This means creative response in the world must take evils into its consideration of the operative factors of the world.

Any view of morality that shapes up its principles such that some of the relevant factors of the situation are not given recognition is formed without a full appreciation for the fundamental sociality that Allport believes must be one of the bases for adequate judgment. I therefore believe that Allport's approach, which begins by taking seriously the full reality of man and the factors that shape his becoming, has the necessary rational possibility for taking seriously the power of evil in human life. Of course there are vast dimensions of evil not touched upon, such as natural evil especially in terms of genetic malfunctions. I do believe, however, that I have addressed the problem of evil as Lehmann posed it and believe that it can easily be seen how through inadequate development there may be a gap between principle and act.

I have already addressed the problem of the authority of conscience from a variety of perspectives, but a concise word may be in order. The authority of conscience derives from the requirement of unity for personality. But this clearly is inadequate alone. The authority of conscience is adequately understood in terms of the congruence of the unity of personality with the unity of reality.

I suggest that the experienced locus of the infallibility of conscience may be found in this experience of the congruence of the unity of the self with the direction of reality. It may well be that what Maslow specifies as peak-experiences may be of help in accounting for this experience.[1] It may be that explorations into such phenomena will add materially to our understanding of the nature of maturity and the kind of cosmos of which we are a part. The character of the peak-experience as felt to be a "self-validating, self-justifying moment which carries its own intrinsic value with it"[2] could naturally enough, I suggest, when its focus was on moral matters, lead some to posit an experiential infallibility to conscience.

Finally I suggest that the account of conscience herein contained meets Hume's two conditions for a rational morality.[3] I have made the connection between the rational and the will.[1] The second condition, that this connection characterizes every well-disposed mind, has been fulfilled. Hume will grant of the well-disposed mind a relatively mature personality.

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[1] Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (Chs. 6 & 7) and Religions, Values and Peak-Experiences.

[2] Toward a Psychology of Being, p. 79.

[3] Supra, p. 55.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 143f.

PART III

CHAPTER 6

THEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION

The Problem of Theological Construction

It is the basic intuition of this dissertation that since Barth's Römerbrief the stress in theology has been on the distinctiveness and decisiveness of the Christian faith and Jesus Christ to such a degree that discontinuity has triumphed over continuity. That is to say, the reaction that Barth set in motion against the continuity between faith and the world of 19th Century Liberalism has resulted in virtually severing the continuity between faith and the world. The result of such a severing has been indicated in the first chapter. Faith and the Christian theological effort seem for many to hang, with the Christian faith itself, in the limbo of death pronouncements or meaninglessness.[1]

I believe it is important, necessary and possible to make out in a conceptually adequate manner both the continuity and the discontinuity of the Chrisitan faith with the world as well as the decisiveness of Jesus Christ for faith and the world. The manner in which Paul Lehmann asserts the discontinuity subverts, in my judgment, his effort to assert the continuity, and so his concern to assert the decisiveness of Jesus Christ. For in his hands neither conscience nor maturity can be adequately understood apart from faith. While there may be some truth to this--a truth I will come back to shortly--the way Lehmann works it out it is

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[1] *Supra*, p. 5f.

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as if God were not related to the world in terms of specifiable structures and processes that can be spelled out apart from faith. Indeed they cannot even be spelled out within faith for Lehmann, for to do so would be idolatry.[1] Lehmann's way of making out the continuity between God and the world is simply to assert it. It is a continuity of God's action which is beyond our understanding. His position with regard to God and his action has been aptly if somewhat crudely characterized by Paul Ramsey as that of a God who "plays peek-a-boo from behind the trees in the forest along the road of human history."[2]

If God is to be understood and responded to as the creator, sustainer and redeemer of the world, then there must be specifiable ways in which the Christian can understand God's action as meshing with the world. I say must because it is difficult to see what meaning faith could have otherwise. To say that God is not related to man in some basic way that can be made out in specifiable structures and processes is simply to say no more and no less than that there is nothing that can be said about God. One may appeal to miracle, special revelation or whatever, but if such does not mesh with the structures of man's existence in some specifiable way, then it is nothing that can be understood and responded to. A group may be formed around some so-called purely miraculous documents; but so long as the documents are their own warrant, then one might as well read another copy of the same newspaper to confirm the validity of what he read in the first.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 15f.

[2] Paul Ramsey, *Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 59.

Of course Lehmann does not draw this kind of conclusion. His concern appears to be that of protecting the distinctiveness of Christianity.[1] With respect to God his intuition appears to be the following. If man could have knowledge of God on his own, then man would have God at his disposal, so that on the basis of such knowledge man could storm the gates of Heaven without the necessity of God's action as manifest decisively in Jesus Christ. Such a state of affairs does not seem consonant with the biblical or traditional understanding, nor does it seem realistic in terms of what man has done with this so-called knowledge he has of God. That is to say, the intuition appears to be that man's pretense of having knowledge of God innately is really only a rationalization of man's _hybris_. Such pretense lacks the prophetic power to stand over against culture. This supposedly is what happened to 19th Century Theological Liberalism. Thus it is necessary to see God giving himself to man on his terms alone and not on man's. This kind of understanding can of course find considerable biblical material to bolster its case. God is one who puts man in question. Salvation does not come through man's knowledge of God but through God's gift, and this gift is to be understood on its own terms. It is not to be confused with or by man's worldly understanding. Thus it would appear that there are reasons both for holding that God must be related to the world in specifiable ways in terms of the world's structures and processes, and that God can not be so related.

I suggest that this is a false dilemma and that so far as Lehmann is concerned it stems in part from his understanding of principles.

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[1] _Supra_, p. 24.

To suppose one could have a principled understanding of God and his will is to ignore the dynamics of the divine behavior. The dynamics of God thus precludes specification of God's relation to the world in terms of structures and processes.[1] I am suggesting that principles of dynamics be used and that in this way the relation of God to the world might be made out.

The considerations that go into my thinking at this point can be seen through the following. One of the implicit themes in the historical typology of conscience presented in Chapter 2 is that the Western tradition no longer has adequate conceptual means to take account of unity. The classical way of speaking of unity was in terms of substance or soul, for instance.[2] Hume, who has been so influential in the modern period, is unable to account for unity in general and the self in particular.[3] In short the rise of modernity has seemed to call into question all the classical ways of speaking of unity. This has resulted in a number of problems, in my judgment. I want to speak of just a couple. The difficulty of treating the problem of unity has resulted in the dismissal of the metaphysical effort as meaningless for a variety of reasons.[4] A popular account of metaphysics is that it is a misguided effort based on linguistic confusions of various sorts.[5] Metaphysics has been, if I understand it correctly, the effort to understand the unity of all the unities, or the character of the unity of the whole. This has been in my judgment the distinctive subject matter of philosophy. Thus in the modern situation we have the phenomenon of professional philosophers wondering if they have any content to their discipline other than its history.

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[1] _Supra_, pp. 15f, 20f. [2] _Supra_, pp. 33, 39. [3] _Supra_, p. 52.

[4] The most notable exceptions to this are the process philosophers and Catholic philosophers.

[5] See for instance Rudolf Carnap, _Logical Syntax of Language_ (New York: Humanities Press, 1937), p. 30.

Psychology is another discipline where the problem of unity has manifested itself. For many psychologists virtually dropped the concept of soul, self or ego altogether.[1] While some psychologists have moved toward re-introduction of the self in recent years, there is as yet no consensus, and the adequate ways of speaking of the self are few. It will be recalled that Allport advanced only general considerations toward the understanding of the self as knower.[2] He has, however, provided a way of speaking of the self as known.[3]

In this situation of a void in ways of speaking of unity that are adequate to the modern world, it is not surprising that theology has a problem of specifying the relation of God to the world. For if philosophy regards the effort to specify the unity of the whole as meaningless, then theology cannot avail itself of philosophers' models for speaking of God. Hence it has no way in which to specify the relation of God to man or the world, unless it performs this task itself.

The key assumption here is that God is the unity of unities or the comprehensive unity of the whole. This assumption might be challenged; but I do not know what could be substituted for it that either (1) would not do an injustice to the idea of God or (2) would not render it impossible to speak of God in terms of specifiable structures and processes of the world. I will proceed with the understanding that I am operating under this assumption of God as the unity of the whole.

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[1] Allport, Becoming, p. 36; "The Ego in Contemporary Psychology", Personality and Social Encounter, p. 71f.

[2] Supra, pp. 125, 149.

[3] Supra, p. 149.

Given my assumption about God, it immediately follows that the unity of God pervades all of the other unities. Assuming this, then it should be possible on the basis of this to generalize from the character of any of the unities of the world to the unity of the whole. For any form of unity should be revelatory in some sense of the more comprehensive unity of which it is a part. Classically the problem has been that unity was thought of in terms of static principles, to follow the analysis of Lehmann, or as has been seen in the historical section, in terms of unchangeableness as the fundamental character of the real. In our time as Lehmann reminds us dynamics or change has become dominant in understanding. For this reason it is impossible according to Lehmann to speak of God in terms of principles or in terms of the unity of the whole. Lehmann's vision in this regard seems to be something like the following. Philosophy's concern is with the essence of things. Given the power of evil in the world, it is impossible to penetrate to the rational essence of things. The truth of reality comes only as a gift from God. Thus the only way to participate in what is really going on in the world is to participate in the Koinonia. Within this Koinonia is revealed the true maturity and the true rootage or context of conscience. Outside this context conscience is subject to all the distortions of the evils of the world.

I have already indicated what I believe to be wrong with this view. Furthermore I have argued on the basis of Allport's thought that it is possible to speak of the unity of the whole in dynamic principles. Understanding God as the unity of the whole where that unity is always emergent, it is not difficult to see in terms of the presentation of the last chapter how the voice of conscience could be said to be the voice of God. It should also be clear how that voice might be distorted in various ways. Thus conscience understood in terms of modern psychology provides one way of specifying the point of connection between God and man.

The response of Lehmann to such a proposal would undoubtedly not be unlike that of Bonhoeffer who in his efforts to maintain the decisiveness of Jesus Christ wrote: "If conscience made a direct line of communication between man and God, it would circumvent God's self-obligation to the mediating Word, hence exclude Christ and the Church."[1] Lehmann does make substantially this response to the possibility of maturity apart from Jesus Christ.[2]

It is this kind of point that marks the difference between Schleiermacher and Lehmann. Schleiermacher attempted to set out the abstract character of the world with special reference to man and religion as the basis for making out the continuity between the Gospel and the world. In terms of the over-all thrust of Ethics in a Christian Context, Lehmann would regard Schleiermacher's theological efforts in much the same way as he would regard maturity or knowledge of God's will apart from Jesus Christ. These could not be possible without subverting the faith. In my judgment, had Lehmann pondered carefully his own analysis of Schleiermacher[3] he might have seen the validity of Schleiermacher's effort.

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[1] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Act and Being (London: Collins, 1962), p. 160.

[2] Supra, p. 24.

[3] Ethics in a Christian Context, p. 264f.

To round these remarks off I will simply note that the major problem in Schleiermacher does not appear to be his move from generality to particularity, from religion in general to Christianity in particular. Rather his problem lies in the fact that Schleiermacher worked with an understanding of the world as a unity in identity and difference. Stated otherwise, he worked with a principle of relativity. His problem arose in making out the relationship between God and the world and man. For he exempts one of the relata, God, from relationship by maintaining the absoluteness of God.[1] Thus while relationship to God is always asserted in Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, it is never actualized. Hence all the distinctive features of his dogmatics come from the world. Thus Barth is justified in his charge that Schleiermacher's theology is anthropology[2] or cultural theology[3]. The reason does not lie, however, in the fact that he began with the general, as Barth believes, but in his exemption of God from relativity. Hence with this understanding of the Schleiermacherian position as having subverted theology, it is understandable that theologians with this understanding should forego the effort to move from religion in general to Christianity in particular. Therefore they do not start with non-theological ideas of maturity, conscience, or man, but with these in terms of the Koinonia of Jesus Christ. But as has been pointed out, this leaves theological language in the position of talking to itself. Any relation it may have with the world is pure assertion on the part of theology. It may use non-theological disciplines in various ways, but it does not use them for substantive theological construction. This results, in my judgment, from the fact that these disciplines are looked upon as non-theological. This raises the question, however, of whether there are in the strict sense that is meant here any disciplines that are non-theological. The understanding that I am working under here in the relation of God to man is that there are no disciplines that are not a part of the on-going reality of God. Hence all disciplines have a theological dimension. The analysis of conscience has pointed to the theological dimension of conscience. I propose to indicate something of the possibilities of theological construction in terms of this analysis of conscience by reference to the doctrines of God and Christology.

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[1] For documentation of this see Gerhard Spiegler, The Eternal Covenant (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 166f.

[2] Church Dogmatics, Vol. 1, Part 2 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), p. 788f, 813.

[3] Theology and Church (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 198.

The general considerations for such construction are as follows. First, as already indicated, God is assumed to be the unity of the whole. Second, all determination is through some form of concreteness. There is no determination in the abstract. In reference to conscience this was seen in the learning principles of registration and identification particularly.[1] The point is that there is no conscience in the abstract except as a drive for unity. But such a drive always unifies in terms of some form of determination. There is a good deal that can be said about conscience in the abstract--for instance, that conscience is always shaped through concreteness. Third, the second consideration means that there are as many possible forms of theology as there are dominant images for the determination of conscience. In terms of this possibility the criteria for maturity may function as a basis for relative judgment of the value of different theologies. At the same time it must be remembered that all ideas of maturity are theoretical constructions which finally have their bases in concrete cases. Hence the concrete forms of maturity from different theological imagery may at the same time serve as a judgment against established forms of maturity.

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[1] _Supra_, p. 174f.

Some remarks are in place regarding the order of treatment of the doctrines of God and Christology. I have chosen to treat of Christology first because of the emphasis the above considerations give to particularity. The central focus of the Christian faith after all is Jesus Christ as being and exemplifying the redeeming work of God. Jesus Christ is the key to the Christian idea of God and not God the key to Christology for the Christian faith. On the other hand, the Old Testament and its experience of God is the presupposition of Christology.

The problematic involved here may be adequately parsed, I believe, in the following manner. All our ideas of unity and so of the unity of the whole arise from experience. Under the pressure of new experiences our ideas are sometimes reshaped. One way to look at the history of Israel is to see it as progressive development of the idea of God under the pressure of Israel's experience. Noteworthy in this history is the fact that it is the experience of suffering that appears to have been most decisive for reshaping the Israelites' understanding of God. I have in mind the two exiles, the experiences of Jeremiah, Hosea and the material from Job as well as a number of the Psalms. I take it that it is the conviction of the Christian community that Jesus

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Christ, including his crucifixion, represents the final and definitive occasion in this historical line of experience for the understanding of God. That is to say, in the reality of Jesus the historical figure, the early Christian community believed that it had experienced the deepest reality of God. How this is to be understood is of course a matter of some debate. In the material that follows I will make out what I believe can be said on this matter in terms of the principles for understanding conscience.

It is of course true that I am not starting exclusively with Jesus Christ and expanding from that point. The understanding of conscience herein worked out and the assumption with regard to God will structure the Christology. This, of course, has been the intention of the dissertation--that is, to be a constructive work. But the analysis to this point has indicated priority to the particular. Thus I start with the particular as required by the understanding developed herein. As the section on Christology develops, it will be shown how the material for Christology requires something like the assumption I have made in regard to God.

Christology

I do not pretend to do anything like a full treatment of the doctrine of Christology. I will only indicate something of the possibility for Christological construction on the basis of the understanding of conscience developed earlier. Additionally I will address myself specifically to a number of issues that have come up in the dissertation concerning Christology. The most important of these are the decisiveness of Jesus Christ for Christian faith and the world, and the relation of

Christian forms of maturity and conscience to non-Christian forms.

There is a basic datum that stands as the ground of Christology. This is the historical witness that lives have been transformed through encounter with Jesus and the story of his life, and that lives continue to be transformed in our own time through response to this story. I do not mean to suggest that only good has come in response to Jesus or that necessarily the good outweighs the ill that we are all so much aware of. I take it as axiomatic that every good has a like potential for evil. Self-consciousness, for instance, has been a great good but with it have come evils that never would have arisen without it. The problem relative to the transforming power of the Christian faith is that of understanding it so that it may be utilized maximally for the redemption of life. I suggest that the way to make out the decisiveness of Jesus Christ has its locus in the basic datum indicated at the beginning of this paragraph. I suggest further that the problem of making out this decisiveness is often obscured by viewing the problem in terms of its classical solution.

There were a good many factors that were taken into account in Christological councils of the early church. I will not attempt to do justice to all of these. I will simply set out a schema which I believe adequately sets out the understanding of classical Christology as it bears on my purposes. I want to focus on the problem of divinity in Christological formulation. When Christians faced the Greek intellectual world with its monotheism, they were naturally enough open to the charge of being polytheistic for worshipping both God and Jesus Christ. Any solution of course would also have to include the Holy Spirit, but Jesus

Christ created the major problem. To the extent to which the problem was solved, this was done with terms drawn from the Greek philosophical tradition. The whole matter is complicated in a number of ways, not the least of which is a language difference between Greek and Latin Christianity. The solution of the Latin church was "una substantia et tres personae", and that of the Eastern church was "treis hypostaseis, mia ousia". This solution seemed to preserve the unity and the distinctiveness that was considered necessary. Divinity was the substance in virtue of which God and Jesus Christ were one.

It is important to note that a great deal was at stake here. The Christian community had experienced new life through Jesus Christ and the witness to him. The question at issue was the validity or authenticity of this experience of salvation. If the experience was grounded in the ultimate, in the divine, then it would be valid. If the experience was not so grounded, then it might simply be regarded as an ephemeral thing. Therefore the validity of their salvation turned on the relation of Jesus to God. To say that Jesus is divine is to say that he is one with God with respect to substance.

The idea of substance has a long and complex history in Western thought. For my present purpose however I believe it is fair to say that it is that which underlies a thing and provides its permanent enduring unity. It is that about anything in terms of which its identity through time can be accounted for. As such it is unchangeable.[1] The notion of substance is but one manifestation of a larger phenomenon, that of a whole way of looking at the world which may be termed the substance mode of thought. According to this mode of thought, only that which is unchanging is real. This means that anything is what it is in and of itself in virtue of its underlying substance.[1] It follows immediately from this that the changing aspects of anything are simply accidents and not defining features of the thing. It is here that the traditional understanding of the necessity and decisiveness of Christ have their basis. On the substance mode of thought Christ is necessary because (1) there needs to be some connection between the two substances (manhood and divinity) for the renewal of the substance of man, i.e. for salvation to be possible or (2) such knowledge for salvation apart from God's action would be something that man possessed on his own. Clearly the tradition had various ways of making this out. The necessity of Christ arises from the need to renew the fallen substance of manhood or humanity, while the decisiveness of Jesus as the Christ is seen in the fact that in him this renewal is possible. As I understand Lehmann, his exclusivistic claims for the Christian version of maturity and the true rootage of conscience have their basis in this type of thinking. For if God is really beyond the world and the world is fallen, then some specific miraculous point of redemption is required.

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[1] Cf. Supra, p. 31f.

The language of substance and so of divinity does not accord well with modern thought. Such language is regarded as meaningless pieces of metaphysics.[2] But the important point is not the out-modedness or meaninglessness of substance language, but how this language functioned in the case of Jesus Christ. When this is seen as the point,

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[1] For some of the qualifications in this see Supra, p. 39.

[2] Supra, p. 190.

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the question of the divinity of Jesus Christ becomes: "Does Jesus Christ function redemptively?"--which is to say, does he open up creative possibilities for new life? But the affirmative answer is the basic datum with which we started; so our question must be how is this new life effected? What are the processes involved? How is it that Jesus Christ functions in this way?

The understanding of conscience worked out in the last chapter points to the fact that there is no conscience without concrete determination. Every conscience arises out of the person's unique integration of the data of his environment. There is no pure conscience prior to concrete determination. Conscience emerges in the developmental process. For the Christian, Jesus Christ must be the concrete determination of conscience. That is to say, his primary identification is derived from Jesus Christ. If this is not the case then he has no claim to being a Christian. How this works in terms of the problems I am concerned to touch on in Christology can only be taken up after the consideration of how Jesus is to be understood in terms of the understanding of personality developed by Allport.

According to the theory of personality worked out by Allport, there may be exceptional individuals, but they are not exceptions to the principles of development. For psychological purposes at least Allport has no use for transcendental, supernatural or mysterious-agent theories of the self. The selfhood of Jesus must have been like that of any other person--developing with respect to his own concrete situation in terms of the developmental processes of personality. Thus his personality must have been not only shaped by his Jewish background; it literally emerged from and in terms of his world. To be sure, his personality was his own unique response to the data. Concerning his actual development we know very little. In terms of the theory of Allport it would be understood that his identity or unity was drawn from response to others. I simply note for the moment how contrary this is to the classical conception where his identity or unity was in terms of his substance or the supposed unity of the two substances in him. Such shift constitutes an emphasis upon the changing accidents and has no place for an unchanging substance to this self. Hence the matter of setting out the decisiveness will necessarily be changed.

If we are to speak of the relation or unity of Jesus with God in terms of Allport's thought as developed herein, this will have to be in terms of God as the unity of the whole which serves as the ground of the lesser unities of the world.[1] The question however is a bit trickier than might be expected. For it would seem that we are not necessarily so much concerned with the personality of Jesus in relation with God as with the fact that he served as the occasion for the redemptive purposes of God. In this sense it does not make much difference how he thought of himself; whether or not he had a messianic consciousness does not matter. Indeed one might want to argue that one of the requirements for being a messianic figure is that one not make this claim for himself. Be that as it may, my point is simply that the response to him was not an incidental matter to his being a Christ. To be sure, on the substance mode of thought it would be incidental. Consider, for instance, if we would want to say anything special of him had Christianity developed into nothing more than a small Judaizing sect, as it started out to be in the minds of some at least, or indeed if no one had been transformed. The point that emerges from this in my judgment is that the Christhood of Jesus cannot be that of a private relationship between Jesus and God but that it must somehow be imbedded in the matrix of relationships that Jesus entered upon. In other words, the Christhood of Jesus is not simply a function of his personality but rather includes the past from which he emerged and the response of the community around him.

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[1] Supra, pp. 148, 179. See also supra, p. 191.

What can be said to have happened in the response to Jesus? In terms of the analysis set forth in this dissertation, what occurred was an expansion of consciousness so that the consciousnesses of those around him were more congruent with the real factors shaping life. It is this that releases increased psychic energies.[1] I have already indicated the conditions in virtue of which such might occur in terms of Allport's thought. The general conditions are those of the drive for unity which characterizes man and his fundamental sociality. The well-formed unity, that is, one basically congruent with creative factors of the unities of which it is a part, will have more energy at its disposal. This results simply from the fact that, all other things being equal, its energy is not diverted in extraneous ways to secure a loose unity.

Jesus functioned as the catalyst or occasion for this transformation. As such there must have been qualities about him which contributed to the bringing about of this transformation. I take it that the Gospels are fairly clear about this. I have in mind the rather consistent witness to Jesus as one who called into question many of the narrow sets of understandings of his day. Think for a moment of such incidents as his healing on the Sabbath,[1] his words against the scribes and Pharisees,[2] his acceptance of the unacceptable,[3] his reversal of who shall be first in the Kingdom.[4] Note how he extends the idea of who the neighbor is,[5] or how he pictures God's concern as quite broad and for "the least of these".[6] There is the consistent witness of his concern for virtually all people and his interpretation of God as love. He is one who directs people not so much to himself but to his Father in heaven.[7] Clearly his own life seems to have been centered around the coming of the Kingdom. These examples are illustrative, I maintain, not of minor or isolated aspects of the biblical picture of Jesus but of the central core of his ministry.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 183.

My point in citing this random group of features of the biblical portrayal of Jesus' ministry is to suggest that the emphasis upon the expansion of his followers' understandings of the scope and purposes of God was critical for the transformation that took place in their lives. I further suggest that it is this element which moves us when preaching does move us. I cite the case of an agnostic acquaintance of mine, a very learned man, who at the request of his children for an explanation of Christmas read one of the Gospels to them. He told me that the story moved him deeply and that if it were not for all the nonsense that goes with being a Christian he would become one. What he singled out were the kinds of things I noted in the above paragraph. These are the kinds of emphases that result, according to Allport's analysis, in the transformation of personality.

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[1] Mark 3:1-6; Matt. 12:9-14; Luke 6:6-11. [2] Matt. 23.

[3] Mark 2:15; Luke 7:36-50, 19:1-10; Mark 10:14; John 4:4-42.

[4] Matt. 20:20-28; Mark 9:25. [5] Luke 10:29-37.

[6] Luke 12:22-31; Matt. 18:10-14, 10:26-33, 25:31-46.

[7] Matt. 6:9-15; Luke 11:27-28.

In order to see this more in terms of Allport's developmental theory of personality, consider the emphasis upon the love of God, upon this world as God's world, upon the trustworthiness of God. There is the emphasis upon the extension of self where there appear to be no limits set. There is emphasis upon individual worth or self-esteem and love for others. All of this is combined in a unifying philosophy of life as response to what God is bringing about in the world. One could of course spell this out in much greater detail. I only want to indicate the possibility of doing so.

I suggest that the impact of such an emphasis is to open one up to what is going on in the world. I see this especially in the emphasis upon the scope of the love of God which means something about the scope of love that man should have. Stated in terms of Allport's theory of personality, one must be reasonably congruent with what is going on in the world to survive.[1] The more congruent one is with what is going on in terms of the fundamental direction of things, the richer will be one's sense of integration. The functional significance of Jesus, then, is that his figure in the Gospel story is one that puts emphasis upon attitudes and processes that are basic for developing maturity in personality.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 141 .

In this sense the figure himself must not have been altogether out of congruence with God, whatever the concreteness of his own self-identity might have been.

It should be clear that the understanding of Jesus functioning in the transformation of lives as worked out here is quite consistent with an understanding of Jesus in historical categories alone. There is no appeal to anything outside of history. It is the impact of the historical Jesus or rather the impact of the story of the man Jesus that I have fixed upon. He is understood as an historically conditioned person without remainder. I suggest that this understanding of Jesus in his redemptive function avoids the problem of trying to work in some transcendental reference to account for the redemptive function. It is the basic rationale for my assumption that God is the unity of the whole, rather than some "wholly other" beyond the structure and processes of the world that intervenes miraculously in these processes.

I want now to address myself to the problem of the relationship of God and Jesus. Classically this was understood in terms of participation in the same substance. This can still be maintained if God is the unity of the whole, for all things are in God and thus all things are potentially revelatory of God. Such a view however means that not just Jesus but all men are in God. This certainly follows, and it also follows that all men have the potentiality for functioning redemptively. That is to say, if God is the unity of the whole, and the drive within the whole for the integration of the many, then men may be the vehicles for this activity. Hence this raises the problem of the uniqueness or decisiveness of Jesus as the Christ.

This problem has come up in the work of Schubert M. Ogden in his analysis of Bultmann's thought and his proposed constructive effort to get around a problem he sees in Bultmann. To focus on the problem of decisiveness as it has come up in the contemporary discussion, I propose to look at Ogden's solution.

> . . .Bultmann's proposal. . .may be reduced to two fundamental propositions: (1) Christian faith is to be interpreted exhaustively and without remainder as man's original possibility of authentic historical (geschichtlich) existence as this is more or less adequately clarified and conceptualized by an appropriate philosophical analysis. (2) Christian faith is actually realizable, or is a "possibility in fact," only because of the particular historical (historisch) event Jesus of Nazareth, which is the originative event of the church and its distinctive word and sacraments.[1]

Ogden is right, I believe, that the two assertions held together result in "the self-contradictory assertion that Christian existence is a historical (geschichtlich) possibility open to man as such yet first becomes possible for him because of a particular historical (historisch) event."[2] Ogden proposes to get over the problem by affirming the first proposition and denying the second. "The specific possibility of faith in Jesus Christ is one and the same with a general ontological possibility belonging to man as such."[3] I submit that Ogden is open to the same criticism that I have suggested might be made of the position I have developed. Ogden's way of getting around this is seen in the following:

> It /the New Testament/ affirms. . .that in him /Jesus Christ/ what has always been possible now "becomes manifest," in the sense of being decisively presented in a human word of witness. . . .
> . . .The only ground of salvation the New Testament knows anything about is the primordial love of God, which is indeed deci-

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[1] Schubert M. Ogden, Christ Without Myth (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), pp. 111-112.

[2] Ibid., p. 117.

[3] Ibid., p. 140.

sively revealed in Jesus the Christ, but is by no means simply to be identified with him.[1]

But this appears no more than a simple assertion of the decisiveness. The question is, of what does this decisiveness consist?[2] As I understand the group Robinson reports on in A New Quest of the Historical Jesus, there is some dispute as to just when the "New Aeon" breaks in. Bultmann holds that the New Aeon breaks in with Easter, while his former students maintain that Jesus looks back to John the Baptist as the dawning of the New Age.[3] Robinson does not say so in so many words, but his critique of Ogden's Christ Without Myth leads one to think that for him the decisiveness of Jesus consisted in Jesus' ushering in of the New Age in his person and thereby making faith possible. But this is impossible for Ogden, for it would essentially reverse his position.

Ogden's critics appear to be more biblically oriented in their concern for the New Testament language of the New and Old Aeons. I believe such an approach to the problem only serves to obscure the issue, since for many there is a real problem as to the sense in which the Bible is authoritative. Nevertheless I think there is more to be said for Ogden's opponents than for Ogden's position on decisiveness. Both however obscure the problem, in my judgment, by thinking of decisiveness in the wrong way. I will now develop this point.

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[1] Ibid., p. 143.

[2] James M. Robinson puts this question to Ogden in The Union Seminary Quarterly Review (May 1962), p. 360.

[3] James M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus (London: SCM Press, 1959), pp. 17-19 and 115-121.

The position being developed in this dissertation is that of the fundamental place of concreteness for all determination. Ogden's position seems to ignore this. I suggest that the proper way to make out the decisiveness of Jesus Christ for faith is to think in terms of historical decisiveness. Ogden, I suggest, is thinking in terms of the kind of decisiveness where it was thought necessary for the two substances, divinity and manhood, to be brought together in Jesus Christ for salvation to be possible. That is to say, he thinks of decisiveness in ontological rather than in historical terms. Ogden clearly has gotten around the ontological problem of bringing the two substances together by his self-consciously working in terms of process philosophy.[1] In this way he has gotten over the classical requirement for decisiveness, and because he thinks in these terms about decisiveness he is unable to give any substance to his assertion of decisiveness. I suggest that what is lurking in the back of the minds of Ogden's critics is also that decisiveness be thought of in ontological terms.

By historical decisiveness I mean something like the following. Consider the development of the first automobile. That was a decisive event as things have turned out. But note that ontologically it was always possible. It had to wait until a number of other things had been developed before it could be an actual historical possibility. That is to say, historical possibilities must await their time. Our world is incurably historical. Shakespeare would not have been Shakespeare in any other century. He might still have been a great writer, but he would not have been Shakespeare as we know him.

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[1] Ogden, pp. 146f and 151.

I suggest that the decisiveness of Jesus as the Christ has just this kind of historical character. The time was right for such a new development in the idea of God.[1] The Jews were looking for a deliverer to come from God, and at least some understood Jesus to be that deliverer. His crucifixion meant the idea of God's salvation for man had to be rethought. Somehow it had to include the idea of a cross and suffering. Out of this emerges a new conception of the love of God, though to be sure this has often been twisted in many ways. My point is that somehow the cross had to be accommodated into the idea of God. This, I suggest, is the new emergent that marks the shift of the aeons. While suffering had characterized the experience of the Hebrews in their definitive moments in the development of their idea of God, the cross means that suffering must be taken up in a radical way into the idea of God. This marks a fundamental shift in the historical wrestling with the problem of God. But the decisiveness extends further. There would, as I indicated earlier, be no decisiveness without the experience of the community. The problem of integrating the cross into the idea of God affected the stream of history; had it not, there would have been no decisiveness to Jesus Christ.

To restate the matter, then, Jesus Christ is decisive for faith because through him a new experience of the meaning of God emerged in history through the necessity for integrating the cross into the idea of God. Because of the cross of Jesus Christ and the response of the community to the events of his life, he signifies something genuinely new in history and it is for this reason that the Christian community finds in him its center.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 196.

I do not suggest that the idea of suffering in relation to God could not have come up in any other way or at any other time. The point is that it did not come up in a form that made an historical impact except in relation to Jesus Christ.

I turn now to the problems of maturity and conscience within and outside of the Christian context. Lehmann, it will be recalled, indicated that there is something special about the Christian conception of maturity which secular conceptions could not have. I have contested that on the ground that there is a good deal of similarity between the two. Indeed I suggest that the Christian faith may come to an understanding of the processes of redemption through attention to what psychologists of the growth of personality are finding out about the structures and processes of maturity. The basic difference I find between maturity for the psychologists and for the Christian faith is that the Christian faith has a concrete determination for its understanding of maturity, whereas that of the psychologists is a theoretical understanding on the basis of concrete cases. The point of unity, to the extent to which there might be agreement, is that the Christian form of maturity has its abstract aspect. It does have structure. Earlier in this section I indicated something of the features of the biblical picture of Jesus that I believe important in the transforming power of his life. I suggest that the cross is the decisive feature in this transforming power. How this may be the case can be seen through the following considerations. The biblical picture of

Jesus is that of one who has centered his life on God and points others to God and expands their vision of God by calling into question their circumscribed views of things. His trust in God is such that he goes to the cross. In the cross he sacrifices himself to that which is ultimate. Thus there emerges the model for us to live wholly for that which is ultimate rather than for ourselves. I suggest that in this sense of giving himself up for the ultimate, for the fundamental direction of reality, the Christian faith may have the supreme imagery for maturity. In this context it should be reinforced that this understanding of maturity is not simply one of self-giving. For the imagery is that of the concern God has for each individual, thus enhancing his place in the world as one who receives and loves as God receives and loves. Recall the passage from Matt. 25:31-46 with its emphasis upon reception. "I was naked and you clothed me, I was sick and you visited me, I was in prison and you came unto me."

In this sense there may be something to Lehmann's claim that true maturity is known only in the Koinonia. But this is so not because the Christian knows something not otherwise accessible, but because of the imagery it has for maturity. Lehmann put the matter of the distinctiveness of the Christian understanding of maturity on the cognitive level. It is not so much proper knowledge that is necessary. That is to get back into the problem of the gap between principle and act which Lehmann seeks to overcome. Rather it is a problem of motivation; and the Christian claim, I should think, is that in Jesus Christ there are resources for dealing with this problem--resources to be sure that can be effectively channeled through the theoretical understanding of how maturity comes about.

I believe something like the same may be said for conscience. A good deal may be known about what goes into the formation of a mature conscience, but this does not necessarily produce a mature conscience. I do not want to say there is no mature conscience outside of the Christian faith. I only mean to say that the mature conscience requires adequate identifications and that these are not easy to come by. On the same basis that the Christian imagery might be regarded as supreme for maturity, so it may also be supreme for conscience. Yet, the church can profit well from the understanding and use of the psychologists' principles for the development of a mature conscience. For it is surely not the case that every Christian develops a mature conscience. Indeed it could be argued that the Church ignores altogether too much the critical factors in the development of maturity and conscience.

I want now to address myself to the problem of a criterion for faith. The basic criterion is that faith be expressible in the structures and processes of the world, which is something more than an assertion of continuity between faith and the world. The basis of the Christian faith is not some theoretical understanding that requires scholars with years of preparation, but is rather a transforming experience that marks a distinctive qualitative character of life. This character may be understood conceptually for any number of purposes. But the point is that it is the fundamental datum of faith and this was introduced, according to the Gospels, by Jesus Christ. His Christhood consists in his serving as the occasion for the new consciousness of God to emerge.

XUM

Before going on to the next section, I want to consider one problem that may have come to the reader's mind with respect to the emphasis here on concreteness and the ability to think in abstractions that Allport posits as a mark of maturity.[1] I do not believe there is any inconsistency here. For the qualities I have picked out from the biblical picture of Jesus are abstractions. What would be an immature identification would be an identification with his self-identity as that is made out in terms of the world of Jesus. Such would mean that essentially we would live as Jesus and the disciples lived. I suggest that this would be a narrowing of the self rather than an expansion of the self. Abstraction is necessary to bring out the salient points so as not to become lost in the irrelevant. On the other hand, the concreteness of the determination has more to do with what I have spoken of earlier as the affective tone of the unity of personality and the processes of maturity.

I believe it should be clear from what I have developed as the decisiveness of Jesus as the Christ that it is crucial to do one's Christology before the doctrine of God. For Jesus as the Christ introduced a new stage in man's consciousness of God. Without holding this firmly in view, this point could be blunted by the way one works out his doctrine of God.

Doctrine of God

In this section I will make explicit some of what I regard as the features of a doctrine of God that are implicit in the understanding of conscience already worked out. I have two basic purposes in mind. The first is to give particular attention to the sense in which God may be said to be the voice of conscience. The second is to show that the criterion of continuity with the world is met with respect to the Christian experience of God. In the last section I indicated how the event of Jesus as the Christ is central for understanding the Christian doctrine of God. This results from the necessity posed by the crucifixion to integrate the cross into the idea of God, which means that Jesus as the Christ reveals God in some sense as suffering love. This is the major symbol for the Christian experience of God. I suggest that such symbolism can be understood as coherent with the structures and processes of my extension of Allport's thought, and that such coherence constitutes the fulfillment of my requirement for criteria. The point of connection between these two purposes is that Jesus Christ serves to open one to the voice of conscience, or God, in his own situation.

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[1] Supra, p. 159.

The basic assumption I have made with respect to God is that he is the unity of the whole.[1] I understand this assumption as an extension of Allport's understanding of the development of personality. The sense of others emerges before the sense of self.[2] This means then that for the emergence of an adequate sense of the unity of self, the child must have relatively unified surroundings. As noted earlier, the unity of personality is always emergent. It results from the integration of the many, of the data of its world of experience, into a new unity.[3] Just as personality is always growing, so God must also be growing in order to preserve his unity. God must be regarded as an open system just as personality is regarded as an open system for Allport.[1] As previously noted, Allport holds that personality "is an aggregate within an aggregate, a structure with, and constituting a part of, a larger structure."[2] For Allport the larger system requires the smaller and the smaller requires the larger. Neither could exist long without the other.[3] The central difference between the unity of the whole and personality is that the latter is a regional unity whereas the former is the comprehensive unity of the whole. Despite this difference it is legitimate to say that the whole must be characterized, as personality is, as the continual process of differentiation and integration.[4]

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[1] *Supra*, p. 191. [2] *Supra*, p. 148. [3] *Supra*, p. 104f.

It appears to me that one of the requirements for the preservation of the world, the whole or God, must be something like "maturity" of the whole. That is to say, the integration of the many must be a sufficiently realistic integration to preserve the whole as well as for the release of energy in the system.[5] To the extent that the whole is unrealistically integrated, its energies will be dissipated in trying to deal with the problems of unrealistic integration. In this way the total system suffers. The requirement of realistic integration means that the whole or God must foster the enrichment of experience. By enrichment I mean the increase of differentiation and integration over time. This is to be understood in terms of the total system. The enrichment clearly could not mean every possible actuality, as there is required a large base of relative stability to allow for the increase of differentiation and integration. Personality requires for instance a high degree of stability of its biological organism. I speak of the increased differentiation and integration as enrichment of the unity of the self or the whole because such expansion makes more options for action available to the self or the whole.[1] Thus the direction, the intention of the whole must be for the enrichment of experience generally as well as for the enrichment of its own unity.

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[1] _Supra_, p. 149; see also Allport's article, "The Open System in Personality" in _Personality and Social Encounter_, pp. 39-53.

[2] _Supra_, p. 99. [3] _Supra_, p. 99. [4] _Supra_, p. 104.

[5] Cf. _supra_, pp. 141 and 183.

I come back now to the central difference between the unity of personality and the unity of the whole. Personality has the option of rejecting data in varying degrees. It is difficult to see how this could be the case with the unity of the whole. For there is by definition nothing outside the whole. (That is to say, there is nothing except the future. I will come to this in a moment.) There is nowhere for anything rejected to be placed outside of the whole. The only alternative is to integrate everything into the whole in the most realistic fashion. I take it that this is only another way of making out the import of Allport's fundamental assumption of sociality with respect to the whole. The integration of everything means that the past continues to function causally even though the lesser systems may largely ignore various aspects of the past. It might be worth observing here that the sustaining ground of the whole is really the causal efficacy of the past. The cosmos presents a vast ordered system that likely would suffer little or no loss in its stability should a solar system or so be destroyed.[1]

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[1] *Supra*, p. 159.

I will now try to make out a bit more precisely the nature of the unity of the whole as I see this from the structure of Allport's thought. In one sense there is no difference between God, the world and the whole as I have used these terms. The important point to note is that of unity. God is not simply the world or the whole: he is the unity of such. Thus God is not to be thought of, in terms of Allport's thought, as another thing or even the world as such but as the all-pervasive unity of the world. The character of this unity is that it grows as the world grows so that the unity is not static but always a new emergent from the past actual world.

I suggest one way of thinking about God on this model is to think of God as the structure of intentionality of the world. This corresponds to the way I suggested Allport's theory leads one to think of the empirical self.[2] In terms of this understanding, then, one knows God in knowing the unity of the world where unity is meant to include the direction of the world. But in knowing God in this way one only knows God as he is no more. On the other hand, the past presents the possibilities for the future.

On the basis of Allport's thought it follows that God's characteristic direction is that of a drive for the enrichment of experience. Earlier I suggested that the best way to think of the self as knower/intender is in the open spaces of personality, and that the moment that it is no longer a "not yet" it becomes integrated into the empirical self.[1] I suggest that to speak of the activity of God is to speak of the drive for unity within the world, with the appropriate drive for increase of integration. This would mean that God is to be thought of as the structure of intentionality and the processes of creative transformation operative in the world. As such he is everywhere. He suffers when we suffer because our sufferings literally are God's sufferings; that is, our loss is a loss of the whole and must make some difference to the way the whole is unified.

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[1] I do not mean to say that there is no real loss. The basis for preservation is in terms of the natural processes of the world. We know that loss occurs, that individuals, if not civilizations, of the past have been lost to the movement of time. But in their time they had to be integrated. In the passage of time they have been lost.

[2] *Supra*, p. 149.

I have said that God can be known in terms of the structure of intentionality within the world.[2] In this sense it is conceivable that all disciplines can tell us something about God. On the other hand, God is acting in the world for a realistic enrichment of experience. This aspect of God is always indeterminate. This integrative work of God pervades the world on its open edge, and in self-directive systems like man this activity is experienced as the voice of conscience. The earlier analysis had shown how this voice may be distorted through inadequate development of the processes which make for mature self-direction. In respect to this problem it should be the function of some major institution of society to give attention to proper development of the self.[1] In this sense then the primary occupation of religion should be with the processes that make for ego-identity and secondarily with the problem of self-identity, though clearly these are not that separable. The major problem in many churches, however, is that they are more concerned with their particular version of self-identity than with the processes that make for stronger ego-identity in the sense in which I have used these terms.[2]

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[1] Supra, p. 150f.

[2] I suggest that one way to begin to spell out this intentionality is the ethical program of Troeltsch that I outlined earlier (supra, pp. 70-75). It would need to be modified somewhat because of the shift in the understanding of unity and God. But his basic program is consonant with the approach outlined here.

For my present purposes, what is seen here with respect to the proper determination of conscience is that this is served through the Christian proclamation of Jesus as the Christ. The redeeming work of God is his ever-present effort to effect new creative syntheses in life. One is not condemned to his past for there is an open edge to the world, to God, to personality which means that one may find new life if the transforming work of God can be released in that life.

This redeeming work has been served in many ways in the past; but the image of God, the ultimate reality, as one who is concerned for man to the extent that he would give his son for man is surely imagery that has set the process of redemption loose in many a life where self-esteem and identity had been lacking. Likewise the passages cited earlier from the biblical portrayal of Jesus as one who questioned the appropriateness of customary views has functioned for many of us to expand our horizons.

I suggest that the view of God elaborated above can serve to integrate the cross into the idea of God. The fundamental character of sociality as applying to God as the whole is one abstract way of making out the meaning of the cross for the life of God. The theoretical understanding of God worked out above means that he integrates not only our joy but also our sorrows, our sufferings and the evils of the world.

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[1] Erik Erikson makes something like this suggestion with respect to religious institutions which he believes have responsibility for fostering a sense of trust. (Identity and the Life Cycle, p. 64f.)

[2] Supra, p. 140.

Lehmann argues that we must not attempt to understand God in terms of concepts and principles, for this very process distorts God and really does no more than create an idol.[1] To understand God in these terms is to confine him to the static categories of our own minds, according to Lehmann. If such an understanding of God were true, it would mean that God would always do the same thing. Thus the dynamics of God or the transcending quality of God would be missing.

The alternative I have proposed on the basis of the view of conscience worked out on Allport's terms leaves plenty of room for the dynamics of God. Indeed it is at its center a dynamic view, based upon the intuition that the world is fundamentally a process of differentiation and integration. God is continually transcending the past actual world in his drive for a richer integration of the world. Hence to respond appropriately, man must likewise be expanding his understanding and experience. To use the biblical language, putting off the old man is a continual process and not a once-and-for-all affair. The extent to which one might be right in saying it is a once-and-for-all affair would have to do with the transformation to a positive ego-identity.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 15.

In conclusion, I submit that I have indicated how a doctrine of God might be developed from dynamic principles drawn from the dynamic psychology of growth of Allport. I have done this with reference to conscience and the Christian experience of God in the event of Jesus as the Christ. I have indicated how the doctrine of God worked out on dynamic principles can contribute to giving specificity to what God is doing in the world. The indicated possibility of specification in terms of the structures of the world to the nature and activity of God constitutes my requirement for criteria.

Conclusion

In the dissertation I have attempted to indicate how the continuity between the Christian faith and the world can be made out in such a way that the integrity of each can be preserved. The concrete imagery of the Christian experience provides identifications that can be creatively transforming of life. The psychologists of growth provide theoretical understandings by which such transforming resources can be effectively appropriated. The unity of these approaches is seen in the doctrine of God and Christology in their relation to conscience.

The connection I propose between God and man in respect to conscience reflects the fundamental character of the world as one of growth or becoming. Because such is the character of the world, the ethical dimension is elevated to paramount importance. There is always the question of the most realistic integration to be striven for. God as the redeemer is the creative process at work in the world, attempting to effect the most creative integration possible under the circumstances. He respects, however, the relative autonomy of man. Why the world is this way I cannot say. It means however that man participates in the creative work of God. It is for this reason that I suggest that there is a substantive relation between theology and theological ethics. On the basis of the present work I suggest that one way of making out this relation and setting forth another model for theological construction is the following. The distinctive focus of theology would be upon the resources of the Christian faith set out in a systematic manner for the development and maintenance of the processes which make for mature ego-identity. The distinctive focus of theological ethics would be upon the creative activity of God in the world, and so upon our response to this, to wit, self-identity. Clearly ego-identity and self-identity must go hand-in-hand. I suggest that this is not in any sense a radical proposition. If I understand what has taken place in the Church' worship, it has been concerned with the process of ego-identity, but has too often merged these with a self-identity from the past. Making the distinction between the two in respect to theology indicates, I submit, how the ethical dimension constitutes an important basis for constructive theological work in our time.

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